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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the modern view of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), the principle of proportionality 
is seen as progressing from a condition of neglect in the 1990s1 to a resurgence in interest 
following the Vietnam War.2 Within this context, the research question asks whether or not  
proportionality is being constrained by the deployment of precision weapons. This does not 
mean that the text defining the meaning of proportionality is challenged, on the contrary, it 
is in the assessment and application of the text within the particular circumstances of 
operational missions, that misunderstandings arise and debates as to meanings are revealed.3 
The links between proportionality and the aspect of “precision” in precision 
weapons4 underpins the commentary of the three case-studies, thus, addressing the structure 
of the thesis, a rigid framework was necessary for containing these assessments, and the use 
of three case studies provided a simple solution. There are many types of case studies, and 
the type selected utilizes the facts of each individual study according to a format chosen by 
the writer as a concrete framework upon which to illustrate the facts of each particular case 
(these being the wars in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan). 
The second major issue of this thesis, the rapid expansion of precision weapons, is 
illustrated with facts drawn from the conflicts in these three conflicts. The historical tracking 
of these conflicts, from 1999 to 2012 has the added advantage of being fresh in the minds of 
readers, and where in some instances, e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq, the military presence 
continues to the present day. 
Central to the structure of the thesis is the temporal triangle, both in diagrammatic 
form and the written text. It provides the details of the working environment of both 
proportionality and precision weapons, and is illustrated in the diagrams of the “Temporal 
Triangle” at the end of each study chapter. The moving bar within each triangle demonstrates 
how the increasing speed of precision weapons is constraining the decreasing environment 
of proportionality, thus supporting the thesis claim regarding this constraint. 
There are however, several areas where progress is lacking. It is proposed that the 
widespread lack of State Practice is a serious matter, resolvable only if the majority of world 
                                                          
1 JG Gardam ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’ (1993) 87 AJIL 391-412. 
2 W Hays Parks ‘Air War and Air Law’ (1990) The Air Force Law Revue. 
3 The issue of semantic vagueness and ambiguity is prevalent throughout the whole field of proportionality, 
both military and academic. 
4 J Sine ‘Defining the “Precision Weapon” in effects-based terms’ ( March 2006)  Air & Space  Power  
Journal 1,7  www.thefreelibrary.com/-/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=154817984 
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States publicly declare their positions, on for example the principle of proportionality, thus 
enabling patterns of State behaviour on the battlefield to gradually emerge. One example 
being Argentina; “the use of weapons, projectiles or material which can cause unnecessary 
suffering” is especially prohibited. It adds that ”the projectiles and weapons covered by this 
prohibition shall be determined solely by the common practice of States to refrain from using 
certain means of warfare in recognition that they in fact cause such suffering.”5 In addition, 
many authors call for a single clear definition of proportionality6 which would benefit both 
the military and the general public alike. Further, the world media is responsible for a major 
misunderstanding of proportionality, disseminating the idea that its main function is the 
prevention of collateral damage, whereas it is in fact the attainment of the military advantage. 
This area was of interest due to a recognition of the fact that additional research into   
the principle of proportionality in the LOAC was desirable, that there was increasing debate 
in the subject between both academics and the military,7  and that the three recent conflicts 
provided sufficient factual material for such a study. 
In sum, it is proposed that the modern, post-Kosovo principle of proportionality is in 
danger from two scenarios; first, of being totally constrained by the progressive deployment 
of precision weapons, and second, of being annihilated by the actions of non-State actors in 
the on-going conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The literary review is sparse; there being only two 
books specific to proportionality, however an ever increasing body of journal articles is 
building an impressive body of modern knowledge of the proportionality matrix. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Argentina – Law of War Manual (1969) § 1.008(1). In ICRC – www.icrc.org/customary- 
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule14 
6 There is no specific definition of the principle of proportionality in the humanitarian conventions but it 
possesses two properties: firstly the proportionality of means, is found in AP/I Art. 51.5(b) : “an attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated” is a proportionality violation; and secondly, proportionality of methods, in AP/I Art. 57.2.(b) where 
“an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or … 
that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated”. The first refers to assessment before the attack, the second, to assessment during the 
attack. 
7 M Newton and L May Proportionality in International law (OUP Oxford 2014); Y Dinstein The Conduct of 
Hostilities under the Law of Armed Conflict (CUP Cambridge 2004); MN Schmitt ‘21st Century Conflict: Can 
the Law Survive?’ (2007) Melbourne Journal of International Law; CJ Dunlap Jr ‘Clever or Clueless? 
Observations about Bombing Norm Debates’ in The American Way of Bombing: Changing Ethical and Legal 
Norms, from Flying Fortresses to Drones. ed. M. Evangelista and Henry Shue (Cornell University Press 2014) 
114; Hays Parks above n2. 
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Chapter One: Theoretical Background of Proportionality in the Law of Armed Conflict 
Newton and May define proportionality as ‘the rule that limits the severity of lethal force so 
that it is only properly employed in a way that is commensurate with the goal to be 
achieved’.8 The fundamental purpose of the principle is to align, insofar as possible, the scale 
and intensity of the force employed with that required for the achievement of the military 
objective. Nevertheless, the fact that they are concerned with such subjective concepts as 
values and weights9 leads one commentator to observe: ‘As yet, an explicit and detailed set 
of norms for the operation of the principle is lacking.’10  
Definition of the principle of proportionality has long been a contested area11 but the 
literature agrees that the rationale of the principle is to “… [balance] the expected collateral 
                                                          
8 A Clapham and P Gaeta eds The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP Oxford 
2015); E David Chapter 14 ‘International and non-International Armed Conflicts’ in A Clapham and P Gaeta 
eds The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP Oxford 2015): D Fleck ed  The 
Handbook of International Humanitarian Law  (3rd ed  OUP Oxford 2013); HPCR Manual On International 
Law Applicable To Air And Missile Warfare  (CUP Cambridge 2013; D Saxon ed  International Humanitarian 
Law and the Changing Technology of  War (Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers  Dordrecht  2013); D Backstrom and 
I Henderson  ‘New Capabilities in Warfare: an overview of contemporary technological developments and the 
associated legal and engineering issues in Article 36 weapons reviews’. (Summer 2012)  94 International 
Review of the Red Cross 886;  D Harris Cases and Materials on International Law (7th ed  Sweet and Maxwell 
London 2010):  JD Wright ‘ “Excessive” ambiguity: analysing and refining the proportionality standard’ (2012) 
International Review of the Red Cross 819 -  854; F Kalshoven and L Zegfeld  Constraints on the Waging of 
War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law  (4th ed CUP  Cambridge 2011); S Vité  ‘Typology 
of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations’ (March 2009) 91 
IRRC 873;  JB Bellinger III and WJ Haynes II  ‘A US government response to the International Committee of 
the Red Cross study Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2007)  89 IRRC 866; E Wilmshurst and S 
Breau eds  Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law  (CUP Cambridge 
2007; D Turns ‘Weapons in the ICRC Study on International humanitarian law’ (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 2  201-237; J-M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian 
Law Volume 1 Rules ICRC (The Study)  (CUP Cambridge 2005); WA Schabas An Introduction to the 
International Criminal Court (4th ed Cambridge CUP 2001);  APV Rogers  Law on the Battlefield  (2nd ed  
Juris Publishing  Manchester University Press  1996); Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons  Advisory 
Opinion 1996. I.C.J.  p 266.; JG Gardam Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Dordrecht 1993); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases ( Federal Republic of 
Germany v Denmark and The Netherlands) Judgement. I.C.J. Reports [1969] 44 at 77; Asylum case (Columbia 
v Peru) I.C.J. Rep. 1950 p266. 
  9  Newton and May above n7 18.    
  10 Gardam above n1 26. 
  11 Newton and May above n7 15-16.  
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damage against a military advantage.”12 As a model for civilian protection, proportionality 
does not operate in isolation but rather interacts with other principles and rules (e.g. – 
distinction and command responsibility) to fulfil this rationale. Whilst it may appear at first 
glance that the principle of proportionality is burdensome and unworkable, it has developed 
over the course of time into a practicable system of civilian protection in tandem with 
military necessity.13 
 Conceptualisation of these issues concerning meaning and purpose is eased when they 
are considered in relation to the use of weapons during specific missions. In these situations, 
the concept of proportionality is ‘boxed in’ factual boundaries with the details of the mission 
providing the evidence which the texts of the existing treaties cannot provide, themselves 
being nebulous. As the scholarship has observed,14 weaponry continues to develop in 
technological sophistication, enabling commanders to attack targets remotely with ever-
diminishing temporal spaces between targeting, decision and deployment.  
Consequently, the temporal matrix for proportionality is becoming increasingly 
constrained. The use of weaponry involves the authority and skill of the military commander 
in control of the mission under way at a specific point in time; his obligations to both civilians 
and to own side forces are integral with the ongoing mission and are of increasing interest 
with the deployment of semi-automated vehicles (‘drones’). The issues raised by drones in 
connection with the principle of proportionality permeate in particular the last two chapters 
of this work, where consideration is given to the question of the role of proportionality in the 
future in the increasing advance of what is termed the ‘new wars and the new laws’.15 
This chapter will first outline the historical development of the principle of 
proportionality, particularly the enactment of the key treaty provisions, in order to explain 
the legal context in which these developments in military technology and tactics are taking 
place. Second, it will examine the key problem of the status of proportionality in customary 
                                                          
12 Dinstein above n7 52; WA Solf ‘Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary 
International Law And Under Protocol I’ (1986) Am.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 1:117; JD Reynolds ‘Collateral 
Damage on the 21st century battlefield: enemy exploitation of the law of armed conflict, and the struggle for a 
moral high ground’ (2005) Air Force Law Review 1-83.  
13 Fleck ed above n8 34; Dinstein above n7 52; Solf above n12 1:117; Reynolds above n12 1- 83; Rogers above 
n8 21. 
14 Saxon ed above n8; HPCR above n8; Turns  above n8 201-237; G Marchant et al “International 
Governance of Autonomous Military Robots” Science and Technology Law Review (2011) X11 272-315; 
http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=12&article=7. 
15 N Lamp ‘Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The “New War” Challenge in International 
Humanitarian Law’ 225-262; JD Ohlin ‘Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?’ (2013) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 11 27-45; PR Cuccia ‘Op-Ed: The Technology Avalanche and the Future of War’ (January 9th 2012)   
http://strategicstudiesinstitutearmy.mil/index.cfm/articles/Technology-Avalanche-and-the-Future-of-
War/2012/9/15 accessed 22.02.2012. 
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international law with reference to the evidentiary threshold for custom and the evidentiary 
assessment of Rule 14 of the International Committee of the Red Cross handbook on 
international humanitarian law with particular reference to the textual differences between 
Additional Protocol I (API)16 to the Geneva Conventions and the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court 1998. Third, it will analyse the applicability of proportionality to non-
ratifying States through customary international law.17 Finally, it will introduce the 
theoretical matrix (the ‘temporal triangle of decision-making’) that this thesis proposes for 
the temporal evaluation of proportionality to conceptualise the operation of proportionality 
in relation to time. 
1.1 The historical development of proportionality 
Although the conceptual origins of proportionality in the jus in bello can be traced to jurists 
and military philosophers of the nineteenth century (e.g. - The Lieber Code),18 it was not 
until API that it was given legal expression. As Rogers explains: ‘The rule of proportionality 
seems to have achieved widespread acceptance since the 1970s, when there was a 
determination to avoid the excesses of the Second World War, but there remain differences 
about the precise formulation of the rule under customary law.’19 The advent of the two 
Protocols had reduced the distinction between the Hague and the Geneva treaties,20 and 
referring to these two treaties, the ICJ was to later observe: 
‘These two branches of the law applicable in armed conflict have become so closely 
interrelated that they are considered to have gradually formed one single complex 
system, known today as international humanitarian law. The provisions of the 
Additional Protocols of 1977 give expression and attest to the unity and complexity 
of that law.’21  
 Following the Second World War, there was considerable interest in determining the 
various balances to be struck between the duty of commanders to achieve required military 
                                                          
16 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts ofs 8 June 1977 eif December 1978 1125 UNTS 3:   Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977; Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187, UNTS  90. Rome Statute 
adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998;  
17 F Kalshoven ‘From International Humanitarian Law to International Criminal Law’ (2003) 3 Chinese JIL   
151, 155. 
18 Lieber Code: Instructions for the armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, 24 April 
1863.                  
19 Rogers above n7; Kalshoven above n17 151, 155. 
  20 Dinstein above n7 13. 
  21 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226 at 256. 
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aims and the requirements of protecting civilians.22 At this time an ICRC report to the 
Conference of Government Experts in 1971 concluded that ‘the need for precautions in 
attack “has been affirmed by publicists for a long time, but without being expressed in a very 
precise manner in the provisions of international law in force.”’23 Responding to such 
concerns in addressing the duties of the commander, API Articles 57 and 58 outline these in 
relation to the principle of proportionality.24 In addition, API addresses the expanded the 
scope of criminal responsibility for any ‘grave breach’ of the provision – a movement which 
was to have implications for the Rome Statute.25  
 The scholarship agrees that there is a ‘core of proportionality’ which has existed for 
as long as the principle itself, which gives stability to the elusive idea of the phenomenon of 
LOAC proportionality through the use of clear thresholds.26 These five thresholds are: ‘(1) 
for war or armed conflict;27 (2) for the special case of self-defence during war and in other 
contexts: (3) for emergency situations, such as terrorist attacks, and for other hostile acts 
committed by non-State actors against States; (4) for the pre-emption of hostilities and the 
accompanying erosion of human rights and safety; and (5) for areas where States exercise a 
very high degree of control over the population, such as during occupation or relief 
operations in the wake of natural disasters’.28 For the purpose of this study, only the first 
threshold is relevant. 
A gradual move by international lawyers towards codifying proportionality was 
furthered by the controversies concerning US actions (e.g. – the use of napalm and other 
‘scorched earth’ tactics) in the Vietnam War.29 It was commonly held that existing treaty 
norms were failing to provide the guidance needed by commanders,30 however, ‘the 
American military review concluded that even if the provisions of Protocol I had been in 
                                                          
22 MW Stephens and D Lewis ‘The Law of Armed Conflict - A Contemporary Critique’ (2005)  Melbourne           
Journal of International Law 13-42;  P Gaeta ‘War Crimes and other “core” crimes in IHL’ in Clapham and     
Gaeta eds above n7 750-751. 
23 ICRC, ‘Protection of the Civilian Population against the Dangers of Hostilities, Report No. 3 to the   
Conference of Government Experts (Geneva, ICRC, 1971), at 75; Rogers above n8 135. 
24 For example, Article 57(2)(a) provides that those planning or deciding upon an attack shall “do everything 
feasible to verify that the objects to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to 
special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52.” 
25 Newton and May above n7 111.  
26 Newton and May above n7 283 - 299.  
27 Vité above n8 69, 72. 
28 Newton and May above n7 5. 
29 BL Brown ‘The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law of Warfare: Recent Efforts at 
Codification’   (1976-1977) Cornell Int’l LJ  141, 143;  D Fidler above n28 in D Saxon ‘The misapplication of 
military technologies in Vietnam stimulated efforts to develop IHL for non-international conflicts that produced 
Additional Protocol II in 1977.’ 318; ‘Napalm; a highly incendiary jellylike substance used in firebombs, flame-
throwers, etc.’ http://dictionary.ref.com/browse/napalm?s=t   accessed 24.09.2015. 
30 Hays Parks above n2 175-177; Reynolds above n12 1-83. 
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effect during the Vietnam War, for tactical, ideological and technical reasons they would 
have been of no value.’31 In 1972, in response to a letter from Senator Edward Kennedy, the 
General Counsel’s memorandum laid out the US military position on collateral damage and 
distinction, nonetheless, with a warning against ‘… attempts to limit the effects of attacks in 
an unreasonable manner.’ This fuelled opposition to the ratification of AP I from within the 
US military and its lawyers.32  
Although the controversies surrounding the Vietnam War were the catalyst for the 
adoption of API, there were also examples of restraint exercised by the US military, 
particularly in the use of precision weapons in the form of laser-guided bombs when 
targeting points of high strategic importance such as dams and hydro-electric stations.33 
Proportionality was linked to allied rules on targeting and forms part of the rules aimed at 
limiting so-called ‘collateral damage’ (i.e. – loss of civilian life and property emanating from 
attacks on military targets). However there remains a high level of disagreement between 
both civilian and military experts as to its effectiveness in application.34 This debate varies 
from the extreme proposition that proportionality can be dispensed with altogether35  to the 
other extreme which values it so highly that it be elevated to the ranks of the jus cogens.36  
 1.1.1  The proportionality rule in Additional Protocol I 
A major development in the law of armed conflict was the adoption in 1977 of two Protocols 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.37 Under the heading of international 
humanitarian law, API to the GC 1949 was the first legal document to formulate a modern 
concept of the traditional international law of war, limiting the application of lethal force to 
those directly involved in the hostilities. Several of the rules of API (e.g. - distinction) have 
their roots in long standing laws and customs of war and, as such, are recognised across 
many different cultures.38 
                                                          
  31 Hays Parks above n2 1, 107. 
  32 Hays Parks n2 22. 
  33 Rogers above n8 22. 
34 Cannizzaro above n8 notes that critics have ‘tended to highlight its inherent indeterminacy and the subjective 
character of its assessment.’ 332 - 352.  
  35 J Keiler ‘The End of Proportionality’ (2009) Parameters 53 - 64.  
36 Fleck above n8 38; Newton and  May above n7 39, describing how this norm is also used in many legal 
situations; Dinstein above n7, addressing the law of treaties, where a conflict between a treaty and a peremptory 
norm of international law, called jus cogens causes the treaty to become void, and further, at 24 the crime of 
torture was declared jus cogens  by the Trial Chamber in the Furundzija  case. ICTY Trial Chamber, Prosecutor 
v Furundzija, Judgement (1998), Case IT-95-17/1, 121; Judge Schwebel and Judge Shahabuddeen above n1 
Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons case.  
37 UK Ministry of Defence The Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict (OUP Oxord 2005) 1.33 15.  (The UK 
gave effect to these Protocols by the GC Amendments Act, 1995 eif 28 July 1998). 
  38 Fleck above n8 123 and 401. 
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 The traditional starting-point for the principle of proportionality is Article 51(5)(b) of 
API which provides: ‘an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that 
the objective is not a military one or … that the attack may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated’. While Article 51(5)(b) of API was based upon nascent State practice (e.g. – at 
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals in 194639 and particularly the controversies in the Vietnam 
War preceding the entry into force of API, it was essentially a provision of progressive 
development at the time that was intended to gain its authority from wide participation in 
API.40 At the CDDH, ‘France voted against Article 51, believing that paragraph 5, by its 
very complexity would seriously hamper the conduct of defensive military operations against 
an invader and prejudice the inherent right of legitimate defence.’41 Upon ratification of API, 
however, France did not enter a reservation to this provision.  
According to the ICRC, as of 26 August 2015 there are 174 parties to AP I and 2 signatories 
out of 193 UN members,42 being one of the highest levels of treaty participation in existence, 
which is a significant factor in the evaluation of its status in customary international law. 
 The Serbia (Kosovo) conflict of 1998 was the first international armed conflict in 
which the legal effects of API were directly applicable.43 As a treaty, API applied not only 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the NATO Member States also party 
to API (e.g. the UK) but it was also argued that the customary status of many of its provisions 
rendered them applicable to non-parties to API as well.44 API is the convention containing 
the majority of targeting rules; however, several States (e.g. – Israel, Iran, Pakistan, India, 
Turkey, the USA) remain non-parties to it with the USA claiming that it relies upon the rules 
of customary international law.45 This is significant for two potential reasons: 1) that the 
customary rule is not the text of Article 51(5)(b); or 2) the customary rule is that of Article 
51(5)(b) but the non-parties may be ‘persistent objectors’ to it. As Cryer notes that it is now 
indisputable that API is now custom.46 
                                                          
  39 Dinstein above n7 229. 
40 Schabas above n8 125. 
  41 The Study above n8 46. 
  42 See the UN Treaty Collection online database at:www.treaties.un.org/Pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1. 
  43 Fleck above n8 28. 
44 Schabas above n8 494; for further commentary; A Cassese above n7 Commentary on the Rome Statute. 8. 
45 Schmitt above n7 ‘The law of targeting’ in Saxon 132.     
46 R Cryer ‘Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel: The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals 
on the ICRC Customary Law Study’ (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 2   239, 258.  
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1.1.3  Rome Statute47 
The Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 (‘Rome Statute’) entered into force on 
1 July 2002 and as of 26 August 2015 has 123 parties and 16 signatories. The fundamental 
purpose of the Rome Statute is to provide a legal structure enabling the ICC to investigate 
and prosecute individuals suspected of having committed the most serious international 
crimes, namely: 1) aggression;48 2) genocide; 3) war crimes; and 4) crimes against humanity. 
To date, there have been no trials at the ICC in which a defendant has been charged with the 
war crime of disproportionate attacks in international armed conflicts. This war crime is 
defined in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute as: ‘Intentionally launching an attack in 
the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects…which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct overall military advantage anticipated’. 
Historically, war crimes as such were prosecuted as early as the 1920s, the most 
famous being the series of Leipzig trials,49 and similarly, the prosecution of the Turks for the 
Armenian genocides of 1915 fell within the categories of war crimes under the Treaty of 
Sevres. This concept of violations of the customs of war continued following WWII with the 
Nuremburg trials of war criminals. There remained however, scant architecture on the scope 
and meaning of war crimes and such remained the case until the 1990s. The main issue at 
this date being the omission of internal armed conflicts from the application of international 
criminal responsibility,50 however this gap was closed in 1998 with the advent of the Rome 
Statute,51 which was ‘…designed to address the lack of enforcement of international law, a 
dilemma which that has undermined the international community’s credibility because of the 
high humanitarian cost of the absence of enforcement.’52  Part of this failure has been the 
reluctance to prosecute by the national courts, despite the fact they are under an obligation 
                                                          
47 Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 (‘Rome Statute’) eif 1 July 2002.  
48 Schabas; above n8 ‘Prospective entry into force: 1 January 2017. The reason being that this will occur only 
if two-thirds of the States’ parties have given their consent’. 154. 
49 Schabas; above n8 124. 
50 A Cullen ‘The Definition of Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold of Application Contained in Article 8(2)(f).’ (2008) 12 Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law 3 419 - 445.  
51 The International Law Commission (ILC) is another agency contributing to the foundation of the Court, 
setting up in 1992 a Working Group to report on the basic parameters of the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis 
of GA Res 46/54 - ILC Working Group Report; para 2 27 January 1992. 
52WR Pace and J Schense ‘The Role of Non-governmental Organisations’ in n7 Cassese 106; In a similar vein, 
JI Charney ‘Aggressive prosecutions of these grave international crimes are easy to support, but they may also 
present difficult conflicts with other objectives of the international legal and political system. Prosecutions of 
international crimes highlight tensions between international politics on the one hand, and the enforcement of 
the law’s natural-justice goals on the other.’ Editorial Comment. ‘Progress in International Criminal Law’ 
(1999) AJIL 452, 452. 
16 
 
to prosecute, this being based upon the Geneva Conventions. Cassese notes that ‘however, 
these provisions on national jurisdiction over grave breaches have been, at least until recent 
years, a dead letter.’53  
In addition to the Statute itself; there exists the Elements of Crimes54 and;  the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.55 Further, ‘— the text of the Rome Statute, reflects the broadly 
accepted view of State practice – as understood in light of the Elements footnote adopted by 
consensus, accurately embodies pre-existing customary international law.’56 However, it is 
an open question whether this applies to all of the crimes contained in the Statute, particularly 
where, as for proportionality, the language of the text diverges from prior treaty law. 
The contemporary definition of war crimes is Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute 1998. 
However, the status of Article 51(5)(b) as custom is challenged by the differing definitions 
of proportionality in attack as a war crime in international armed conflicts under Article 
8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute 1998, which provides: ‘For the purpose of this Statute. “war 
crimes” means: of ‘(i)ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such an attack 
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects… which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.’ 57 
 The two key differences in the text of the Rome Statute from that of API are the 
inclusion of the words ‘intent’ and ‘clearly excessive’. The term ‘clearly excessive’ was 
deliberately used by the drafters of the Rome Statute, with Wright noting that the aim of the 
text was to present a clearer view of what constitutes ‘excessive’ collateral damage. 58  One 
such situation can arise when a military mission against a legitimate target is being planned, 
with some expectation of civilian death or injury. These form the basis of scholarly debates59 
in relation to the legal standard of proportionality in international criminal law (applicable 
to individuals) as against the LOAC (applicable to States).  
                                                          
  53 A Cassese above n44 18. 
54 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute Article 9 §1.  Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the   
interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, 8 and 8bis in Schabas above n8 417. 
  55 Elements of Procedure of the Rome Statute Article 51 in Schabas above n8 441. 
56 Newton and May above n7 114; Schabas above n8 ‘The definition of crimes set out in Article 6-8 bis, as 
completed by the Element of Crimes, correspond in a general sense to the state of customary international law.’ 
92 (These being Article 6, Genocide; Article 7, Crimes against Humanity, and Article 8, War Crimes). 
  57 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute (1998) in Schabas above n8 407. 
  58 Newton and  May above n7 160 - 162; Wright above n8 819 - 854; Dinstein above n7 120. 
59 Schabas above n8 134 - 135, also for the work of the UN Security Council on the crime of aggression.150; 
Schmitt ‘Air Warfare’ in Clapham and Gaeta 138; Wright above n7 819 -  854;  Lamp above n14 225 - 262;  
Cullen above n50 419 - 445.  
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These differences between the two conditions potentially weaken the claim that 
Article 51(5)(b reflects a customary rule of proportionality, as the legislation of a narrower 
provision in a subsequent treaty with 123 parties 60 arguably manifests a lack of opinio juris 
confirming Article 51(5)(b) as custom. In the absence of case-law at the ICC interpreting 
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) it is suggested that its plain textual meaning constitutes evidence 
militating against the exact formulation of Article 51(5)(b) being custom. While this does 
not undermine the claim to the principle of proportionality in international conflicts as 
custom - indeed, its inclusion in the Rome Statute would rather be evidence confirming it - 
it does indicate that the customary rule does not entirely reflect the terms of Article 51(5)(b). 
It is possible that the text of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) will be interpreted by the ICC to be 
harmonious with that of Article 51(5)(b) but this remains to be seen.61 
Whilst Wright opines that the Rome Statute standard ‘raises the threshold’ in relation 
to AP I, others62 have interpreted these additions in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) as being aimed at 
clarifying the standard, not raising it. In the absence of prosecutions at the ICC that would 
prompt judicial clarification on this point, there are three potential outcomes of the 
relationship between the rules in API and the Rome Statute. The first is that the two contain 
identical rules because the Rome Statute additions merely define, but do not change, the legal 
standard, which results in no divergence between the two. This would appear to contradict 
the plain meaning of the text, which is the standard approach in the law of treaties.63  
The second is that there is a difference in the two standards and that the Rome Statute 
standard displaces the API standard due to the rule of the law of treaties of lex posterior 
derogat legi priori.64 This is unconvincing due to the fact that the Rome Statute does not 
address State responsibility but only criminal responsibility. Consequently, it is argued that 
the third outcome is the most correct: the two treaties lay down different legal standards for 
two regimes of responsibility. Thus, the fact that the Rome Statute differs from AP I does 
not negate the value of the latter for customary international law on State responsibility, 
which is the next question to be considered. 
                                                          
60 The Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 above n47. 
61 J Kamerhoffer ‘Uncertainty in the formal sources of international law: customary international law and 
some of its problems’ (2004) EJIL 523-553. 
61 Wright above n8 ‘The International Criminal Court (ICC) also has subject matter jurisdiction for States 
Party to the Rome Statute where such damage is clearly “excessive” in relation to the concrete and direct 
“overall” military advantage anticipated.’ 819, 834; Another view is expressed by the HPCR above  n8 ‘The 
term “excessive” is often misinterpreted… it applies where there is a significant imbalance between the 
military advantage  anticipated on the one hand, and the expected collateral damage on the other.’  98;  
Wilmshurst and Breau eds above n8 ‘ … ICRC implied no change in the Protocol’s standard.’  156. 
  63 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Art. 31(1).  
  64 Ibid, as above n63 Art. 31(3)(c). 
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1.2   Custom  
The principle of proportionality is traced to Article 51(5)(b) of API to the Geneva 
Conventions, with scholars claiming that it has attained the status of customary international 
law (‘custom’).65 The importance of custom in the field of the law of armed conflict is 
increasing as treaty frameworks of humanitarian rules are not progressing rapidly enough to 
adequately address contemporary problems.66 Moreover, a key problem is the applicability 
of CIL to those states that are not party to API and other treaties 67 in which the status of 
proportionality as custom is commonly grounded.    
 Custom in international law is classically defined in Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) and comprises two well-established elements: 1) 
the practice of States; and 2) opinio juris sive necessitatis or ‘an opinion as to law or 
necessity’.68 Although the existence of this source of law and of these two components is 
settled, their precise contours are a matter of longstanding and ongoing debate.69 There is a 
need to forensically sustain claims to the status of customary international law of individual 
provisions.  
1.2.1 Evidential threshold for custom 
 There are three leading cases in this area; Asylum,70  North Sea Continental Shelf 71 
and Legality of Nuclear Weapons 72 with each of these being considered chronologically.  
 The Asylum case illuminates two aspects of customary international law; that of the 
existence of ‘local’ or regional custom, and the requirement of a ‘constant and uniform 
                                                          
65 Oeter ‘… the provisions of Articles 51-60. API are mostly considered to represent established rules of 
traditional customary law.’ in ‘Methods and Means of Combat’, in Fleck above n8 119; Kalshoven and 
Zegfeld above n8. In referring to humanitarian treaties, even before WWII it was considered that the 1907 
Hague Convention had acquired the status of customary international law. 4.                              
66 The Study Vol II: Practice Part 1 above n8; Heinsch above n8 in D Saxon, who notes that one of the 
reasons for the recent rapid growth in the use of customary international law is the establishment of the 
specialised criminal tribunals which, in lacking any specific jurisprudence, are forced to consider custom as a 
source. 19. 
67 In particular, Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 1988, which defines the 
war crime of ‘Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of 
life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects… which would be clearly excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.’ Schabas above n8 412. 
  68 Statute of the International Court of Justice; Article 38 UN Charter (1945) TS 993. 
69 Wilmshurst and Breau above n8 ‘The practice in question, including the States that are “specially 
affected”, must be “extensive and virtually uniform … and should moreover have occurred in such a way as 
to show a general recognition that the rule of law or legal obligation is involved.’ 132; Judge Koroma in the 
“Study”, above n8. There is no decisive limitation on the time required for State practice to crystallise into 
custom, what is essential is that ‘…State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially 
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked…’ xIii. 
  70 Asylum above n8.   
  71 Continental Shelf above n8.   
  72 Nuclear Weapons above n8. 
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usage’. In addition to the general custom referred to in the ICJ Statute local and regional 
customs also exist in particular areas of a State or in a certain part of the world, as in this 
case South America, the local custom involved the granting of political asylum by one State 
to a national of another State. Dismissing the claim, the Court held there was a failure to 
prove a ”constant and uniform usage”, one of the two vital elements required to prove the 
existence of a customary law which will bind the other party.  
 In North Sea Continental Shelf the dispute concerned the delineation of the coastal 
continental shelf common to each of the three countries bordering the Baltic Sea. In its 
Judgement of the Court held that ‘Not only must the acts concerned amount to settled 
practice, but they must also be such, as carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of the 
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory– … —The States concerned must therefore 
feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.’ The Court went on to 
say that many international acts such as ceremony and protocol, whilst being carried out in 
a regular manner could not be claimed to be motivated by any ‘… sense of legal duty.’73   
 In Nuclear Weapons, the Court held that the States who agree that nuclear weapons 
are lawful relied upon the doctrine and practice of deterrence; they always reserved the right 
to use these weapons in self-defence against attack which threatened ultimate State security 
and the vital interests of the nation. The States disagreeing that nuclear weapons are lawful 
look to customary international law to determine that the use of these weapons is unlawful; 
and refer to the constant practice of ‘non-use’ by States since 1945 as expressions opinio 
juris by those who possess such weapons. Further, the Court was unable to find an opinio 
juris in the acts that States had not used them for fifty years.74   
Referring to the principle of proportionality, and turning to the separate Opinions, of 
the 13 judges, five specifically addressed proportionality in their Opinions, Judges 
Weeramantry, Herczeg, Fleiscchauer, Schwebel and Shahabuddeen.75 
                                                          
  73 Continental Shelf above n8 132. 
  74  Nuclear Weapons above n8 254 at 67. 
75 In his dissenting Opinion, Judge Weeramantry, commenting upon the French position noted that ‘This 
criticism of proportionality does not itself rule out in principle the utilisation, whether in response or as a 
matter of first use, of any particular weapon whatsoever, including a nuclear weapon, provided that such use 
is intended to withstand an attack and appears to be the most appropriate means of doing so.’ (French 
Written Statement, p. 29, emphasis added).”’ Further, ‘According to this view, the factors referred to could, 
in a given case, even outweigh the principle of proportionality.’; Judge Herczeg; Dissenting Opinion; ‘… the 
entitlement to resort to self-defence is subject to certain constraints, and that there is a specific rule…well 
established in customary international law’ whereby ‘self-defence would warrant only measures which are 
proportionate to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it.’; Judge Fleiscchauer in his Opinion - 
international law and international humanitarian law contain the rules and principles of nuclear war as against 
the inherent right of self-defence. A threat of nuclear weapons should be compatible with the rules of armed 
conflict; rules and principles of international humanitarian law which evolved generations before nuclear 
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The judges had based their judgement upon the requirement of sufficient similarity of the 
acts which counted as State practice when deciding whether or not such practice when 
deciding whether or not such practice had hardened into custom, and these acts did not 
require identical factual details.  
 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Higgins noted that ‘…[H]umanitarian law is very well 
developed. The fact that its principles are broadly stated and often raise further questions 
that require a response can be no ground for a non liquet. It is exactly the judicial function 
to take principles of general application, to elaborate their meaning and to apply them to 
specific situations.’76 The Court pronounced by eleven votes to three that ‘… There is in 
neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal 
prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.’ 
Against this judicial background, other agencies contribute to the continuing 
development of the evaluation of State practice to determine the status of customary 
international law, including the International Law Commission.77 In its draft conclusion 12, 
on custom, the ILC outlines three modes by which a treaty provision can reflect custom: 1) 
at the time when the treaty was concluded, codifies an existing rule of custom: 2) has led to 
the crystallization of an emerging rule of custom; or 3) has generated a new rule of custom, 
by giving rise to a general practice accepted as law.78 In its sixty-fourth session in 2012, the 
International Law Commission took up the ‘identification of customary international law’79 
                                                          
weapons.75 He further noted that ‘The rules and principles of international humanitarian law are justiciable 
yet international law is not yet developed, in either conventional or customary law, a norm of how these 
principles can be reconciled in the face of nuclear weapons.’ The proportionality principle may thus not in 
itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances; Judge Schwebel; Dissenting Opinion 
‘…“disproportionate to what?”  it is to the threat posed to the victim State. It is by reference to that threat that 
proportionality must be measured.”;Judge Shahabuddeen; Dissenting Opinion; The Court had agreed with the 
General Assembly’s request for an Advisory Opinion, however, the Court  had replied by a bare majority that 
it could not answer the question. ‘Assuming that the use of nuclear weapons is lawful, the nature of the 
weapons, combined by the limitations imposed by the requirements of necessity and proportionality which 
condition the exercise of the right of self-defence, will serve to confine their lawful use to that “extreme 
circumstance.”’75    
  76 Judge Higgins Nuclear Weapons above n8 at 794. 32.   
77 The International Law Commission; The International Law Commission; a body established by the UN 
General Assembly Resolution 174 in 1948 for the ‘Promotion and progressive development of international 
law and its codification.’ see unelections.org. Forming part of the legal framework of the UN, it addresses 
issues of particular concern brought by the General Assembly, with the aim of providing expert comment 
towards solutions; their role is however purely advisory. The late Sir Derek Bowett was a member of the 
drafting committee of the ILC in the early days of formulating a draft of an international criminal court. 
Working between 1992 - 1996, he set up a “Draft code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind” 
(44th Session), with the final draft in the 1996 (48th Session), the draft Statute for the ICC being accepted by 
the Commission. 
  78 Ibid. above n77   35 (para 44) ILC Draft conclusion C.       
78  Sir M Wood ‘Third Report on the Identification of Customary International Law’. UN Doc. A/CN4/682 
(27 March 2015). 21-22 (Para 37). 
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as a project in its long-term programme of work, and in his third report, Special Rapporteur 
Sir Michael Wood outlined the problem of identifying customary international law based 
upon underlying treaties as follows: 
‘Treaties purporting to codify rules of customary international law, however “are not 
self-verifying on that point”. Codification conventions may (and often do) contain 
provisions that develop the law or represent particular arrangements decided on by the 
negotiating parties, and even a single provision may be only partly declaratory of 
customary international law. There is also the possibility that the assertion in a treaty 
text regarding the status of customary international law is incorrect, or that customary 
international law has evolved since the treaty was concluded. It is thus necessary in 
each case to verify whether the provision in question was indeed intended to codify 
custom, and whether it reflects customary international law, that is, it is necessary to 
confirm that “the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of states is confirmed by 
practice”. Examining practice outside the treaty, i.e. that of non-parties or of parties 
towards non-parties, may be particularly important.’80 
In the Reports of Michael Wood addressing the work of the ICTY, two judicial approaches 
are noticeable, those in which both elements of customary international law are deemed to 
be necessary, and those in which a single element has been found to be sufficient in the 
circumstances. In the former, where the tribunal was employed in determining its 
jurisdiction, it was held that presence of the two elements of opinio juris and state practice 
was essential in this respect.81 Conversely, there were Tribunals where the two elements 
were not clearly established; in Prosecutor v Kupreškić,82 the Trial Chamber held that a rule 
of custom could emerge through a process under demands of humanity or of public 
conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent, the scale of the immediate 
atrocities being so great that the presence of any State practice would be difficult to 
determine. 
 Another organ of the United Nations, the Security Council, has adopted only two 
resolutions which infer, but do not specifically name, the principle of proportionality in 
                                                          
79 Wood above n78 ‘Third Report on the Identification of Customary International Law’. UN Doc.   
A/CN4/682 (27 March 2015). 21-22 (Para 37). 
  80 Wood above n78 ‘Third Report on the Identification of Customary International Law’. 
 81 Prosecutor v Hadžinasanović Case Number IT-01-47-AR72. Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging     
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility. 16 July 2003. (para 12), at Woods p 28-29; Prosecutor v 
Delalić Case Number IT-96-21-T. Judgement (16 November 1998). para 302 and 256, at Woods above n78  
29; Prosecutor v Kupreškić Case Number IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000). para 527, at Woods above n78 30. 
  82 above n81 Prosecutor v Kupreškić, 
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armed conflict. These references appear in Resolution 1160 (“Condemning the use of 
excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in 
Kosovo”)83 and Resolution 1199 (‘Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in 
Kosovo and in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security 
forces and the Yugoslav army’84). There are no references to SC Resolutions in the First 
Report of Sir Michael Wood. One reason, it is purported, is the inconsistency of the Security 
Council in the application of principles in like cases. a further consideration is the binding 
effect of customary rules: ‘… if Security Council acts (and as a subsidiary matter, statements 
of Council members during meetings of the Security Council) are relevant to custom then 
those same customary rules would bind the UN (and the Council as an organ of the UN), 
which raises important considerations with regards to the perennial debate about what legal 
limits apply to the Security Council.85 
 The evidentiary standard is at present set by the courts, international,86 (e.g. for settled 
practice in custom); domestic courts, and those of the ad hoc Criminal Tribunal type. 
Referring to the ICTY, ‘…although the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is defined by Statute, reliance 
on customary law ensures that the principle of legality87  is respected even where the alleged 
crimes occurred before the Statute entered into force.’88 Central to the customary law debate 
remain the two elements of State practice and opinio juris, where the views of commentators 
oscillate between those who consider both elements are required to fulfil the element of 
custom, to those with the view that State practice alone is sufficient89, and finally to those 
who quote Cheng90 on the possibility of “instant” customary law where, due to exceptional 
circumstances and the absence of relevant law, the issue of State practice needs to be 
                                                          
  83 S/RES/1160 (31 March 1998) UN DocS/RES/1160. 
  84 S/RES/1119 (23 September 1998) UN DocS/RES/ 1119. 
85 K Boon ‘Are Security Council Acts relevant to the Formation of Customary International Law?’ http:// 
opiniojuris.org/2014/06/26/security-council-acts-relevant-formation-customary-international-law/ last 
accessed   05.08.2015; R Deplano, for a timely analysis of the working of the Security Council, ‘The Use of 
International Law by the United Nations Security Council: An Empirical Framework for Analysis’ (2015) 
Emory International Law Review 2085-2112. 
86 Continental Shelf above n8 Judgement. I.C.J Reports (1969) 44 at 77; Cryer above n46 ‘The evidentiary 
threshold for custom in the law of armed conflict is determined through four processes; the law of treaties; the 
law of custom; the use of military manuals to determine State practice; and official statements by authoritative 
sources.’ 239, 257. 
87  This principle ensures that a criminal conviction is based on a legal rule established at the time of the offence. 
Meron above n8 ‘Customary International Law Today: From the Academy to the Courtroom’ in  A Clapham 
and P Gaeta  41; Cryer above n46 239-250. 
  88 Meron above n8 Clapham and Gaeta  41. 
89 Wilmshurst and Breau above n8 ‘However, it is essential to keep practice at the forefront of any analysis, as 
customary law emerges only through State practice characterised by opinio juris.’ 132. 
  90  B Cheng Studies in International Space Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1997) 680. 
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dispensed with. In addition is the question of jus cogens, whose imperative power is 
informing the debates concerning compliance by both States and individuals. 
 These disparate issues form part of the jurisprudence of the ICC, in which the fora for 
the discussion of customary law is considerably widened. From it’s central tenet of 
criminalizing the individual and not the State, to the reception of new words into the lexicon 
of the ICC (e.g.) “clearly” and “intent”, customary international law is under increased 
scrutiny, with the literature reflecting the resulting tensions and outcomes. In relation to this, 
Gardam reminds the reader that the single function of the principle of proportionality is to 
reconcile military necessity with the security of the civilian population.91 However, 
separating this apparently simple detail from the accretions of history and placing it into 
contemporary military practice is a complex problem which, with the passing of time, brings 
new issues from the field of technology.  
 From the military viewpoint, proportionality was unheard of officially prior to the 
1990 Iran/Iraq war.92 Earlier, the conflict in Vietnam had been the pivot which swung public 
opinion in favour of providing legal protection for the civilian. The use of chemical agents 
by US forces to destroy forests and crops, and therefore deny cover for the enemy forces was 
widely used between 1962-7, however this ‘Agent Orange’ resulted in widespread death and 
injury among the civilian population without achieving the intended military aim.93  Words 
and phrases such as collateral damage entered the vocabulary of the LOAC, and from such 
failures developed pressures from agencies like the ICRC for the codification of principles 
in the field of civilian protection which led eventually to the formation of API.  
 API provided the foundation for new guidelines within the Military Manuals of 
individual States and the details of how different States responded during the drafting and 
ratification of these rules generate issues to the present day. One perennial problem emerging 
from the negotiations, and which persists to the present day, is the issue of the relationship 
between the new treaties (API and APII), and customary international law.  
1.2.2 Rule 14 - proportionality as custom - API v ICC 
The principal formulation of the customary principle is commonly taken94 from Rule 14  
(‘Proportionality in Attack’) of the ICRC Customary International Law Handbook: 
‘Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
                                                          
91 Gardam above n1 94.  
  92 Gardam above n1 19. 
  93 ‘Agent Orange’ is not the same as napalm, x/r Reynolds above n12 83; Solf above n12 125.  
  94  The Study, above n8.   
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to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.’ 95 In the 
commentary to Rule 14 (‘Proportionality in attack’), the ICRC based this formulation upon 
Article 51(5)(b) of API - which is textually identical - and also cited a number of sources 
(e.g. – military manuals, national and international criminal jurisprudence and other treaties) 
to illustrate its subsequent adoption in state practice. Thus, the status of the principle of 
proportionality as customary international law rests upon the third of the grounds articulated 
by the ILC in that Article 51(5)(b) of API ‘generated a new rule of customary international 
law, by giving rise to a general practice accepted as law.’   
 However, as the ILC explains, the treaty rule itself does not affirm the customary rule, 
though it may be its source. Rather the rule as custom must be sustained by subsequent State 
practice and opinio juris. This distinction is important because of the question of the 
applicability of Article 51(5)(b), rather than the whole of API, to non-parties to API as 
custom. This explains the references in the ICRC Commentary to Rule 14 to the sources 
subsequent to the entry into force of API n7 December 1978. While the ICRC Study has 
been criticised for failing to forensically sustain all of its claims of customary status for the 
rules that it propounds (e.g. - Rule 45 on damage to the natural environment), the claim to 
customary status of Rule 14 in international armed conflicts appears to have been generally 
accepted in the scholarship.96 
Despite the plaudits given to the ICRC study, some criticisms have also been made.97 
One example being that the Study places too much emphasis on written materials, such as 
military manuals and other guidelines published by States, as opposed to actual operational 
practice by States during armed conflict. “Although manuals may provide important 
indications of State behaviour and opinio juris, they cannot be a replacement for a 
meaningful assessment of operational State practice in connection with actual military 
operations”.98 In addition, The United States also questions the rigour of the Study: ‘... for   
many rules proffered as rising to the level of customary international law, the State practice 
                                                          
95  Customary IHL- Rule 14- Proportionality in Attack. www.icrc.org/customary- 
ihl/eng/print/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14 ; APII Article 57 and Amended Protocol 2 to the UN Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects:  adopted 10 October 1980, eif 2 December 1983    
1342 UNTS 137.   
96 Meron above n8 in  Clapham and Gaeta 46;  Wilmshurst and Breau above n8 403, 405; D Fleck above n8 
593. 1205; Kalsoven and Zegveld above n8, also at 434 n 163. 
97 For a detailed critique; Cryer above n 46; D Bethlehem in ‘The Methodological framework of the Study’ in 
Wilmshurst and  Breau above n8; I Scobbie ‘The approach to customary international law’ in Wilmshurst and  
Breau above n8. 
  98 Bellinger III and Haynes II above n8 443, 445.  
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cited is insufficiently dense to meet the “extensive virtually uniform” standards generally 
required to demonstrate the existence of a customary rule’.99 The text of the ICRC Study 
itself proposes that the ‘…  only relevant acts are those of State practice.’100 One example 
being the practice of Russia101 which considers the principle of proportionality the “weakest 
point of IHL because...In the armed forces of the CIS countries there are neither provisions 
defining the terms of the respect of the principle of proportionality nor provisions envisaging 
prosecution of individuals who violate this principle.102  
Aldridge posits two thoughts on the matter. Initially it is claimed that the authors (of 
the Study) utilized customary international law in attempts to simplify articles of API, 
whereas complexity in a text is frequently desirable in order to facilitate discussion and 
choice of response.103  It is however, his second criticism is more serious; ‘Their principal 
mistake is to claim customary law status for some simplified rules that would not have been 
accepted in the negotiation of Protocol I and would not be accepted today by many States.’104 
In this context, the question is whether Rule 14 of the ICRC study, which is identical to 
Article 51(5)(b), can be shown to reflect the customary standard.  
Despite objections made to the methodology of the ICRC Study and ongoing 
disagreement as to interpretation, since the founding of the ICC in 1999 the contemporary 
textual definition of proportionality has continued to be accepted by States.105 Thus, it is 
submitted that there is widespread acceptance by States of the principle of proportionality as 
embodied in Rule 14 as the customary standard for international armed conflicts. It has taken 
more than 150 years for proportionality to evolve into its present form in API, and ultimately, 
into the Rome Statute. While the textual divergence between the two instruments potentially 
reflects a higher standard of proportionality for the purpose of individual criminal 
responsibility as opposed to State responsibility as reflected in API, the existence of both 
rules with relatively high numbers of ratifications evinces proportionality in international 
armed conflicts is custom, albeit to slightly different standards for two purposes. This is 
further affirmed by the evidence of State practice and opinio juris endorsing Rule 14 of the 
ICRC Handbook.  
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In a similar vein, but against the particular national background of Israel, Cohen and 
Shany propose the use of their three tests for proportionality construction could contribute 
towards the further development of the principle of proportionality under international 
humanitarian law. Additionally, they suggest that the use of robust institutional requirements 
leading to increased clarity in textual meaning could assist the work of the ICC in cases 
concerning culpable personal responsibility in command responsibility.106 The authors do 
not propose any indication that a clear rule of proportionality has emerged at this point, but 
the paper contributes to the continuing conversation concerning this important humanitarian 
principle. 
In considering proportionality in relation to targeting, Ohlin opines that the principle 
remains vague and elusive for one major reason at least, because the courts have rarely, if 
ever, convicted anyone of violating the proportionality rule, and there are no judicial 
decisions available on what is, or should be, the precise parameters of the proportionality 
principle. There is at present no widely accepted rule of proportionality. “Proportionality is 
obviously linked to targeting, but the legal rule is ‘notoriously difficult’ to apply during the 
heat of battle.”107 
Which leads to the application of the principle of proportionality in relation to the 
development and deployment of new weaponry. There are three points to be addressed here; 
first, there is the applicability of the principle to states that have not ratified API and/or the 
Rome Statute and may consequently regard themselves as ‘persistent objectors’ to a 
customary rule of proportionality in international armed conflicts. Second, there is the 
controversial customary status of the principle in non- international armed conflicts despite 
the absence of a basis in either API or the Rome Statute. Third, there is the potentially 
differing standards in relation to international armed conflicts between API and the Rome 
Statute.    
Whereas the previous narrative has noted the historical existence of custom, there is 
contemporary evidence of some States claiming the “need” for custom to suit its particular 
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stance, and this is evidenced by attempts by non-ratifying States to claim the status of 
persistent objector. 
1.2.3  Application of the customary rule to non-ratifying States 
Despite the acceptance of proportionality as a customary rule applicable to international 
armed conflicts, there is the possibility of non-parties to AP1 claiming the status of 
‘persistent objector’. The role of the ‘persistent objector’ is part of the creation of customary 
international law, forcing debate upon areas of uncertainty in the specific case.108 One 
commentator proposes that ‘… the most favourable argument from the objecting States point 
of view would be that because they are “specially affected” States, the rule has not become 
customary law. The concept of “specially affected” States was set out by the ICJ in the 
Continental Shelf where it stressed that practice must include that of such States109 and has 
been interpreted to mean that no customary rule can develop if these States do not accept the 
practice.’110 
 There are two attitudes non-ratifying States can take; either, as is the case with the 
USA, the customary rule is not the text of API Art 51 or, the customary rule is the text of 
API Art 51, but the non-parties may be persistent objectors to it. Opposition to API, 
specifically the principle of proportionality as laid down in API Art 51(5)(b) was most 
publicly articulated by the USA, their view being that it would hamper their inherent right 
of self-defence. The importance of this claim lies in the fact that, as one of the most powerful 
members of the P5, legal positions taken by the USA and other members influence the 
continuing development of customary international law.  
 This is a complex area, demanding precise evidence of practice, however the bench of 
an international court is constituted by judges from all areas of the world, each possessing 
their own cultural views as to what forms customary law may take in both theory and 
practice. This new “need” is the reduction of State practice (the objective element), and 
increased reliance upon opinio juris (the subjective element), thus distorting the historical 
balance between the two elements. As Guldal notes, ‘As customary international 
humanitarian law in general is experiencing a tendency to let the lex ferenda conflate the lex 
lata, attempts by certain States to object to the development of new rules have been met with 
resistance.’111  
                                                          
108 Kammerhofer above n61 523-550; Fleck above n8 52-3. 
  109 Continental Shelf  above n8 74. 
110 CG Guldahl ‘The Role of Persistent Objection in International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) Nordic Journal   
of International Law 77   51, 76; J Green Persistent Objectors in International Law (OUP Oxford 2016). 
111 Guldahl above n110 51, 86. 
28 
 
 If there is the possibility of non-parties to AP1 claiming the status of ‘persistent 
objector’ the burden of proof would be on the objector to show that it is an objector and that 
the burden has been held by the ICJ to be a high one.112 Of the P5, only the USA is not party 
to API, and the US Naval Handbook 2007 codifies the principle of proportionality in the 
exact terms of the API test.113    
 It is arguable that the USA and other non-parties have discharged this burden through 
their continuing opposition to API Article 51(5)(b). One sign of such constant opposition 
would be the following; on the 6th May 2002, the US Government sent the following 
communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; ‘This is to inform you, in 
connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 
1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the 
United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000. 
…’.114 Nevertheless, the Report on US Practice states that “United States practice recognises 
the principle of proportionality as part of the customary law of non-nuclear war.”115 
 A key question is whether Rule 14 of the Study applies to those States that have not 
ratified API, particularly the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (‘the P5’) 
as the most important States for the purposes of new weaponry due to their advanced 
militaries and high GDP spending on military research and development.116  (Despite not 
being a signatory to API, the US is one of only a few States to have adopted formal review 
processes.)117 
Referring to the P5, France118 had, upon ratification of API stated “… the 
Government of the French Republic considers the first sentence of paragraph 2 of [Article 
52] prohibits only such attacks as may be directed against non-military objects. Such a 
sentence does not deal with the question of collateral damage caused by attacks directed 
against military objects.’119 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland made 
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the following Declaration; ‘…that Article 51(5)(b) was a “useful codification of a concept 
that as rapidly becoming accepted by all States as an important principle of international law 
relating to armed conflict.’120 Neither China, the Russian Federation or the United States 
entered a reservation or declaration. check. In addition, the USA also questions the rigour of 
the Study: ‘…for many rules proffered as rising to the level of customary international law, 
the State practice cited is insufficiently dense to meet “the extensive virtually uniform” 
standards generally required to demonstrate the existence of a customary rule’.121  
Thus, even if Rule 14 can be said to reflect customary international law for the 
purpose of State responsibility122 in international armed conflicts, the discharge of the 
persistent objector burden by the non-participating States in API restricts the applicability of 
the customary international law rule to them as the principle of proportionality inhibits the 
use of these weapons. As these are some of the most important States in the world in the 
development of new weaponry in research and development this is an important limitation. 
Nevertheless, this does not undermine the study of the temporal compression in a 
commander’s decision-making in proportionality for new weaponry, not only because others 
of the P5 (e.g. the UK) accept proportionality in international armed conflicts but also 
because other States that accept proportionality can acquire such new weaponry from the 
main suppliers. 
 Meron makes the important point that the behaviour of ‘persistent objectors’ in the 
formation of customary international law is equally as important as that of belligerents,123 
and as a further point of interest, Fleck notes that the First and Second Gulf conflicts, together 
with Afghanistan and Iraq, were fought mainly by the armed forces of states not subject to 
the rules of API, ‘… which renders serious comment on the practical effects of the provisions 
of API almost impossible.’124 This paradox is joined below by another issue which remains 
a severe problem in the LOAC, the difference between international and non- international 
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armed conflicts, although ‘…customary international law is certainly not confined to “wars”, 
it applies to international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.’125 
1.2.4 Application of proportionality to non-international armed conflicts.126 
More controversial, however, has been the claim127 that proportionality in attack applies to 
the same standard in non-international armed conflicts despite the lack of an equivalent 
provision in APII to that of Article 51(5)(b) in API. This is compounded by the different 
approaches to proportionality taken in the Rome Statute: Article 8(2)(b)(iv) which prescribes 
the war crime in international armed conflicts. Significantly, this war crime is not replicated 
in the Article 8 (c) list for non- international armed conflicts, a point to be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
Doctrinally, as these conflicts do not meet the standards required for international 
armed conflicts (IACs), the standard threshold of protracted armed violence is determined 
by the presence of two elements namely “intensity” and “organization”, the intensity of the 
violence together with the level of organisation within the groups involved. Recognising the 
usual chaotic nature of these outburst, each is assessed on a case-by-case basis.128 In contrast 
with CA3, a more restricted standard is necessary with an APII outbreak, where the level of 
organisation is particularly high together with control of sufficient territory to enable the 
group to ‘… carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol.129 
Prior to the statute of the ICC, only the rules of the Hague and Geneva conventions 
applied in international law. Schabas notes there was little evidence that the concept of 
international criminal responsibility reached as far as NIACs, 130 with this remaining 
unaltered with the adoption of API and APII. The first definitive step was the adoption by 
the Security Council of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR), November 
1994, with this being followed in 1995 when the Appeals Chamber in Tadić 131affirmed that, 
as part of the development of custom, international criminal responsibility could be assigned 
to NIACs, this being later confirmed by the Rome conference of 1998.132 
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Traditionally, States did not desire any external interference in the way they 
conducted their external  affairs which impinged upon their sovereignty and subject matter 
of jurisdiction, one of which was engaging in armed conflict.133 The main difference between 
an international and a non-international armed conflict depends solely on the parties to the 
conflicts: in an IAC there are two or more states involved, while in the NIAC the conflict is 
between a state and organized non-state armed groups, or between such groups.134 Any 
conflict between two or more states (IACs) is governed by the Geneva Conventions, 1949: 
however conflicts between parties within a state, (NIACs), there is no definition of 
combatant status or obligations, or indeed for the combatant status itself.  
Nevertheless, Schindler writes that, over time, these disparate areas appearing in both 
IACs and NIACs have been drawing closer together. Defined in the Tadic decision135 this 
was a clear response to the increasing levels of atrocities being committed within such 
internal wars were of such an extent that world opinion could no longer be ignored and such 
behaviour became the concern of the international community as a whole.136 Following 
Tadić, the difference between IACs and NIACs is now obsolete under the aegis of the criteria 
of War Crimes in the Rome Statute.137  
Coming in the wake of Tadić which had confirmed the fact that international criminal 
responsibility could attach to military commanders during the course of an internal conflict, 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute was considered to be a progressive development over  previous 
humanitarian treaties. This consists of two categories of war crimes; those in IACs and those 
in NIACs.138 Schabas writes that ‘…subject to a few minor exceptions, paragraphs (c) and 
(d) of Article 8(2) apply to non-international armed conflicts contemplated by Common 
Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, while paragraphs (e) and (f) apply to non-
international armed conflicts within the scope of Additional Protocol II.’139  
Thus, at present, there is no rule on proportionality in non- international armed 
conflicts in APII or Rome Statute, neither is there a customary rule as evidence of State 
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practice. This is an important limitation on the applicability of proportionality due to the fact 
that many, if not most, of the armed conflicts taking place in the twenty-first century are non- 
international armed conflicts.140 In this thesis, this is the case with Afghanistan141 and Iraq,142 
whereas the bombing campaign by NATO forces in Serbia (Kosovo) was an international 
armed conflict. Although this necessarily constrains the application of the rule, the value of 
the study of the temporality of the commander’s decision-making remains valid due to the 
possibility that proportionality will be extended to non- international armed conflicts in the 
future.   
1.3 The commander and the element of time 
The rationale of this thesis rests upon the length of time available to the commander to 
interpret information into an attack decision, A strong reason for focussing upon the element 
of time is given by Kolb and del Mar;  
‘…the law of armed conflict is designed to apply in situations of great social and 
psychological stress, namely during warfare. In such situations there is usually no time 
and no possibility to consult legal writings or to have complex discussions about how 
to balance general principles in order to shape a contextual rule… there must be ready-
made and concrete rules at hand.’143 
 Since the Vietnam war, emerging technology has engendered corresponding 
development in the law of armed conflict. Whereas at the time of Vietnam, due to the 
weaponry available at that time, military commanders had sufficient time to plan the ROE, 
however in contemporary warfare the rise of robotic weaponry means that ‘… as the 
complexity and speed of these systems increase, it will be increasingly limiting and 
problematic for performance levels to have to interject relatively slow human decision-
making into the process.’144   
 Recalling the statement by Newton and May addressing those ‘… soldiers and leaders 
who are making decisions on the ground and do not have time to make complex 
proportionality decisions.’145, all their evaluations should rely on sound and unbiased 
information, however ‘Commanders trying to “manage” this situation may be overwhelmed 
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by the amount of information sent to them, creating a new virtual kind of “fog of war”.’146  
Problematically, the amount of information now available to commanders frequently leads 
to information overload which further leads to mistakes and delays in his assignment,147 
leading to what the author describes as warfare leaving the human space.  
 Lippman notes that ‘… the Kosovo campaign was the culmination of the trend towards 
“virtual war” in which militarily sophisticated Western regimes relied on precision bombing 
and high technology to intervene in industrializing and militarily weak territories to protect 
human rights.’148 This trend continues ruthlessly, as powerful States with large economies 
continue to dictate the levels of available weaponry and in some cases influence the courses 
of the developing law, thus the deployment of this weaponry is exerting tensions upon the 
existing laws of conflict, upon the “concrete rules” mentioned earlier.  
 The task of the commander lies at the meeting point of weaponry and legal doctrine, 
however at the present time ’The lack of technological and doctrinal convergence supporting 
less lethal and destructive armed conflict means that IHL is left with long-standing problems 
and emerging conumdrums… the availability of precision or “non-lethal” weapons does not 
resolve these questions.’149  Further, Myers notes that if this trend towards a fully automated 
air defence system continues, by the year 2020 most of the Western forces will have the 
capacity to deploy semi-autonomous weapons with the ability to perform the whole range of 
operations.150 Following this argument to its logical conclusion, is it possible to foresee the 
demise of the commander, together with the extinction of the warfighter altogether.151 
These issues, embedded in the element of the time factor, are considered in the following 
conflict studies.  
1.5 The Temporal Triangle 
A brief outline is given here of the temporal decision triangle, further described in more 
detail in graph form in the three conflict studies. In addition, the quotation by Kolb and del 
Mar is repeated here due to its focus upon the element of time: 
‘…the law of armed conflict is designed to apply in situations of great social and 
psychological stress, namely during warfare. In such situations there is usually no time 
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and no possibility to consult legal writings or to have complex discussions about how 
to balance general principles in order to shape a contextual rule… there must be ready-
made and concrete rules at hand.’152 
How much time a commander needs to make a reasoned decision, and how much time he 
actually has, are two separate and urgent issues, but what can be said at this point is that the 
high speed of contemporary weaponry is pushing his available decision time into the zero 
sector. 
 To this end, and building on the existing scholarship that examines the issue of 
temporality in proportionality in relation to decision – making time for commanders,153 this 
thesis proposes a theoretical model for the conceptualisation of this issue. There are four 
issues at play here, all operating during the same time as a military attack is operational; 
proportionality, distance, speed and time. These are linked together ontologically in an 
environment which is in itself dynamic and unpredictable. The units within the triangle are 
relatively predictable in that speed and distance can be precisely calculated, the one variable 
being the subjective issue of proportionality. 
Due to the use of the new precision weapons, could this compression of the time 
available for such judgements be so reduced that any consideration of the civilian, either as 
an individual or a population, is reduced almost to a zero, there is no temporal space for 
factoring in the human element in the face of the military advantage. Recalling that the thesis 
question asks what, if any, changes in the practice of modern conflict could impact upon 
proportionality, it is this reduction in the time/decision ratio. If, as is claimed, proportionality 
reflects the concepts of humanity, this requires some time at least for a subjective assessment 
of the current situation by those in command. Should this reflective window be reduced to 
almost vanishing point, the anomaly is raised that the weapons designed to increase the 
accuracy of target strikes and therefore reduce collateral damage are themselves denying the 
commanders the chance to make choices which could limit the number of civilian casualties. 
               Referring to the method, the two variables are speed and time. Even without the 
support of computer algorithms, it is true that the greater the speed of the weapon in reaching 
its target the less time there will be for the commander to make rapid decisions in the heat 
                                                          
152 Kolb and del Mar above n143 ‘Treaties for Armed Conflict’ in Clapham and Gaeta The Oxford Handbook 
of International Law in Armed Conflict 51-52. 
153 As examples, WH Boothby ‘How Far Will the Law Allow Unmanned Targeting to Go? in above n 8 Saxon 
54; Marchant above n14 272, 276;  Bolt ‘The Use of Autonomous Weapons and the Role of the Legal Advisor’ 
in Saxon above n 8 48-49;  RJ Vogel ‘Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2013) Denv. J. Int. L. 
& Pol’y 39:1  52 101, 128. 
 
35 
 
of battle, ….those who do not have the time to make complex proportionality calculations 
when under the stress of battle situations.154 There are occasions where time is so important 
that the planners and commanders are by-passed, and the relevant instructions are fed 
directly to the pilot in the cockpit, and ‘… collapsing decision-making timing 
dramatically’.155 
 The problem of determining a purely objective decision from standards which have 
been previously reached subjectively remains a point of dissention between writers, amongst 
others Wright suggests a hybrid standard for use by the commander as increased clarity 
equals a reduction in the time taken to make decisions.156 
However, what is appearing over time is a pattern. Where military strikes are 
successful on the first attempt, very few if any civilian casualties are recorded; it is however 
where a second follow-up strike is required, where the commander has little or no time at all 
to re-assess new information including a proportionality calculation, that excessive collateral 
damage may result.157 The amount of available time may also be dictated by the size of the 
military unit involved. Where there are large numbers involved, such as brigades or 
squadrons, the planning facilities available to their commanders will necessarily be larger 
and provided with more sophisticated systems for dealing with changing tactics and 
incoming information; where however maybe a small unit of men is deployed in the field, 
their access to critical information may be less robust, resulting in more intuitive decision-
making by their direct commander. ‘Decisive here is not so much a particular level of 
command as, rather, the combination, within a given time frame, of freedom of choice of 
ways and means and availability of information.’158 
 This mixture of compression of time, human mistake, and secondary air-strikes are 
developing this pattern of unforeseeable error which is considered throughout the three case-
studies.  
 There is now notice being taken that ‘Unplanned strikes, however, do not allow the 
military sufficient time to thoroughly estimate collateral damage.’159 Adams notes that 
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‘more and more aspects of warfighting are not only leaving the realm of human senses, but 
also crossing outside the limits of human reaction times.’160 Within these parameters is 
information, and the ‘… proliferation of information-based systems will produce a data 
overload that will make it difficult or impossible for humans to directly intervene in decision 
making’. 161  
 ‘Many of the objections to the use of proportionality focus on how hard it is for 
commanders to make such calculations when they are in battle or in other situations where 
quick decisions need to be made and where there is no time for elaborate calculations’.162 
This statement justifies the claim made at the beginning of this study that the principle of 
proportionality is in danger of being affected by the use of such weaponry, although it is 
regrettable that at this point in time there is not more detailed accounts available. 
There are two points to be made; first, when referring to the use of gravity bombs, it 
is the speed of the aircraft delivering them from the aim point (an airfield) to the target that 
is important. The bombs themselves fall according to the laws of gravity. Second, as the 
speed of aircraft increased, parallel advances in the field of weapons technology meant that 
the weapons themselves acquired guidance systems which enabled them to perform tasks 
according to pre-set computerised programmes, whether they were released by aircraft or 
fired from ground based launch pads.163  
In the early phases of the Kosovo conflict the majority of weapons used were the 
dumb free-fall bombs, dropped by B1 and B-52 aircraft of the US Air Force. However, as 
the campaign escalated, up to 90% of all weapons used were of the precision type.164  used 
is the B-52 Stratofortress bomber, a heavy duty machine used initially in the Vietnam war 
and in constant service since. Its place in the Kosovo campaign was part of the strategy to 
force the enemy into abandoning its progress into Kosovo, a strategy involving both bomber 
and fighter aircraft of the NATO allies. The A-10 aircraft was chosen for both its relatively 
slow speed and the type of mission of assignment (Exact specifications of aircraft 
performance is given below the diagram). 
The diagram illustrates the relatively slower rate of delivery, both of the speed of the 
aircraft itself and of its load of gravity bombs upon release, which provided commanders 
                                                          
160 Adams above n147 1, 2. 
161 Adams above n147 1, 2. 
162 Newton and May above n7 11. 
163 Cruise missiles. U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet: BOEING AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missile 
www.hill.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?  
  164 The Oxford Group Workshop Report ‘Proportionality in War’ 1,4. 
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with sufficient time for decision making, including assessment and application of the 
proportionality principle. 
  It is proposed that this triangle offers a simple working model, easy to imagine and 
keep in the mind, of what is involved without having to think of numbers and risk factors, 
not only for the military but also, and increasingly so, civilians involved for example, in 
affiliated agencies such as the Red Cross. Academically, it provides a model into which 
proportionality can be demonstrated on a certain and repeatable basis, and contributes to 
building the argument that the principle of proportionality is being constrained by the use of 
high speed weapons. 
 This relationship of the military commander with proportionality, weaponry and time 
will be illustrated in the following triangle: 
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TEMPORAL TRIANGLE   
General Outline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Launch (a)  to  (b)  -  the distance line; the distance between the launch point and the target (b). 
Launch (a)  to  (c)  -  the speed line; how fast the weapon travels between the launch point and the target (b). 
Background  -  this shaded area constitutes the presence of the principle of proportionality in the temporal 
matrix. This shading will change with each case study, illustrating how this proportionality is degraded by the 
differing speeds of the weapons used, until the diagram changes from a completely shaded fill to a nearly empty 
space. 
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   1.6 Conclusion    
The years since the Kosovo conflict have witnessed profound changes within both 
international law and the LOAC, and in relation to this thesis, two particular instances are 
noted as important drivers to these changes – the establishment of the ICC165 and the rise in 
importance of customary international law.166 Throughout this thesis, in both theory and 
practice, these two issues interact with the rule of proportionality in its relationship with the 
laws of weaponry and targeting which, in their turn, lead to the obligations of the 
commanders and the temporal constraints upon their decision – making. 
 The first change was the establishment of the ICC. Being a response to the requirement 
of bringing to justice some of the perpetrators of the worst types of war crimes, the Court 
provides a contemporary forum in which to apply criminal law in the areas of conflict, and 
in this aim it is linked to the second issue, that of customary international law. In relation to 
the Court, the function of the International Law Commission remains a work in progress, 
from its initial involvement in deciding the referral process,167 to its current involvement in 
defining the contours of customary international law. 
 The second change, the increase in importance of customary international law, driven 
primarily by the lack of State practice in cases classified as non-international armed conflicts, 
is driving a large academic response.168 As the formulation in API has now been superseded 
by the criminal statute169 the question arises as to whether the provisions in API as pertaining 
to custom, are the same as those of Article 8 of the Rome Statute. API states that the sources 
of custom are found in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, while in the Rome Statute. the 
applicable provisions are found in Article 21(b) and (c).170 These are not the same as the two 
treaties lay down different legal standards for two regimes of responsibility. 
Some additional changes are clearly beneficial, as an example, attempts to clarify the 
meaning of “excessive” collateral damage in Article 8 of the Rome Statute171 whereas in 
                                                          
165 How the work of the Law Commission on the formation of custom, and the influence of the Security Council 
were linked in the formation of this Court is considered in the following chapters. 
166 Moreover, a key problem is the applicability of CIL to those States that are not party to API and other treaties 
in which the status of proportionality as custom is not grounded, as is the position of the US and other non-
ratifying States. 
167 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 2 May-22 July 1994, 
Chapter II, UN Doc. A/49/10, Arts 23(1) and (2) in Schabas see n7 158. 
168 As examples see T Meron ‘Customary International Law Today: From Academy to the Courtroom’ in 
Clapham and Gaeta above n8 37-50;  Cryer see n46  
169 Fleck above n8 1 and 133; Newton and  May above n7 112; and ‘To be more precise, the text of the Rome 
Statute as understood in light of the Elements footnote adopted by consensus, accurately embodies pre-existing 
customary international law.’ Newton and May above n7 114. 
170 Schabas above n8 425;   Dinstein above n7 6. 
171 Wright above n8 819-854. 
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other areas particularly that of customary international law, much remains to be verified and 
refined, even the basic question of what elements constitute the concept of custom itself. 
The following chapter begins the series of case studies, in which the temporal triangle 
is employed in support of the thesis proposition that the principle of proportionality is under 
challenge from contemporary precision weaponry. 
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Chapter 2 -  proportionality in the Kosovo war  
Whereas Chapter One addressed the principle of proportionality in theory, the present 
chapter focuses upon the assessment of the application of proportionality in practice.172 To 
this end, it appears in the context of one of the armed conflicts occurring within the last 
fifteen years; the aerial bombing campaign by Member States of NATO against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in relation to Kosovo (the Kosovo War).173 
This period witnessed a surge in the deployment of precision weapons, comprising a variety 
of bomber and fighter aircraft and their respective missiles.174  
As such it represents the first example of a modern armed conflict in which precision 
weaponry was deployed in a primarily air-to-surface military campaign with the ostensible 
aim of minimising civilian casualties or ’collateral damage’ through proportionate strikes.175 
The ICTY Chief Prosecutor issued a report on alleged war crimes committed by the parties 
to the armed conflict: though this report was criticised,176 it is nonetheless the most 
authoritative factual account of the incidents in question. Referring to n2 177, during the initial 
stages of the preparations for the intervention, it was not clear whether or not the armed 
conflict in Kosovo was, for the purposes of classification, an international or a non-
international armed conflict.  
The rules of Article 3, common to all the Geneva Conventions178 together with the 
majority of the rules in APII (1977),179 governs this area of the LOAC. Whereas historically 
States were averse to other States having any involvement in their internal affairs, 
                                                          
172 Hensel HM (Ed) The Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary use of Military Force 
(Ashgate Aldershot 2005); Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (2000). 19.  
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm; N Ronzitti ‘Is the non liquet of the Final Report by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
acceptable?’ 31-12-2000 International Review of the Red Cross  No 480  1017 – 1028; Kosovo Chronology: 
Timeline of Events. 1989-1999. Issued by the Department of State, Washington, DC. (May 21 1999)    
173 ‘Statement on Kosovo’ NATO Press Release S-1 (99) 62 (23 April 1999). 11 “Atrocities against the people 
of Kosovo by FRY military, police and paramilitary forces represent a flagrant violation of international law.” 
174 RP Hallion ‘precision guided munitions and the new era of warfare’. (1995) APSC Paper Number 53. Air 
Power Studies Centre. www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/docs/paper/53.htm; JM Beard ‘Law and War in 
the Virtual Era’ (2009) 103 AJIL 3 409, 439; J Sine above n3 1, 7. 
175 above n173 ‘Statement on Kosovo’. 
176 Ronzitti above n 172 1, 6 -10. 
177 above n 173 ‘Statement on Kosovo’. 
178 Article 3 GC I-IV provides that ‘”each Party to the conflict” must afford protection to “persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who  have laid down their arms and those 
placed “hors de combat.” in ICRC ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law’ (December 2008) Vol 90  Number 872  991-1033;  HPCR above n1  
53.11. 
179 E David above n8 Chapter 14 ‘International and non-International Armed Conflicts’ in A Clapham and P 
Gaeta 354. 
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particularly the waging of war at the international level, this situation changed gradually 
throughout the period of de-colonisation following WWII. Common Article 3 was the first 
rule of international humanitarian law to address the issue of internal wars, those fought 
within the territorial boundaries of a State.180 In the context of this study, the question arises 
as to whether or not the Kosovo conflict was such an internal affair.181 
There are two main criteria involved in solving this question; first, the nature of 
hostilities, and second, the nature of the actors. Why this determination is so important at the 
outset of hostilities is due to the fact that different legal rules and procedures may apply to 
each of the two classifications, although this is now becoming less common, with rules 
applying to both equally.182 A further stipulation is that these rules do not cover riots and 
local disturbances, which are under the jurisdiction of the national police of the relevant 
area.183  
Considering the two criteria, first the nature of hostilities which fall under two 
headings; first, that of gravity, in this case, the pattern of destruction carried out by the 
Serbian forces against villages and towns, interference with the activities of local police and 
security agencies, and the blocking of lines of communication such as major and minor 
roads. The ICTY had confirmed that the number of attacks on the civilian population of 
Kosovo had increased dramatically from 1995 to 1998 184. 
The second criteria being that of duration; there needs to be a period of “protracted 
armed violence” 185 can 5 months can be said to be protracted in any sense. However, what 
about situations where there is one without the other? 186 There is a second benchmark crucial 
to this determination, the nature of the actors. There must be evidence of an organised armed 
group187 under a responsible command which exerts public power and is responsible and 
identifiable. This is evidenced in the case of Kosovo by the existence of the Serbian military 
                                                          
179 MN Shaw International Law (3rd ed CUP Cambridge 1991) 138. The Montevideo Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States, Article 1: The requirements of a State as an international person requires the following; 
a permanent population within a defined territory with a government with the capacity to enter into 
relationships with other States.  
180 Shaw above n179. 
181 P Hilpold ‘The Kosovo case and International Law: Looking for Applicable Theories’ (2009) 8 Chinese 
Journal of International Law 1 47-61. 
  182 HPCR above n8 xxiv.  
  183 E David above n8 355; HPCR above n 7 53.8. 
  184 Final ICTY Report above n 172 9. 
  185 E David above n 8 357. 
  186 E David above n 8 358. 
  187 APII Article 1 (1). 
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and police forces, with the armed conflict being finally classified as an International Armed 
Conflict (IAC). 
Historically, following the end of the Cold War in the mid-1990s and the death of its 
President, Marshal Tito, Yugoslavia as a State began to disintegrate. Civil war erupted, with 
the final phase of this complex war being the Serbian programme of ethnic cleansing of the 
Albanian population in the enclave of Kosovo in order to reclaim the country for Serbia. The 
NATO188 intervention to bring this to an end, “Operation Allied Force”, saw an air campaign 
lasting from 24th March 1999 to 10th June 1999.189 The conflict ended with the withdrawal 
of President Milosovic from the Presidency.  
The chapter thus begins with a description of the precision weaponry deployed during 
the Kosovo War. This comprises the key aspects of the weaponry specifications that pertain 
to factors for the purposes of proportionality assessment in relation to temporality. These 
factors include, for example, the speeds of the aircraft and the missiles, the precision of the 
missiles in relation to the targeting systems and the visual capabilities of the pilots of the 
aircraft to accurately identify targets. In the Kosovo conflict, the attacks on the Djakovice 
convoy and the Grdelica Bridge engage the precision of the weaponry and the information 
available to the decision-maker in undertaking a proportionality assessment in situations in 
which the time available is highly constrained. 
The Grdelica  Bridge and the Djakovice convoy incidents were selected according to 
two criteria. First, referring to the official “Final Report”, in setting up its Review Criteria 
thresholds, the Committee chose incidents in which more than ten civilians had been killed; 
this was essential as there had been hundreds of incidents involving death and injury to 
civilians, in some reported cases however fewer than three deaths or injuries were 
involved.190 Second, the choices of the two specific incidents by the author reflects the 
importance of the actions of the pilots linked with the time frames available to the relevant 
commanders on duty at the time of the attack. Within these parameters, the Djakovice 
convoy and the Grdelica bridge incidents were chosen. 
 In relation to the temporal triangle, the Kosovo War case study illustrates the outcome 
of the relationships between the weaponry in use and the commander’s proportionality 
decisions in air-to-surface strikes. As such, the case study primarily concerns the constraint 
of time prior to the deployment of precision weaponry caused both by extraneous factors 
                                                          
  188 NATO; North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, formed in 1949 under the Washington Treaty.  
  189 Kosovo Chronology: above n172. 
  190 Final ICTY Report above n172 1 2. 
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such as dust and debris thrown up by the wheels of the vehicles, and any pertinent weather 
conditions, and by the nature of the weaponry, for example, the speed of the aircraft and the 
missiles. The case study illustrates that the characteristics of precision weaponry can 
constrain the time available to the commander to undertake a proportionality assessment 
prior to the deployment of the weaponry, which can therefore increase the risk of a 
disproportionate attack. 
 Each of the two incidents analysed in the Kosovo War is structured in sections, these 
being repeated throughout the following two chapters; § (a) the reason the target was 
attacked; § (b) details of the weapons used in the attack; § (c) the proportionality assessment, 
and § (d) the temporal triangle. 
2.1. Precision Weapons   
To set the scene for analysis of the Djakovice convoy and Grdelica bridge incidents, and 
specifically the issue of the increasing use of precision weaponry, it is necessary to cover the 
area of weaponry in some detail. As this research has progressed, it became noticeable how 
variable some of the technical terms were when used by authors from other domains, and in 
particular, one such word requiring semantic clarity being “precision”. Sine provides a 
simple description of a “precision” weapon as ‘…a technical capability providing 
measurable and quantifiable first-order effects and minimal unintended or undesirable 
effects. The intent is to focus specifically on the preciseness of the effect the weapon achieves 
and not to the precision that relates to its guidance-system accuracy.’191  
What does the word precision mean in relation to which weaponry; the aircraft, the 
missile, the launching platform, a system as a whole … or as an aggregation of any of these. 
The following text attempts to make sense of these terms. 
In the first case-study, the precision weapon was not the F-16 aircraft which struck 
the Djakovice convoy, that was the aircraft used to launch the missile. Neither was it the 
missile itself. In this case, the US A-10 was used (for the purposes of this thesis) as a 
“precision weapon” for two reasons; first, purely because it became an active member of the 
aerial activity surrounding the convoy, and secondly, to use its speed, 450 mph, as the base 
line for all the faster aircraft deployed both at the same time, and later in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The F-15 could not have been used due to its higher speed, together with the 
fact that an F-16, an up-grade of the F-15 from the same manufacturer, was required as a key 
aircraft for the Iraq conflict. 
                                                          
  191 Sine above n4   1, 7.   
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In the second case-study, the precision weapon was not the F-16 aircraft, but was the 
missile which struck the train on the Grdelica Bridge. Being pre-programmed to strike the 
bridge at one end it did so with perfect precision using its GPS navigation system, but also 
destroyed the train progressing across it at the time. 
            However, what is the factor which makes such missiles “precision weapons”. It is 
not their ability to exactly strike the target which is a different issue. Another factor which 
gives the impression that it is the aircraft which is the precision weapon is the high speed of 
modern aircraft. The F-16, with a speed of over 1,500 mph, can give the idea that speed 
equals precision, where this is not the case. Having said that, such high speed certainly 
contributes to the success of a mission, as such aircraft will approach the target in a much   
reduced time, either from take-off time at an airfield, or from the time and air tasking order 
is received, and are difficult to target by enemy ground anti-aircraft batteries and other enemy 
aircraft. 
              Further, the lower the aircraft flies, the shorter the time to impact. Relating to 
precision, this can be positive in that the pilot may also be able to visually affirm the target 
and carry out a last minute collateral damage assessment. He will know immediately if there 
is a need to “go round again” for another target run. He can also use additional weapons on 
his aircraft, such as air to ground cannon or machine guns. Conversely however, he is entirely 
at the mercy of the immediate environment in which he is deployed. In the air war above 
Fallujah, in the famous “wedding-cake” stack, there were so many aircraft at every height 
from 1,000 feet to 30,000 feet that at one point, one pilot noted they were more at risk from 
each other rather than from the enemy. 
 As the law stands at present, proportionality exists to reduce collateral damage as 
a result of a state exerting its right under the LOAC to achieve a military aim, it is purely 
logical therefore that it be applied ahead of the mission, in order to capture this multitude of 
reasons for its existence which have been reduced to minimalist texts in the Additional 
Protocols. At the outset of this study, Newton and May observe that proportionality exists to 
‘… contain the effect of lethal force…’193 This clarifies the difficulties faced by those who 
would control the assessment and application of proportionality, that it is the unforeseen 
effects of lethal force which causes the damage, not the application of the lethal force itself. 
The following section relates how such lethal force was controlled, and the weaponry 
deployed in the Kosovo war. 
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2.1.1 The weaponry deployed in the NATO bombing. 
Due to difficulties presented by both the local terrain and weather patterns, a broad variety 
of weapons were deployed by the NATO forces. In Kosovo, the types of weapons used by 
the NATO forces were a combination of the traditional and the new, from dumb bombs to 
precision weapons, to drones or UAVs.194  
 At the time of writing, most attention given by the public is upon such precision 
weapons, these being linked with the issue of collateral damage. An important issue is the 
speed of the aircraft or platform used, the specifications of these being generally available to 
the public domain. However, this is not the case with the technical specifications of some 
precision guided missiles, the details of which remain classified. Consequently, this 
chapter’s analysis of the proportionality of precision weaponry is inhibited in some areas by 
the lack of publicly available information on the speed and other characteristics of the 
precision weapons.195 
 Nevertheless, the essential difference between precision guided missiles on the one 
hand and ‘dumb’ or free-fall bombs on the other hand is that precision guided missiles are 
equipped with computerized systems which guide them to the target.196 There are differing 
opinions as to what constitutes a precision weapon, however this study will adhere to the 
view of Sine who describes how the core of the “precision” concept lies in the identification 
and application of the least amount of explosive material necessary to destroy the target.197  
Precision is everything concerned with the complete missile, from its component 
parts to its delivery platform and explosive, every component is scaled down to the absolute 
minimum necessary for the destruction of the relevant target, according to its size and 
location. A large target, for example an aircraft hangar will require a larger mass component, 
in comparison to a smaller target in the shape of a human being. As one expert explains, 
‘Precision guided weapons (PGMs) are guided by on-board computer algorithms. They are 
not the platforms which deliver them, such as aircraft, but are highly technical weapons 
which are guided, not “smart” self-automated systems’.198 
 The laser guidance systems used for these missiles has been, as Hallion notes, one of 
the most decisive advances in air warfare. With such accuracy, one aircraft can replace the 
                                                          
194 M Hagger and T McCormack ‘Regulating the Use of Unmanned Combat Vehicles: Are General Principles   
of International Humanitarian Law Sufficient?’  5 (2011-2012) 21(2) 4, 13. 
195 One example being details of the exact speed and range of the B52-Spirit bomber. 
196 Hallion above n174 1-19. 
197 Sine above n4 1, 1.  
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47 
 
many required to place dumb bombs anywhere near the target; ‘… it was as revolutionary a 
development in military air power terms, as say, the jet engine or aerial refuelling.’199 In the 
same vein, Farley observes precision-guided munitions as ‘America’s Ultimate Weapon of 
War.’200 
 Such precision has consequences for the assessment of collateral damage, and also, as 
such strikes are statistically more successful on the first attack, there are fewer requirements 
for re-visits201 to the target at a later time which may produce further civilian casualties as 
frequently other persons go to assist the previously wounded. Such precision further gives a 
high probability of an accurate strike upon the target regardless of weather conditions, which 
in the earlier phases of the campaign produced rain and mist which can seriously reduce the 
effectiveness of airstrikes, in ‘… that they affect the outcome of modern combat because 
sophisticated aircraft and weaponry, (such as laser-guided missiles and night-vision sights) 
do not operate properly in the presence of clouds.’202  
This is of particular relevance in the Kosovo campaign as, apart from the major 
climate conditions of winter and summer, the mountainous terrain causes localised pockets 
of wind turbulence causing unstable flying conditions, and even the suspension of some 
planned missions. The additional issue of cloud cover was a problem in the earlier Balkans 
campaign of 1992 and the earlier part of the Kosovo campaign, and finding a solution to this 
issue became urgent. On some occasions during the Kosovo campaign there had been over 
50 percent cloud cover more than 70 percent of the time.203  A Cloud-Analysis Model was 
specifically developed; the Operational Weather Squadron was formed in Germany204 which 
collected and collated relevant cloud patterns and communicated them to the planning teams 
and commanders in the battle zone.  
Cloud cover continues to present one drawback to the use of even “state of the art” 
PGMs. ‘Even when PGMs are used against a military target they may miss the target because 
                                                          
  199 Hallion above n174 7, 19.  
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 203 JA Tirpak ‘The State of Precision Engagement’ (March 2000) airforce-magazine.com 1, 5. 
 204 Tirpak above n203 1, 6. 
48 
 
of weather obstructing the pilot’s view, technological malfunction, or because the aircraft is 
dodging anti-air defenses.’205  
Modern technology itself may be producing one solution to this problem. As laser-
guided bombs would not operate to their precision specifications if dropped through heavy 
cloud cover or smoke, it was decided to use the military strategy of “stand-off”206 using, for 
example, Cruise Missiles which carry their own GPS target co-ordinates guidance systems, 
pre-programmed before take-off, and are launched from an aircraft outside, or “standing-
off” from the affected area. An issue with this is that these can only be dropped by the large 
B-52 bombers,207 another facet of the complexity of interoperability. 
 There are many types of such weapons, each of which provides the means of causing 
a specific, measurable, tactical effect while minimizing undesired effects. Dependent on 
scenario, this effect must be quantifiable, assessable and predictable.208 The importance of 
API Article 36209 is noted by Haines, ‘Implicit in this requirement is an assumption about 
the relationship between technology and law by which the existing law should constrain 
weapons development rather than new weapons technology drive the shaping of new law.’210 
The precision weapon carries with it a whole environment not only of the physical machinery 
which implements the intended operation, but also the new languages of military command 
and control and computer science which always evolve with new developments in any 
discipline. 
 Schmitt gives details of the growth of this area: ‘During Operation Desert Storm in 
1991, only 8.8% of attacks employed precision munitions. By Operation Allied Force in 
1999, this figure had grown to approximately one-third of all munitions dropped. Two years 
later, in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the percentage was 65%, with slight 
growth to 68% by Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.211 These statistics will be revisited in 
the following two chapters.  
                                                          
 205 A Boivin ‘The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting Military Objectives in the Context of 
Contemporary Warfare’ (2006) Research Paper Series No. 2.  University Centre for International Law 1, 40; 
quoting DL Gilmour ‘Precision Guided Weapons and the law of war.’ Paper on file with Boisin; Rogers 
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The A-10 Thunderbolt 212 was widely deployed during the campaign, including the 
Djakovice convoy incident. Used as close air support and attack for ground troops, it was 
originally designed during the Cold War period to deal with potential enemy tanks and heavy 
armour in the European theatre.213 Designed to operate at low altitudes, flying at below 100 
feet it is unlikely to be spotted by enemy radar, it can take a lot of structural damage and still 
continue to pursue its mission. Frequently used in conjunction with other aircraft of differing 
types, helicopters, and artillery sites, the only criticism of its operational capabilities has 
been its lack of all-weather capability. In order to alleviate this, the LANTIRN system was 
installed214 At the time of the Kosovo campaign, the A-10 had a speed of 450 mph with a 
range of 2,580 mph, carrying a large and varied load of ordnance, including an external 
rotary cannon in the nose.215   
As part of NATO, the UK Royal Air Force Jaguar was deployed as a fighter and 
tactical reconnaissance aircraft. In low-level operations, it possessed the ability to destroy 
the target completely on the first pass, eliminating the need for a revisit strike. Robinson 
notes that the characteristics demanded of such an aircraft include ‘… the ability to evade 
air defences by flying at low level and following the contours of the terrain and the capability 
of operating in all weather conditions.’216  
With a speed of Mach 1.1 217 the Jaguar may operate as low as 1,000 feet, with an 
operating range of 564 miles. It supports an external payload load of up to 10,000 lbs, and in 
its tactical reconnaissance mode, it carries external pod-mounted cameras. (Some of these 
above comments are taken from a book published in 1983, and it is interesting to note that in 
one section concerning the operational capacity of the Jaguar, he specifies that at the end of a 
sortie, ‘… the film is rapidly processed so that within ten minutes it is being examined by 
interpreters… can be passed on within half an hour of the aircraft landing.’218 This bears little 
comparison with today’s almost instantaneous processing of data from different sources. 
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One of the predominant aircraft in the Kosovo campaign, and again specifically 
chosen for its ability to fulfil a task within the strategic plan was the F-16 fighter.219 Flown 
by several of the NATO partners, the latest version has the capacity to locate and attack 
targets in all weather conditions. With a speed of 1,500 mph, the payload is comprised of 
two 2,000lb bombs and two AIM-9 and two AIM-20 laser guided missiles. In addition, the 
external armoury consists of up to six air-to-air missiles; conventional air-to-air missiles and 
air-to-surface missiles. The F-16D-2, carries a crew of two, the pilot and the weapons 
systems officer. 
 These three aircraft constituted the largest percentile contribution of fighter/ tactical 
reconnaissance to the air campaign, however that is but one part of the overall picture. 
Working in conjunction, frequently on a rotating 24  hour basis, were the heavy bombers and 
multiple use aircraft. The B-2 Spirit represents the technology of “low-observability” stealth, 
whose signatures make it difficult for enemy radars to detect and track it. The exact speed is 
not specifically provided, but noted as “high sub-sonic” Its weaponry is conventional and 
nuclear, with a payload of 40,000 lbs, it is one of the largest aircraft in the campaign, and 
with an “inter-continental” range,220 making it one of the most versatile when it comes to 
distances between the theatre of war and home and re-fuelling points.  
The B-52 Stratofortress.221 With a cruising speed of 525 mph and a maximum range 
of 8,800 miles, the B-52 will remain in service until 2040.222 First flown in 1952, this aircraft 
remained until recently the backbone of the US heavy bomber fleet. Fielded from the first 
days of the Kosovo conflict, their payload included CALCMs (Cruise Missiles) until a 
shortage of these weapons led to the B-52s carrying conventional dumb bombs as part of the 
campaign to cripple the Serbian army in Kosovo. Later in May, laser-guided munitions were 
added, and, as one expert observed, ‘… their exceptionally heavy bombing of the FRY army 
staging areas in Kosovo is widely seen as the final push that was needed to bring about a 
peace agreement between Serbia and NATO on 23 June.’ Payload includes conventional 
munitions (guided or gravity bombs), CALCMs (Cruise Missiles); AGM-142 ‘HAVE NAP’ 
TV-Guided missiles.223 
                                                          
219 F-16 fighter: www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/1   last accessed 12.12.2015. 
220 The B-2 Spirit: www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/b-2-spirit.as… last accessed 
10.02.2014. 
  221 S Davies Boeing B-52 (Haynes Publishing Yeovil 2013). 
  222 “Airpower Classics” The B-52 Stratofortress Air Force Magazine  June 2013. 
  223 Davies above n221 48-49. 
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The aircraft section needs to be read in conjunction with the following parts 
describing the missiles deployed by these aircraft. The question is posed, would the NATO 
allies have intervened in Kosovo, had they not been in possession of PGMs? During the pre-
war planning stage, it was the ability of these weapons to destroy enemy assets with 
potentially low civilian damage, that tipped the decision in favour of launching the 
campaign.224 
The three main missiles were, the Predator (Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles-UAVs); 
Early in the conflict there was widespread use of the Predator UAV, ‘…with the ability to 
loiter under the cloud ceiling and identify mobile and camouflaged targets;’225 the JDAM 
(Joint Direct Attack Munition) precision guided missile was further developed following the 
weather issues experienced in Operation Desert Storm,226 and the Boeing AGM-86 Air-
Launched Cruise Missile: this unmanned air-to-ground weapon has a maximum speed of 500 
mph, and is launched from both the B-52 Stratofortress and B-1 Lancer bombers.227 Smaller 
weaponry was also fielded, including the GAU Avenger 30mm cannons used by the A-10 
strike aircraft.  
  Dumb bombs are those munitions dropped from an aircraft directly onto the target 
aim point with no intervening guidance from a human being, their destructive effects relying 
solely upon kinetic effects of blast, explosion and possibly fire. Being economic to use and 
fairly accurate to aim, they remain in favour where specific targets require destruction which 
are not close to civilian populations or vital civilian support entities, as examples electricity 
grids and water supply centres.228 Historic fact illustrates how inaccurate these gravity bombs 
were: [In] 1944, an attacking B-172 had to drop roughly 240 tons of bombs, on average, to 
be sure of destroying one German bridge, even in clear weather. By 1965, F4-D fighters 
could destroy a North Vietnamese bridge by dropping 200 tons of unguided bombs, again in 
unclouded weather. However, with the advent of laser-guided bombs, by 1972 the same 
aircraft could destroy a bridge using only 12.5 tons of bombs; unclear weather still had an 
effect. By the time of Operation Allied Force against Serbia in 1999 B-2 stealth bombers 
                                                          
224 Report: The National Interest: Robert Farley ‘America’s Ultimate Weapon of War:Precision-Guided 
Munitions’ (no date available www.nationalinterest.org/print/feature/americas-ultimate-weapon-war-
precision-guided-munitions-11389  accessed 12.09.2016  1, 2. 
  225 JA Kitfield ‘Another Look at the War that Was’ (1999) airforce-magazine.com 1,4. 
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228 HPCR above n8 61; MOD above n37 83  5.32.4  “Dumb, or free-fall bombs are, however, less likely to hit 
a smaller precisely defined target than is a guided precision weapon.” 
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could undertake the same mission using only 4 tons of GPS229 Joint Direct Attack Munitions 
(JDAM)s, in any type of weather.230 
2.1.2 The NATO Command Structure 
The Washington Treaty of 4th April 1949231 laid the foundations for the organization which, 
without changing the original tenets, has enabled it subsequently to adapt to the pressures of 
an evolving world.  
The surviving NATO Command Structure can reflect the realities of a Europe 
reorganizing itself following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Central to its aim is that of a “collective defence” system232 based upon Article 5 of the 
Treaty233 which states; 
‘The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered as an attack against them all, and consequently they agree 
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual 
or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith , individually 
and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attacks and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately 
be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain 
international peace and security.’ 
Building upon this collective defence system, the fundamental tasks of NATO are elaborated 
in the model of “strategic concepts”.234 The existing Security model accommodates such 
issues as international security and non-state actors. The Active Engagement text235 engages 
the tasks of the military commanders; 
                                                          
228 The GPS, Navstar Global Positioning System. A constellation of orbiting satellites that provides 
navigation data to military and civilian users all around the world. U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet Navstar Global 
Positioning System (March 2003) http://space.au.af.mil/factsheets/gps.htm   last accessed 12.07.2010. See in 
connection with the GPS, the Defense Satellite Communications System which supports military users 
worldwide. U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet (2006).  
http://space.au.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=95&page=1  last accessed 11.03.2009. 
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233 ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’ NATO Official text: 1.1. 
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36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able 
to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere 
throughout its integrated military command structure, and that has at its disposal core 
capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.236  
Turning now to the specific military command chain of responsibility, the Military 
Committee itself is subordinate to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the supreme policy 
making body of NATO. This Committee itself is subject to the widespread adaptations 
demanded by the London Declaration of 1991, ‘… and the promulgation of a new strategic 
concept that foresaw a NATO collective security role in crisis management and rapid 
reaction expeditionary forces.’237 Within 10 years, with the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo 
reaching unacceptable levels, NATO set three strategic objectives for its proposed use of 
force in Kosovo: 
- To demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in the 
Balkans. 
- To deter Milosovich’s escalating attacks on civilians and cease the process of ethnic 
cleansing. 
- To damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future, to prevent the 
war from spreading across territorial boundaries, and to degrade Serbia’s military 
means to prosecute the war.238 
In order to achieve these objectives, NATO specified Five Phases of Operation Allied 
Force.239 The first in order of priority was the destruction of the FRY’s aerial early warning 
system,240 to blind the enemy, denying him the ability to observe and to assess information 
from, the activities of the NATO forces. The second phase aimed at the degradation of the 
enemy’s communication links; the roads and railways along which he transported the oil and 
petroleum products essential for the sustenance of his fleets of tanks and lorries, his 
remaining means of waging war since the destruction of his air forces early in the campaign. 
 It is at this point that another “event” occurs that singles out the Kosovo campaign 
from those fought previously, the presence in the operational scheme of the military lawyers. 
These are serving officers, civilian lawyers contracted in, such reflecting the fact that they 
                                                          
  236 ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’ above n234 1, 4. 
237 ‘NATO’ answers.com. www.answers.com/topic/nato-6?&printtrue         
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can be held responsible for their actions the same as would apply to the pilot or navigator in 
the aircraft concerned. Questions were subsequently raised as to the large numbers of these 
employed during the campaign, and did their advice have any undue influence with the 
ultimate strategic aim of winning the war.  
 The tools utilised by the military strategists include, in addition to the aircraft and 
weapon systems, the software of intelligence data and the human communication essential 
for the building of pre-flight ROEs. Each airborne mission is given its own target folder, 
dedicated to that mission only, in which a tiered analytical technique gives, inter alia, a risk 
assessment of the civilian casualties (if any) could be expected as a direct result of this 
mission.241 
The lawyers are involved in both the preparatory stages and are present with the air 
controllers during the actual mission. The control procedures are more exacting and complex 
when the target is physically moving, as was the case in the Djacovice convoy incident, and 
also at the Grdelica bridge when the decision time may be cut down to almost a second. In 
situations such as the latter, the procedure known as “time critical targeting”, (TCT), is a 
means of controlling the levels of collateral damage. ‘TCT is the part of the air operations’ 
process that is probably the most vulnerable to incurring unintended collateral damage. By 
its very nature, the TCT dynamics do not allow for the studied examination of target folders 
that the pre-planned process permits.’ 242 (The role of the lawyers is examined further in the 
section addressing proportionality).  
Following the attack, what analysis would be carried out to determine the 
proportionality of the means of attack to express the military advantage? Again, there is a 
set procedure in place; First, the correlation of civilian deaths to the location and nature of 
the target; second, the timing of target selection as against list of priorities; third, the methods 
and conditions under which the weapons were deployed; and finally, to determine the 
presence of any indiscriminate nature to the attack.243   
 What military targets and objectives are permissible under the LOAC; civilian 
immunity from attack. This can be approached from two viewpoints; from the air and from 
the ground. 
                                                          
241 CJ Dunlap Jr. ‘Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts’ (2001) 
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From the air, at the height he was flying, the pilot of the F-16 observed what he believed to 
be a convoy of military vehicles, mainly lorries with some tractors toward the rear. From the 
shape and colour of the vehicles, he deduced it to be military and as such, fell under the terms 
of his existing Rules of Engagement, these being the primary means of controlling the use 
of force in armed conflict,244  and which change with each specific mission, and may even 
be amended during its course. The weather conditions for the flight were good, bearing in 
mind the capricious weather patterns indigenous to the area.245 Aircrews are taught the tenets 
of the LOAC and the protection of the civilian, and attempts to reconcile these 
responsibilities with the realities of attacking the military target whilst controlling a high-
speed aircraft produces situations   … and judgements under extreme pressure, within a 
constricted time-frame. 
  2.2 The case studies  
2.2.1 the Djakovice convoy 
Details of why these two incidents were chosen as against other possibilities is due to two 
factors. First, referring to the official  “Final Report”, in setting up its Review Criteria 
thresholds, chose incidents in which more than ten civilians had been killed; this was 
essential as there had been hundreds of incidents involving death and injury to civilians, in 
some reported cases however fewer than three deaths or injuries were involved.246 Second, 
the choices of the two specific incidents by the author reflects the importance of the actions 
of the pilots linked with the time frames available to the relevant commanders on duty at the 
time of the attack. Within these parameters, the Djakovice convoy and the Grdelica bridge 
were chosen. 
Kosovo was the first modern war where there were as many lawyers in the control 
rooms as there were planners and commanders, reflecting the desire of the NATO leaders to 
adhere to the laws of armed conflict and keep excessive collateral damage to a minimum. 
The section dedicated to planners and commanders includes an analysis as to the state of the 
“commanders intent”, the presence of the actus reus and the mens rea required to establish 
criminal intent.247  
                                                          
244 GD Solis. The ROE are the primary means of controlling the use of force in armed conflict. The Law of 
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Additional Protocol II (1977) of the Geneva Conventions brought up to date the 
provisions of Common 3 of the Geneva Conventions248, and for the first time gave the 
civilian recognition. Although couched in the concept of “rights”, these articles are not 
“human rights” in the widely known sense, where the individual is a claimant on the state,249 
but under the humanitarian regime the individual citizen is protected because he is a human 
being in his own right. There are only two classifications of this situation, he is either a 
civilian or a belligerent. (For the remainder of this study, the citizen is called a civilian).  
Hensel also notes that the overall aim of the articles are to provide normative standards.250  
Each case study is structured in sections, these being repeated throughout the 
following two chapters. § (a); the reason the target was attacked; § (b) details of the weapons 
used in the attack; § (c) the importance of the weather and the terrain in the target area; § (d) 
the commander, the issue of information and the time factor; § (d) the temporal triangle. 
2.2.1.a the reason the target was attacked 
Further information revealed there had been reports of systematic ethnic cleansing in this 
area, together with the fact that this road was regularly used by both local civilian and also 
Serbian military vehicles. On the morning of the 14th April 1999, NATO forces had reported 
a series of fires in the area, apparently deliberately ignited indicating further destruction of 
civilian properties as the ethnic cleansing moved southwards. At 10.30am a NATO pilot 
reported what appeared to be green military type vehicles proceeding along the Pristina road. 
  2.2.1.b   details of the weapons used in the attack; 
The conflict in Kosovo recorded the rise in the development and deployment of precision 
weapons.251 The convoy was attacked initially by one F-16 and one Jaguar aircraft which 
dropped two 500lb laser-guided precision bombs. These bombs, for example the EGBU-27 
are the most widely known, chosen specifically for high-precision strikes. the letter E in the 
name indicated it was upgraded with guidance from GPS satellites.  
‘…An F-16 bombed the convoy’s lead vehicle, at approximately 1110 the pilot 
relayed a threat update and the coordinates of the attack… A second F-16 aircraft arrived on 
the scene at around 1135 and visually assessed the target area as containing large vehicles…’ 
252 However, as the purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the speed of a slower aircraft to 
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provide a base-line for the temporal triangle specifications of the A-10 Thunderbolt provided 
a suitable comparison. These aircraft had been deployed from the beginning of the Kosovo 
conflict as part of the overall attrition of the Serbian war effort, forming part of the same 
NATO coalition as were the US and British fighters involved in the Djakovice convoy attack. 
The Lockheed-Martin A-10 Thunderbolt253 was widely deployed during the 
campaign, including the Djakovice convoy incident. Used as an agile fighter, with bombing 
capabilities, it provided a versatile ability to deliver ordnance onto ground targets, either 
mobile or difficult to access by the larger high-altitude bombers. The single or dual pilot A-
10 has a speed of 420 mph with a range of 2,580 mph.  
Evidence of the involvement of A-10 aircraft in the Djakovice attack is found in 
Rogers; ‘Doubts began to assail the military planners because it was unusual for the Serbian 
forces to travel in such large convoys, so A-10 aircraft, which are slower and more stable 
than F-16s, were called in to check, and further attacks on the convoy were suspended at 
13.00 GMT.’254 
Its varied load of ordnance; including GAU Avenger 30mm cannons.  However, as 
the purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the speed of a slower aircraft to provide a base-line 
for the temporal triangle specifications of the A-10 Thunderbolt provided a suitable 
comparison. These bombers had been deployed from the beginning of the Kosovo conflict 
as part of the overall attrition of the Serbian war effort, forming part of the same NATO 
coalition as were the US and British fighters involved in the Djakovice convoy attack. 
Problems encountered by the serving pilots, particularly the issues of distinction and human 
shields, is recorded in a book255 authored by two A-10 pilots involved in the Kosovo 
campaign, and although the individual attacks are not specifically cited, the phrase, for 
example ‘… in the Djakovice area…’ gives the reader a sense of location.  
However, as the purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the speed of a slower aircraft 
to provide a base-line for the temporal triangle specifications of the A-10 Thunderbolt 
provided a suitable comparison. Whereas at the time of Operation Allied Force against 
Serbia in 1999 B-2 stealth bombers could undertake the same mission using only 4 tons of 
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GPS Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)s undertake the same mission using only 4 tons 
of GPS256 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)s, in any type of weather.257  
 In the early days of the conflict, the Serbian army fielded a formidable range of 
ground-to-air artillery which, in one instance succeeded in shooting down a US Stealth 
bomber.258 As the war proceeded however most of this equipment, together with tanks, was 
successfully camouflaged to hide it from NATO aircraft which, in their reconnaissance 
modes, would take note of potential targets, both static and mobile. 
  2.2.1.c    the proportionality assessment  
In this case-study, this assessment is carried out by the commanders and planning teams 
before the attack begins. The value of any military advantage to be gained is determined 
during the initial planning stage, when the strategic military objective is clear and agreed 
upon by the NATO partners. Following the establishment of the military objective and 
military advantage, should the facts of either of these two processes be in doubt, there will 
be no requirement for a proportionality assessment as the mission itself will not take place. 
What is called the “belligerent nexus” will have been established; specifically, ‘… in order 
to amount to direct participation in hostilities, an act must not only be objectively likely to 
inflict harm that meets the first two criteria, but it must also be specifically designed to do so 
in support of a party to an armed conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent 
nexus).259   
 Experts260 propose that the key factor in the proportionality assessment for the 
Djakovice convoy attack was the “feasibility” aspect of API Article 57 (2)(a)(i), 261 one of 
the vital steps necessary to prevent indiscriminate attacks. ‘The relevant question that needs 
to be asked about the incident is whether it was feasible for the aircrew in action to verify 
the status of the target.’262 There is no evidence that the pilot had any doubt about it being a 
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strictly military target. Had he any doubts, he would have been taught during his training 
that in any case of uncertainty, API Article 52 (3) states that the object/s be considered 
civilian. 
 The operating altitude for the entire conflict was set at 15,000 feet up to 23,000 feet at 
the highest level of NATO political and strategic planning. Basing their decision on the 
premise that civilian losses be kept to a minimum, pilots were ordered to fly at the medium 
altitude of 15,000 feet, above the reach of enemy artillery, the technical reason for this being 
that PGMs op PGMs operate at their maximum efficiency when dropped from this height. 
With more kinetic energy at their disposal, this gives time for the missile’s fins to open fully, 
giving maximum outputs for accuracy in targeting and efficiency in use as to the explosive 
charges within the missile.263 (The case in support of bombing from a lower altitude is given 
in the following section, The Grdelica Bridge.) 
Returning to the “feasibility” aspect, would the F-16 pilot have been expected to 
consider this in the context of the attack. The reply must be negative. Responsibility is laid 
down in API Article 57 (2), strictly states that “a) those who plan or decide upon an attack 
…” points directly to the planners and commanders in the Command and Control Centre 
who are in direct communication with the pilot. Unless it can be later proved that the pilot 
showed a deliberate mens rea in firing his weapons, with the express intent of killing or 
injuring civilians, there can be no claim of indiscriminate attack brought against him.264      
 Such strategies can place aircrews in an impossible situation. If they fly at 15,000 feet 
in obedience to the ROE, they run the risk of charges of indiscriminate attack; if they fly 
lower, they fall within the range of enemy artillery and the risk of being shot down. In this 
case, such complexities led the commanders eventually to dispatch an A-10 aircraft to 
determine whether or not there were civilians present in the convoy. On receiving an 
affirmative reply, the attacks were called off. (There were other aerial attacks in the 
Djakovice area at the same time, however evidence was so sparse as to civilian loss and 
damage that no further investigative action was taken).  
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The role of the lawyers, the Judge Advocates (JAG)265 from hereon, is of increasing 
importance.266 ‘Commanders are expected to influence their subordinates to achieve the 
command’s missions and goals, they are expected to act, particularly in times of crisis, …’.267 
Their task, to ensure compliance with the rules of the relevant ROE is both assisted and 
hindered by the huge amount of information generated through contemporary military 
systems of communication.268 Nevertheless, assessments and decisions must be made, 
frequently under stress of time, as they form part of the protection process built to give some 
element of safety to civilians caught up in hostile activity. ‘Reality requires that commanders 
may need to act quickly, often without the advice and counsel of others.’269 This pressure of 
time, reflecting the claim that precision weaponry is influencing the efficiency of the 
proportionality principle, is continued in the following section, the incident at the Grdelica 
bridge. 
2.2.1.d   Application of the temporal triangle 
The slow speed of the A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft will be factored into the ROE, and once the 
mission is under way, this slow speed, 450 mph maximum, should allow the commander 
sufficient time to reconfigure the plan of attack. (In this case, the A-10 was being used as a 
surveillance aircraft and not an attack fighter). The base-line of the temporal triangle baseline 
therefore remains at the lowest level. 
2.2.2  the Grdelica bridge incident 
The commentary on the second attack, upon the Grdelica bridge, illustrates two facts; first, 
that several different variants of aircraft and weaponry utilizing the latest technologies, were 
used by NATO to disrupt and destroy the Serbian war machine, and second, this particular 
attack is unusual in that the evidence given following the raid includes a direct reference to 
the shortage of, indeed total lack of time available to the pilot to abort the mission in the final 
few seconds.  
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On 12 April 1999, a NATO F-16 aircraft launched two laser-guided EGBU-27 bombs 
at the Leskovac railway bridge over the Grdelica gorge and Juzna Morava river, in Eastern 
Serbia. A 5-carriage passenger train, carrying both freight and civilian passengers travelling 
from Belgrade to Risktovac on the Macedonian border, was approaching the bridge at the 
time and was struck by the first missile.270 
 Carrying out his orders to completely destroy the bridge, the pilot made a second   
bombing run on the further end of the bridge, now covered by clouds of debris, yet during 
this brief interval parts of the damaged train had slid along the tracks and were struck by the 
second missile. During the later investigations, evidence was given by the officer in charge 
of NATO operations in Kosovo, general Wesley Clark who stated ‘As the pilot stared 
intently at the desired target point on the bridge, and I talked to the team in Aviano who was 
directly engaged in this operation, as he stared intently at the desired target point on the 
bridge and worked it and worked it, and all of a sudden at the very last instant with less than 
a second to go he caught a flash of movement that came into the screen and it was the train 
coming in.’271 
 A German eye-witness later entered a technical report, challenging some aspects of 
the NATO findings. One point made by the Final Report being, ‘If the committee accepts 
Mr Wenz’s estimate of the reaction time available, the person controlling the bombs still had 
a very short period of time, less than 7 or 8 seconds in all probability, to react.’272 
   2.2.2.a    the reason the target was attacked. 
The bridge was identified as a military target 273 within the overall mission of Operation 
Allied Force to degrade and halt the campaign of ethnic cleansing by the Serbian forces in 
southern Kosovo.274 One important tactic involved the breaking up of the Serbian forces into 
smaller pockets, hence the denial to them of strategic bridges, road links, and other systems 
used for the transportation of oil and petrol, essential for the widespread use of military 
vehicles.275 The outcome of the Committee determined that the pilot and the WSO were 
targeting the bridge and not the train. There were no grounds for an investigation concerning 
                                                          
270 Final ICTY Report above n172 at 58. 
271 Final ICTY Report above n172 at 59. 
272 Final ICTY Report above n172 at 61. 
273 Final ICTY Report above n172 ‘in combat, military commanders are required to a) direct their operations 
against military objectives…’ 8 at 28. 
274 Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign - The Crisis in Kosovo above n 172 1, 2.  
www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/nato/Nat bm200-01.htm  
275 Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign.. As above n274. 1, 2 Citing n8; Testimony of General Henry 
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the attack on the bridge, neither was there sufficient information regarding command 
responsibility either at the crew level or at a higher level of command.276  
2.2.2.b    Weapons deployed in the attack  
The aircraft deployed was the F-16 fighter.277 Flown by many of the NATO partners, and 
with a speed of 1,500 mph. the latest version has the capacity to locate and attack targets in 
all weather conditions. The payload is comprised of two 2,000lb dumb bombs and two AIM-
9 and two AIM-20 laser guided missiles. In addition, the external armoury consists of up to 
six air-to-air missiles; conventional air-to-air missiles and air-to-surface missiles. The F15C-
1 carries a crew of one; the F-16D-2, a crew of two, the pilot and the weapons systems 
officer. 
The weapons used; EGBU-27. These 500lb laser-guided precision bombs, are the 
most widely known, chosen specifically for high-precision strikes. the letter E in the name 
indicating it was upgraded with guidance from GPS satellites.  In relation to the weaponry 
deployed, the types of dumb gravity bombs as used in earlier conflicts are deployed together 
with the rapidly developing precision weaponry.278  
Maverick missiles, known as “launch and leave” weapons, as they could be launched 
from the aircraft, from high altitude to tree-top height, and left to find their own way to the 
target. The distance available for travelling to the target varies from a few thousand feet to 
13 nautical miles, flying at a medium height. these Maverick missiles are equipped with an 
electro-optical television system which links with a 5-inch television screen in the cockpit 
of the aircraft. The pilot selects the target, locks on, and launches the weapon. The latest 
infra-red navigational system in the missile allows it to be used in all types of weather. 
2.2.2.c the proportionality assessment  
The rapid increase in the use of precision weapons, influences all aspects of the relationships 
between the commander, weaponry, and the civilian, while at the same time such 
relationships extend to the texts of the LOAC causing tensions in how to balance the 
intentions of the drafters of the humanitarian conventions with the realities of the means and 
methods of contemporary warfare.   
Gardam reminds us that, with API as the relevant treaty, specifically Articles 51(5)(b) 
and 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b), ‘…what these provisions require is an assessment before the attack 
                                                          
  276 Final ICTY Report above n172 18 at 61 and 62. 
  277 The F-16 fighter.www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/1    last accessed 12.12.2015. 
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as to the anticipated military advantage and whether the civilian damage is likely to be 
excessive in relation thereto.’279 
When undertaking such assessments, as noted in the previous chapter,280 one means 
by which planners and commanders can obtain guidance in the assessment of proportionality 
is through the interpretation of humanitarian treaties and conventions, together with 
reference to State practice in all its forms. State practice of the US illustrates the quandaries 
faced by contemporary commanders; ‘The main problem with the principle of 
proportionality is not whether or not it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied. 
It is relatively simple to state that there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate 
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects.’281 The task facing the commander is the 
reconciliation of proportionality with the law of weaponry, against a background where the 
facts of the target situation change from mission to mission. 
Whereas despite correct control procedures being followed, the occurrence of 
collateral damage appears in two situations beyond the intent of a commander; first, where 
there is a mistake in identifying the specifics of a target at the last moment and frequently 
under conditions of stress for the pilot concerned, and, second, where there is a change of 
circumstances during the last few seconds of a mission. In relation to this, the concept of 
“intent” is acquiring prominence since the founding of the ICC. The Russian Federation, in 
2010 stated that ‘We resolutely condemn both wilful attacks against civilians and civilian 
loss of life as a result of … disproportionate use of force, which is a gross violation of 
international humanitarian law.’282  
 ‘Air power is more susceptible to legal and policy adjustment than ground combat, in light 
of the variations of the means and methods of attack available through variation in munitions, 
delivery azimuth, aim point, fuse and explosive, all amplified with the assistance of computer 
simulation.’283      
2.2.2.d    The temporal triangle 
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281 United States, Department of Justice, Statement of Interest of the United States submitted to the US 
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In the case of this temporal triangle, ‘TCT sometimes allows the JAG only a split second to 
formulate advice involving life and death.’284 Is there however, a limit to what any human 
being can cognitively control? Adams notes that ‘More and more aspects of warfighting are 
not only leaving the realm of human senses, but also crossing outside the limit of human 
reaction times…in short, the military systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will 
be too fast, too small, too numerous, and will create an environment too complex for humans 
to direct’.285 Time and information are tightly locked together and it is difficult to discuss 
one without awareness of the other. 
Human beings require spaces in the unfolding of world events to cognitively make 
sense of what is happening at a specific point in time. When the amount of data cascades and 
accumulates to such an extent that it leads to a situation of information overload, this 
cognitive understanding is challenged, leading to potential mistakes in understanding and 
decision making. There are actually two situations at work together in the case of the 
commander; due to modern technology, there is the physical amount of data available, and 
second, again due to the speed of contemporary weaponry, there is less and less time actually 
available for a reasoned decision. 
From the available facts given by expert commentators, and from the fact that the 
Prosecutor refused a further detailed enquiry whereby further details would have been made 
public (which may or may not have added to the discussion), the conclusion is that there was 
adequate time available for the commander to reach a reasonable assessment of the principle 
of proportionality. The weaponry used as the base-line for the temporal triangle, the A-10, 
had the capacity to drop dumb bombs, and, with the later up—dates in its armament system, 
some precision-guided weapons. The following chapter, Iraq, utilises precision-guided 
weapons, whether some weapons are “precision” weapons or not, and this conversation 
continues throughout the remainder of the study. This mixture of compression of time, 
human mistake, and secondary air-strikes are developing this pattern of unforeseeable error 
which is considered throughout the three case studies. 
There is now notice being taken that ‘Unplanned strikes, however, do not allow the 
military sufficient time to thoroughly estimate collateral damage.’286 Adams notes that ‘more 
and more aspects of warfighting are not only leaving the realm of human senses, but also 
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crossing outside the limits of human reaction times.’287 Within these parameters is 
information, and the ‘… proliferation of information-based systems will produce a data 
overload that will make it difficult or impossible for humans to directly intervene in decision 
making’. 288  
 ‘Many of the objections to the use of proportionality focus on how hard it is for 
commanders to make such calculations when they are in battle or in other situations where 
quick decisions need to be made and where there is no time for elaborate calculations’.289 
This statement justifies the claim made at the beginning of this study that the principle of 
proportionality is in danger of being affected by the use of such weaponry, although it is 
regrettable that at this point in time there are not more detailed accounts available. 
There are two points to be made; first, when referring to the use of dumb bombs, it 
is the speed of the aircraft delivering them from the aim point (an airfield) to the target that 
is important. The bombs themselves fall according to the laws of gravity. Second, as the 
speed of aircraft increased, parallel advances in the field of weapons technology meant that 
the weapons themselves acquired guidance systems which enabled them to perform tasks 
according to pre-set computerised programmes, whether they were released by aircraft or 
fired from ground based launch pads.290  
As a result of such intense levels of planning, ‘In practice, only 20 of the approximately 
23,000 munitions expended by NATO in the 1999 Balkan air operation caused collateral 
damage or civilian casualties. Some others were deliberately steered off course to avoid 
harming civilians who had not been seen in the target area until the last moment.’ 291  
2.3 Application of the temporal triangle  
The diagram illustrates the relatively slow rate of delivery, both of the speed of the aircraft 
itself and, which provided commanders with sufficient time for decision making, including 
assessment of the proportionality principle. 
The temporal triangle is most effectively viewed as a two-part diagram, the 
background and the base-line. Within the Kosovo narrative, the base-line is at its lowest 
level, the speed of the slowest aircraft and weaponry. The large amount of background 
environment remaining represents the fact that there was sufficient time available for 
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reasonable command decision making when assessment of the principle of proportionality 
was executed before the attack. 
The background is the most permanent of the two, with the base-line moving upward 
across the background as the speed of the weapons system increases. This background 
illustrates the environment in which the principle of proportionality exists, together with 
other humanitarian principles, in the law of armed conflict. Represented by the shaded 
section of the diagram, this proportionality environment is gradually reduced as the base-
line moves from the slowest weaponry speed to the highest. As time is the concept in which 
the particular environment exists, this reduction in space shows how the time available to 
the commander is correspondingly reduced. 
The A-10 Thunderbolt 292was widely deployed during the campaign, including the 
Djakovice convoy incident. Used as close air support for ground troops, including the 
deployment of some dumb bombs, the single pilot A-10 has a speed of 450 mph with a range 
of 2,580 mph. It carries a large and varied load of ordnance; Maverick AGM 65 missiles. 
Referring to the temporal triangle, and repeating the fact that the specifications for 
some precision-guided weapons remains classified information, the speed of the slowest 
aircraft, the A-10 fighter in the Djakovice concoy incident is used to provide the base-line 
(450 mph) for the comparisons with the aircraft in the following Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts. The white (empty) area biting into the black/grey “proportionality” background 
indicates how much proportionality time is available for commanders to make decisions. As 
the speeds increase, this shaded area lessens until at the highest speeds of over 1,000 mph 
there is very little shaded proportionality time left. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The Kosovo campaign produced the lowest number of civilian casualties since the Vietnam 
War.293 Whilst this is a positive indicator, producing such a result can come with a heavy 
price, and to ‘… be respected, international humanitarian law must continue to rationally 
balance humanitarian concerns with military necessity.’294 Schmitt notes that ‘…strictly 
speaking, there is no direct relationship between precision and the proportionality principle 
as a matter of law, there is a very real de facto nexus.’295 
                                                          
 292 The A-10 Thunderbolt; www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/1   last accessed 
12.12.2015. 
293 BS Lambeth ‘The Synergy of Air and Space’ (Summer 1998) Airpower Journal 1 219. 
294 Schmitt above n211 ‘Precision attack and international humanitarian law’ 445, 456.  
  295 Schmitt above n211 ‘Precision attack and international humanitarian law’ 445, 457. 
67 
 
Possibly the acceptance of this “nexus” offers one tangible method of ensuring the 
survival of the principle of proportionality in an age of uncertainty and increasing speed and 
desired precision. Proportionality continues to perplex those who attempt to interpret and 
apply it, to the point where even the ICTY Commission ‘… reflected on the considerable 
intellectual difficulties associated with the implementation of the proportionality rule.’296 It 
is clear that efforts were made during these three attacks to enforce the tenets of avoiding 
“excessive” damage to civilians; the resulting collateral damage was due to accident, the one 
element that cannot be factored into any risk element of an ROE.  
Experts consider that finding an agreed common standard or metric for the principle 
of proportionality would be a significant step in the general understanding of this principle. 
Newton and May have, amongst other proposals, suggested the “common denominator 
principle” which has the aim of balancing the values found in every proportionality 
calculation.297   
Summarising the issues of accident and mistake; in the Grdelica gorge incident, once 
the missile was locked onto the target, despite the best efforts of the pilot, it was inevitable 
that the missile would strike the train. Whereas in the Djakovice convoy incident, there was 
genuine mistake on the part of the first F-16 pilot as to the identity of the vehicles in the 
convoy.  
Towards the end of the conflict, it was realized that ‘Strategic attacks on Serbian 
centres of gravity, not the destruction of Serb tanks and troops in Kosovo, paved the way for 
NATO’s victory in Operation Allied Force, according to the man who ran the air 
campaign’.298  Centres of gravity are ‘Characteristic(s), capability(ies), or locality(ies) from 
which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derive its freedom of action, 
physical strength or will to fight’.299 Since then, the ICC recognizes that attacking civilians 
and civilian objects now constitutes a war crime subject to specific criteria being met.300 
However, as recently as 2012, the UN Secretary General noted there had been little progress 
in protecting civilians from deliberate targeting, indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, 
and other violations of humanitarian law.  
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The difference between planned and unplanned strikes will be considered in more 
detail in the following chapter, the conflict in Iraq. Although the accidental bombing of the 
Chinese Embassy was also a controversial incident, its cause was found to be faulty 
targeting information rather than a time element.301   
‘The employment of dumb bombs has not been rendered unlawful by the advent of 
precision guided or “smart” bombs, but developing technology does bring with it a change 
in the standards effecting the choice of munitions when taking the precautions …’ 302  (The 
precautions noted here being API Art 57 (2).) 
Conflicting facts and opinions distort the construction of a clear picture of what 
occurred… being survivors of the attack, many if not all of the witnesses so medically 
shocked    unable to present any coherent … but with the passage of time,,, a more accurate 
and stable picture emerges from which credible evidence can be accrued, sufficient to 
provide in some cases, facts that will support accusations of war crimes. Historically there 
had been disquiet that the security of the civilian in a rapidly changing world was 
insufficiently determined, leading to the drafting of the two 1977 Additional Protocols; their 
scope of application being, the first dealing with international armed conflicts (IACs), and 
the second dealing with non-international armed conflicts (NIAC)s. An additional Article 
was added later in the form of Common Article 3 (CA3),303 this being a precisiated 
convention addressing only internal armed conflicts. How these texts continue to support the 
civilian is the subject matter of the following two chapters. 
Finally, Tirpak considers that ‘Operation Allied Force proved that true precision air 
attack- once a far-off goal but now taken for granted has become an indispensable 
capability.’304  
           The following pages contains the diagram of the temporal triangle, a simple device to 
visually impart a difficult concept. By containing the proportionality principle within a 
bounded space and giving it a colour to further define it, this principle, one of many in the 
legal firmament, can be imagined in a realistic manner, rather than something nebulous “out 
there” which is not a clear legal object like a contract or a trust. Each chapter has its own 
discrete diagram. 
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THE TEMPORAL TRIANGLE 
 
 
The triangle is most effectively viewed as a two-part diagram, with the shaded background 
of the proportionality environment, with the variable neutral baselines indicating time and 
speed above this. 
 
The background illustrates the environment of the proportionality principle in the LOAC and 
includes all the other principles and issues relevant to the assessment of proportionality at a 
specific time and place in a particular mission – and no other. In this case it is the attack on 
the Djakovice convoy. As the baseline rises, the space below it becomes empty. This leaves 
reducing levels of the background environment (of which time is one element) available for 
command decision making. 
 
Here, the baseline is at its lowest level, indicating the speed of the slowest aircraft involved 
in the attack, the aircraft used for surveillance and reporting of the battle in progress. It also 
reflects the slower operating speeds of dumb bombs. The background environment is full, 
indicating ample time for decision making ahead of the event. 
 
The side of the diagram a-c indicates the speed of the aircraft. 
The side of the diagram a-b indicates the distance between the launch point and the target. 
 
The given facts are used as there were no (to my knowledge) other aircraft involved in the 
actual destruction of the convoy which were not deploying precision weapons. There were 
other “slow” aircraft, significantly the B-52 stealth bombers but which operated from high 
altitudes and mainly at night. 
 
In the next chapter, the conflict in Iraq, the temporal baseline rises to the mid-level, indicating 
the configurations of precision weapons in a different proportionality environment. 
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TEMPORAL TRIANGLE - KOSOVO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Launch (a)  to  (b)  -  the distance line; the distance between the launch point and the target (b). 
Launch (a)  to  (c)  -  the speed line; how fast the weapon travels between the launch point and the target (b). 
Background  -  this shaded area constitutes the presence of the principle of proportionality in the temporal 
matrix. This shading will change with each case study, illustrating how this proportionality is degraded by the 
differing speeds of the weapons used, until the diagram changes from a completely shaded fill to a nearly empty 
space. 
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Chapter Three: Proportionality305 in the Iraq war 
The battles in Iraq, and particularly that in Fallujah, was fought primarily with precision 
weapons chosen specifically for their use in urban situations. The “Fallujah Model” as it is 
generally named, illustrates the closeness with which Allied air and ground forces co-
operated as a single fighting unit, and as Yves Sandoz 306 observes, ‘…the fact cannot be 
ignored that most contemporary armed conflicts are conducted on land,’ To this end, the two 
case studies, one on the air war and one on the land war, use a “proxy” approach, whereby 
unknown actors are used within strictly factual situations to illustrate proportionality, 
precision weapons and the temporal triangle in their application in relation to this strategic 
model.  
Chapter Two has proposed that the principle of proportionality307 was not yet heavily 
influenced by the introduction of precision weapons in 1999, while in comparison, the Iraq 
conflict reflects the extraordinary expansion in the use of these of different capacities, 
particularly that of speed. However, the battle of Fallujah illustrates some areas where the 
principle could be seriously challenged.308 In these cases, the principle of proportionality is 
assessed during the attack; in this instance, upon a densely populated area which also raises 
the issue of indiscriminate attacks,309 and the difference between civilian houses and enemy-
occupied houses. Movement of civilian populations into urban conurbations is increasing, 
due to social pressures of employment and quality of life,310 elevating the risk of civilian 
casualties in the event of an armed conflict, and such co-locating between combatant and 
non-combatants increases the workloads and responsibilities of all the military personnel 
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concerned, particularly the commanders and the lawyers involved in the assessment of 
specific missions.  
The temporal triangle for Iraq illustrates how at best the commander may have merely 
half the usual time311 for consideration when proportionality is being assessed during a 
mission, due either to a change of plan, a mistake, or an unforeseen circumstance. The 
importance of this compression of available time is made clear by Gardam; ‘The clarification 
of where the onus lies for complying with the requirements of proportionality paves the way 
for the criminal liability of the individuals concerned for any such failure.’312 However, since 
the declaration of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 
2016  not to consider failures of proportionality, any charges of indiscriminate attacks would 
need to be generated within the national courts of the defendant. 
3.1  Precision weapons313 
Precision weapons had proved their air superiority in the Kosovo conflict. That had been 
fought over open countryside; the battle of Fallujah however was a different matter, being 
that of an urban space, of narrow alley-ways and crowded houses and small shops. It was in 
both the airspace above, on the ground space between, and in the basements and tunnels 
below these objects that the next generation of precision weapons were deployed. (This 
thesis avoids the inclusion of fully autonomous weapons, which have many differences to 
fired weapons.314 Their inclusion would result in an overload of weaponry related text as 
balanced against that available for the discussion of the principle of proportionality). 
Precision guided weapons (PGMs) are directed by on-board computer algorithms. 
They are not the platforms which deliver them such as aircraft, but are high technology 
weapons which are guided, neither are they self-automated systems.315 Sine notes further 
that the preciseness of a weapon ‘… must be calculated considering all the variables 
associated with weapons employment, including navigation accuracy, weapons effects, 
undesired effects, and potential unintended effects.’316 Expanding upon this, he gives a clear 
definition of a precision weapon when used in the context of Effects Based Operations 
                                                          
  311 This is elaborated in the section dealing with the temporal triangle; see p 107. 
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(EBO)317 as ‘…including the context within which the weapon will be employed to include 
the target, its environment, the desired and undesired effects, and the rules of engagement’.318  
It is not, however, required to employ precision weapons should other weapons be available 
which would be more suitable under the circumstances.319 
           There are many types of such weapons, each of which provides the means of causing 
a specific, measurable tactical effect while minimizing undesired effects. Dependent on 
scenario, this effect must be quantifiable, assessable and predictable’.320 Put more simply, it 
means using the least amount of explosive of the correct type to attain the desired aim and 
placing it as near to the target as possible. In the case study, the target may have been a 
suspect insurgent taking shelter in the house of IHAT 127,321  and the use of a precision 
weapon could have caused the death of the suspect through a limited explosion rather than 
through a massive explosion capable of reducing the whole building to rubble. 
          The precision weapon carries with it a whole environment not only of the physical 
machinery which implements the intended operation, but also the new languages of military 
command and control and computer science which always evolve with new developments 
in any discipline. There will be occasions when it is necessary for commanders and pilots to 
assess proportionality during a strike; due to last minute changes in strategy, or targets, the 
sudden appearance of civilians in a designated target zone, or shifts in predicted weather 
patterns, and as is usual, if one thing is changed many others are required to do so in order 
to keep the battle order true to the original design.  
As previously noted, a major aspect of contemporary warfare is that it is increasingly 
being fought in areas of high human density, the urban space.322  Attacking the civilians or 
civilian objects within such centres, whether large or small, are prohibited. Due to the greater 
risk of damage to civilians and their property due to this crowding, the rules of engagement   
applies more stringent legal rules in these circumstances than in other conflict situations 
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where the population is more widely spread,323 and there is evidence that “urban warfare” 
poses serious challenges for future military operations. Kreuder records that in 2008, half the 
world’s population already live in urban areas. ‘By 2020, the United Nations (UN) estimates 
this figure will reach 55%. This trend will likely continue through 2050, when the UN 
predicts a staggering 70% of the world’s population will live in or near cities.’324 Kreuder 
notes further that the reasons large cities present major targets is that they contain centres of 
political, economic and military importance, and these items of terrain, population and 
infrastructure meld together forming a complex matrix called the urban triad. 
3.1.1 Weapons deployed in the Fallujah conflict. 
“Precision” in relation to weaponry is also dependent on circumstances prevailing at the time 
of the attack. The concept of precision as a tactical capability, as portrayed by Sine, helps in 
the understanding of this facility, as, similar to proportionality its objective has the capacity 
to change from one mission to the next, and as such, the type and amount of explosive may 
change to fit the requirements of destroying the target. As the word “precision” implies 
clarity, so the words describing it in its modern form require clearness in themselves. 
  Therefore terminology becomes important, as by some, drones are called aircraft and  
by others, just their generic names are sufficient indicators of what they are, good examples 
being the Predator and the Reaper. A further development being the “systems platform”, is 
this an aircraft, a drone, or something specific unto itself.  For ease of reading, this study 
uses the word “aircraft” for all fixed-wing aircraft; helicopters for helicopters; and drones 
for all manned and unmanned vehicles, from the massive Predator with the ability to launch 
its own missiles; and “missiles” to cover all bombs and rockets.325 
  The niceties of these calibrations are highlighted when it becomes necessary to make 
the choice of a precision weapon for the temporal triangle, will it be an aircraft, a drone, or 
a missile. What these weapons are, as in the triad above, is immaterial. It is all a matter of 
speed, and the effect this produces on the time a commander has for making reasonable 
decisions concerning proportionality.  
During the build-up to this conflict (now called the Second Battle of Fallujah), it was 
realised that the most efficient method of achieving the strategic aims of rapid success and 
keeping the level of civilian casualties as low as possible, lay in deploying the air forces and 
                                                          
323 Reynolds above n12 1, 7. which gives in full the outline of the Restrictions and Rules of Engagement for 
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  324 Kreuder above n305 1, 1. 
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the ground forces jointly,326 in fast-moving series of attacks, rotating both day and night. To 
this end, weapons were chosen with care, specific weapons for specific strikes particularly 
those with “first-strike capability”,327 with this model of a joint air and ground attack rapidly 
became the template for future air-to-ground attacks. 
  3.1.1.1 The Air War  
Aircraft form part of the strategic defence force of a State, and of the Allied Forces involved 
in this “second battle of Fallujah”328, the US and the UK provided the largest percentile 
numbers of aircraft of all types. For the purpose of this study, three are briefly described 
here, and in more detail in the case-studies.  
First, the AC-130 gunship (US Air Force) – the heavy AC130 Coalition Air Support 
(CAS) transports supplies of weapons and fuel necessary for the prosecution of the conflict. 
Derived from the Boeing Hercules, this large four-engine machine possesses a variety of 
roles from transportation of supplies and heavy equipment to the close air support given to 
the troops329 on the ground when in battlefield situations as when a small unit of troops is 
pinned down or ambushed by insurgents, the unit may run short of ammunition or be taking 
casualties and require additional manpower to halt further attacks.330   
Second, the F-16 fighter-bomber (US Air Force).331 Due to its precision abilities, 
used for the “first-strike a success” concept which furthers the aim of reducing civilian 
casualties as it reduces the number of return strikes, played a lead role in the “persistent strike 
and surveillance” strategy 
Third, the Hercules Royal Air Force (RAF) C130K CI/3.332 Manufactured by 
Lockheed, and deployed as a large air transport vehicle designed to carry troops, up to 28 
passengers and 20 tonnes of pallet freight, stores and equipment. Powered by four turbo-
prop engines and with a range of 3,500 to 4,000 miles, with the aid of mid-air fuelling, this 
aircraft provided an ideal carrier between Europe and the Middle East. 
                                                          
326 Illustrating the development of “Combined Command”, a strategic concept demonstrated particularly in 
the following chapter, the Afghanistan campaign. 
  327 Head above n305 105, 120. 
328 The first battle of Fallujah, as it was later called, was the first Allied attempt to control the rising number 
of disturbances in the city following the murder and desecration of four civilians working for the Allies. The 
outcome was never decided, and the situation deteriorated to the point where the second intervention, with 
the assent of the local governor, was required. 
329 “Troops” is a general generic term used to describe the military who fight on the ground, and includes 
members of the Allied armies, Marines, Sea, Air and Land forces (SEALS), and Special Forces. 
330 AC-130 Coalition Air Support (CAS) - Report: Operation Iraqi Freedom – By the Numbers   USCENTAF     
30 April 2003. www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/af/oifcentaf.pdf  accessed 05/01/2009; above n304 Head 
105,120. 
  331 Lockheed Martin F-16. Air Force Magazine “Air Force Classics” December 2015. 
  332 RAF Hercules: http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/hercC1C3.cfm  
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3.1.1.2 The Ground War 
Both heavy and light armour was deployed in the Fallujah conflict. The heavy armour 
included the US M1 Abrams tank, equipped with a large array of weaponry with the capacity 
of demolishing walls and entire buildings. Light armour included howitzers, indirect fire 
weapons which can be fired without a “line of sight” to the targets, that is aiming at targets 
which cannot be seen, for example ‘…over the tops of buildings.’333 The US and other 
ground forces carried a variety of small arms weapons, service revolvers, long-range rifles 
and hand-grenades. More details of the crew and their obligations are given in the second 
case study, ‘The Tank Commander.’ 
Leading the list of what are now defined as precision weapons, and recognized by 
the public generally as “drones”, deployed by both ground and air forces, is the MQ-1 
Predator, valued as it can overcome the “line of sight” issue and find its own way to the 
target,334  and which also possesses persistent battlespace abilities.335  In addition, the Joint 
Direct Attack Munition (J-Dam), GBU-31; a GPS Guided Bomb,336 the GBU -12 Paveway 
II laser-guided bombs,337  and in an addition, large numbers of dumb gravity bombs were 
dropped,338 proving that although modern precision weapons are desirable in many cases, 
dumb bombs also have roles to play in scenarios where large-scale destruction of infra-
structures is required, as with the destruction of runways or storage facilities. 
3.1.2 The Allies Command Structure 
At the head of the command structure, ‘…the United States Central Command 
(USCENTCOM) issued the orders and policies which would direct military operations 
                                                          
  333 Corderoy and Perkins above n305 1, 15. 
334 MQ-9 Predator Aircraft. 
Manufacturer General Atomic Aeronautical Systems.   
Specifications: Speed - 120 KTAS; Altitude - 25,000 feet; Endurance – 35 hours; 
Mission ISR; Interdiction; close air support; force protection; combat search and rescue; remote operations 
video enhanced receiver operations.  This aircraft flew in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Has both line of sight and 
beyond line of sight capabilities.http://www.ga.asi.com/aircraftplatforms  accessed 04/11/16; Grant above n 
305 48, 51. 
  335 Grant above n305 48, 52; Head above n305 105, 120. 
336 Joint Direct Attack Munition (J-Dam) – GBU-3. Type; J-Dams, where tail kits were attached to dumb 
bombs. 
Manufacturer -  Boeing: Specifications; Guidance semi-active laser (man-in-the-loop); Range 8 nautical miles; 
CEP  9 metres; Weight 800 lbs. Mission: Neutralizes targets at long-range with precision accuracy. Add-on 
laser sensor kits to prosecute moving, re-locatable or maritime targets. Modular capability enhancement – small 
diameter bomb with ultra-low level of collateral damage – focused lethality. Can be leveraged as ground 
artillery weapon. http://wwwboeing.com  accessed 04/11/16.   
  337 Corderoy and Perkins above n305 1, 11. 
  338 Corderoy and Perkins above n305 1, 17. 
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within the recognized battle space of Iraq. Three other agencies were involved in this task; 
the Combined Forces Land Component (CFLCC), the V Corps and Combined Joint Task 
Force’,339 with the Command Hub for Iraq being located in the US Combined Air Operations 
Centre in Qatar. 
The primary political goal of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was to establish a stable 
Iraq with its territorial integrity intact and a broad based government that renounced 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) development and use, and no longer supported terror 
or threatened its neighbours. Following from this, the Combined Force Commander’s top 
three objectives were to defeat or compel capitulation of Iraq’s military forces; to neutralize 
the regime leadership’ and to neutralize Iraq theatre ballistic missile system, WMDs, 
delivery systems. Together with this, Air Force operations focussed upon security, stability 
transition and reconstruction.340 
Upon the outbreak of conflict in 2001, there were two clear stages of separation in 
the intended battle order; the initial stage, with the strategic aim of removing the Head of 
State of the Baa’th party, and the second stage of “belligerent occupation”. The first, 
Operation “Iraqi Freedom” began 19 March 2003 and ended 30 June 2004.341  
With over 50 countries contributing to this war effort, command and control was 
complex and difficult, a standard for Command and Control was sought, resulting in NATO 
launching the Combined Training Initiative (CTI). Its mission noted that it, NATO, took 
advantage of the changing conditions to take NATO interoperability and operational 
readiness to a higher level, being based on NATO’s three components of interoperability; 
the technical, the procedural, and the human. 
First, the technical involved plurality of countries involved in exercises carried out 
sometimes outside their own borders; 
Second, the procedural involved two processes; doctrinal, the joint utilization of 
“lessons learned” from previous exercises, and organizational, the codifying of techniques 
and procedural tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to mitigate doctrinal diversity 
together with a focus on the functional interoperability of TTP disseminated through 
                                                          
  339 Warren above n305 167, 168. 
  340 http://www.afhso.af.mil/topic/factsheet/facts.asp?id=18635  
341 MN Schmitt ‘Iraq (2003 onwards)’ in E Wilmshurst ed International Law and the Classification of      
Conflicts (OUP Oxford 2012) 362; Grant above n305;  Head above n305 105, 106. 
78 
 
NATO’s Centres of Excellence (COE) in training facilities in Europe and the US.342 (The 
third, human, does not relate to this section). 
            In addition to the regular Standing Orders, “Fragmentary orders” were issued to 
soldiers of all ranks from officers to the lowest ranks in times of emergency, when situation 
on the battlefield are changing so rapidly that there is no time to go through the regular 
channels of communication and publication. One example343 ‘re-emphasised adherence to 
the law of armed conflict, directed that all forces under their command be treated with dignity 
and respect, and required dissemination of the memorandum down to the platoon level.’  
Specific guidelines exist in the LOAC for the formation of a combined operations 
group of States. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the operations of such a coalition would on 
occasion overlap, due to the timescales of the missions. Particular rules apply when several 
States are working together in unison against a common enemy.344 Intended to reduce 
misunderstandings and friction between States of differing cultures, languages and political 
systems, these rules are general in construction and neutral in application. Specifically, in 
identifying the applicable law, these rules mediate the range of ‘…problems that arise when 
different legal obligations exist among the partners in a combined operation.’345 
 The forces operating in Iraq were members of an ad hoc coalition (coalition of the 
willing). Whether or not the members are part of a coalition or part of a permanent group 
such as NATO is immaterial; providing they willingly participate in the operation under a 
unified command structure, this qualifies them as contributing to the combined operations. 
In battlefield conditions as in Fallujah, the speed of the operational activity both on the 
ground and in the air that commanders will have neither the time nor inclination to question 
the quality or veracity of the stream of superior orders requiring their attention.  
 In conjunction with this is the issue of different cultures and languages. With over fifty 
participating States, ... the rules deal with this situation by stipulating that ‘The legal 
obligations of a State … do not change when its armed forces are operating in a multinational 
force under the command and control of a military commander of a different nationality.’ As 
these rules are laid down in treaty law and custom, the habit has developed, when a dispute 
arises among the States, to leave those concerned to reach a compromise. One example given 
                                                          
342 J Derieth ‘Enhancing the Combined Training Initiative, (2015) at        
http://www.nato.int/document/Review/2015/enhancing-ir  
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being, as in the attack on the area of Fallujah which killed IHAT 271, one State may agree 
to carry out a lethal attack while another may strongly disagree. The operational tasks could 
be separated, where one State would deploy an aircraft to guide and protect the attacking 
aircraft deployed by the other State.346 
 Correll347 writes that, following the Vietnam War the US government sought a new 
method, or approach on waging future conflicts. This “Revolution in Military Affairs” 
reflected the advances made in both civilian and military technology, moving increasingly 
towards control systems reliant upon space-based platforms. Its stated intention being not to 
destroy the enemy but achieve a strategic result.  
This Effects-Based Operations strategy was the move away from the traditional   
titanic battles between massed armies to the more agile, responsive, forces of the present 
day. The variable conditions of warfare as found in Korea and Vietnam made accurate 
targeting difficult although there were instances of successful specific avoidance tactics by 
the US Air Force.348  From information to the aircrew who use it and the aircraft available. 
The three basic principles of weapons law remain: first, that the means and methods of 
warfare are not unlimited; second, the principle of distinction; and third, the principle of 
humanity which has retained its structure from the Preamble of the St. Petersburg 
Convention, to the text of API Article 35(2), then to the text of the CCW.349 The principle 
of proportionality now occupies a space in the idea of strategic integrated planning, 
introduced in the 2010 edition of the US FM - 50.350 
The following section addresses the theatres of war where such strategic planning 
was instrumented. 
3.2  The Case Studies 
The second attack on Fallujah is the campaign recognized as “the battle of Fallujah”, with 
the second, from 8th November to 23rd December 2004 (Operation Phantom Fury).351 Within 
these factual boundaries, the principle of proportionality is assessed during the course of the 
attack, with emphasis upon the issues of indiscriminate attacks, civilian objects and military 
objects. The attack on one of the populous towns in Iraq raised many issues, however of 
                                                          
346 In the LOAC, the word “attack” is strictly defined as an act of violence, whether in offence or defence.     
above n7 HPCR 11. 
347 JG Correll ‘Casualties’ (June 2003) Air Force Magazine 48 - 53. 
348 Hallion above n174 1-19. 
349 Haines above n210  279-281. 
350 WW Grigsby et al ‘Integrated Planning; The Operations Process, Design, and the Military Decision 
Making Process’ (January – February 2011) Military Review 28-35. 
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these, there were two legal aspects of particular importance; the rules concerning civilian 
objects and those concerning military objects.  
Such was the complexity of this campaign, that it was difficult to decide on a specific 
item of civilian damage against which to assess the proportionality principle. So widespread 
was the damage and suffering across the face of the battle zone,352 that this study decided to 
take a non-personal approach. By this was meant, building proxy civilian and military 
scenarios behind facts taken from real life sources; these being firstly the IHAT Database353, 
which gives only numbers and no names; and for the second case-study, the experiences of 
a US tank commander in the ground war, which includes a reference to indiscriminate 
attacks. 
3.2.1  A Fallujah incident – IHAT 271. 
This data-base was used to provide an element of fact, and recognition is given to the 
tragedies behind the lists of victims of war. IHAT 271 gives a person a place within what 
has become known as one of the most vicious battles of modern times, an incident which 
would have been replicated many times over as the battle progressed. 
  3.2.1. a     The reason the target was attacked.  
The first battle of Fallujah, although considered successful at the time as it temporarily 
calmed the civic life of the city proved short lived, and the second battle was aimed at 
bringing to an end the strife between returning insurgents, various other interest groups and 
local civilians in preparation for intended local elections. 
Designated “Phantom Fury”, the strategic aim of the second assault on Fallujah was 
to finally rid the town of insurgents, who had been increasing in numbers since the deaths of 
four foreign civilian workers earlier in the year. The terms of operational mission focussed 
upon identifying and destroying specific primary nodes of insurgent activity identified by 
intelligence reports, including that of indigenous Iraqi civilians, and associated with this, to 
attack individual insurgents who were targeting the Allied forces with a wide range of 
weapons from Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) to small arms fire. To prevent the escape 
of insurgents to the outside world, and the re-supply of their weapons, a heavily policed 
cordon was thrown around the city,354 which remained in place until the end of the fighting 
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353 The Iraq Historical Allegations Team above n321, followed two lines of enquiry; allegations of 
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  3.2.1.b  the weapons deployed in the air attack. 
To re-iterate from the previous chapter, a precision guided missile PGM is a missile, bomb 
or artillery shell equipped with a terminal guidance system. Since the Kosovo war, great 
advances had been made in the development of precision vehicles and systems of all types 
of air and ground weapons, however restraints on laser-guided bombs include the fact that 
they need a clear line of sight between the laser seeker and the laser spot beam designating 
the target. A further restraint being their inability to operate to their best levels under adverse 
weather conditions, rain, dust.355  
 It is noticeable by this stage in aerial warfare how many different types of “aerial 
vehicles” were being deployed in the Fallujah incident, with some names being applied to 
apparently different vehicles; as an example, an aircraft can be a fixed wing aircraft, a rotary 
wing helicopter, or an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). It is a strange fact that a “drone” can 
be called an aircraft, yet this is what they are; as with the MQ-9 Predator Aircraft. (n333). 
This particular drone has wings, a stabilizing structure similar to a tail, and looks like an 
aircraft. However, the drones of the future may look totally different and have different 
classifications altogether. The initials before the name of a military aircraft indicates the 
classification of its use; for example  the F-15 aircraft means “Fighter” aircraft, with the 
number 15 indicating the particular model at a certain stage of development. 
A wide range of aircraft of the variety of coalition Air Forces were deployed to 
airfields in the surrounding area, each country contributing according to availability and 
expertise. While the US provided the largest contingent of heavy bombers, strike aircraft and 
helicopters; specialised aircraft including intelligence gathering platforms such as the Boeing 
E-8a J-Stars356 together with the Boeing KC -135 re-fuelling tankers 357 deployed by the US 
Air Force, without which the whole operation would not have been possible. From these, 
this Study considers three aircraft which were in continuous deployment during the battle, 
particularly during the first few days when the “persistent strike and surveillance” 
programme was at its height. The specific details of these aircraft have already been given 
in the previous section, 3.1.1.1., however this section illustrates their particular contribution 
to the outcome of the conflict in this specific circumstance. 
                                                          
  355 Definition of a precision guided missile; http://www.GlobalSecurity.org. accessed 04/11/16. 
356 Type: J-Stars; Manufacturer: Boeing; Specifications: Speed 405-445 kph; Altitude 41- 45,000 feet; 
Endurance 11.5 – 12.5 hours; Mission: Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. 
http://www.boeing.com/defense/jstars/index.page#specs  accessed 04/11/16. 
357 Type: KC-135; Manufacturer: Boeing; Specifications: Speed – 530 mph; Altitude – 30,000 feet; Mission:  
Aerial re-fuelling and airlift. Re-fuels other aircraft via operator controlling the flying boom system.   
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheetsDisplay/tabid224/article1  accessed 04/11/16. 
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The large Northrop Grumman AC-130 Thunderbolt 358 gunship carried a versatile 
armoury with weapons and ammunition to meet any demand from such a rapidly changing 
battle zone. Originally developed from the four-engine Hercules transport aircraft, it held 
not only state of the art weapons systems but also a crew of 14, among whom were 
intelligence gathering, electronic and communications specialists, the loss of which would 
have been a major setback, and was one reason the aircraft was deployed only at night. This 
contributed to the 24 hour non-stop prosecution of the war in Fallujah, partly aimed at 
wearing down the enemy but mainly through responding to call-ins from troops on the 
ground, where its 1.30mm GAU-8 7-barrelled Gatling machine gun and use of its and infra-
red flares proved its suitability for night-time engagements. In addition, its suite of night-
sensor equipment, structural strength in manoeuvrability, and armoury of precision weapons 
made it the primary aircraft for use in crowded urban areas. Targeting individual buildings, 
aided by surveillance data provided by ground forces such as the US Marine Corps and other 
forces, this tactic was intended to target only identified groups of insurgents and not local 
civilians remaining in the city.359  
              Second, the Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter-bomber (US Air Force); deployed as part 
of the “persistent strike and surveillance” tactic. Valued due to its capacity for high-speed 
operational performance whilst deploying an armoury of varying types of precision 
weaponry and due to its precision abilities, used for the “first-strike a success” concept. First 
flown in 1974, with periodic up-grades, this aircraft carries a crew of one or two, the pilot 
and a weapons-control officer. Valued due to its capacity for high-speed operational 
performance whilst deploying an armoury of varying types of precision weaponry. First 
flown in 1974, with periodic up-grades, this aircraft carries a crew of one or two, the pilot 
and a weapons-control officer.   
With a maximum speed of 1,320 mph and a cruising speed of 550 mph and with an 
operating range of 575 miles, the F-16 was in continuous operation during the battle. Its 
ceiling of 50,000 feet also gave it the ability to operate at the same levels as all the other 
aircraft involved, from the highest heavy bombers, down to almost roof-top height. 
Deploying a wide range of weaponry both internally and external; internal being the Vulcan 
                                                          
358 Northrop Grumman AC-130 Thunderbolt II. Specifications from  
http://www.ng.com/capabilities/A10ThunderboltII   last accessed 05/11/16.  
  359 Head above n305 105, 126.  
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1.20 mm cannon Sidewinder missiles, while externally it carries a 12,000 bomb and munition 
load, including the Paveway, JASSM and JDAM bombs.360 
Because of its wide range of high speeds, this aircraft is chosen to represent the mid-
line of the temporal triangle. (x/r p107).   
Third, the Hercules Royal Air Force (RAF) C130K CI/3.  Manufactured by 
Lockheed, it was deployed as a large air transport vehicle designed to carry troops, up to 28 
passengers and 20 tonnes of pallet freight, stores and equipment. Powered by 4 Allison T56-
A-15 turbo-prop engines, it has a maximum cruising speed of 310k; altitude 32,000 feet; 
with a direct range of 3,500 miles or 4,000 miles if re-fuelled in mid-air. Equipped with air 
and defensive countermeasures equipment; radar warning receivers; chaff and flare 
countermeasures; missile approach warning system; and “station keeping” equipment for use 
in cloud conditions.361 
Many different types of aircraft contributed by the Allied forces were based on 
airfields around the city of Bagdad, and in addition to the aircraft and helicopters, precision 
weapons in the form of missiles used in the Fallujah battle included;  
First, the Joint Direct Attack Munition (J-Dam); GBU-38.362 Manufactured by Boeing, this is 
a guidance tail-kit which converts dumb (gravity) bombs into all-weather “smart” munitions. 
First launched from a B-2 in 1997, it has a launch-range of 5-15 miles, using GPS 
(autonomous) guidance system. The GBU-38 caused less collateral damage and eliminated 
uncertainties associated with laser guided bombs.’ and Dr Grant described this as ‘… the top 
air weapon for use in the urban environment.364  
Specifications include; weight 800 lbs; a Guidance semi-active laser (man-in-the-
loop) system; a range of 8 nautical miles, and a CEP of 9 metres. Its mission being to 
neutralize targets at long-range with precision accuracy, it employs add-on laser sensor kits 
to prosecute moving, re-locatable or maritime targets, and modular capability enhancement 
resulting in a small diameter bomb with focused lethality and an ultra-low level of collateral 
damage. It can also be leveraged as a ground artillery weapon. 
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Second, the GBU -12 Paveway II laser-guided all-weather bombs. Manufactured by 
Texas Instruments, Paveway bomb systems are hybrids. In the centre of each system is a 
bomb which can be one of a various number of sizes; for example, a 1,000lb MK83 bomb 
for GBU-16. The operator illuminates the target with a laser designator, then the munition 
guides to a spot of laser energy reflected from the target. The laser guidance kit integral with 
each bomb ensures the degree of precision. When the target is illuminated by the laser (air 
or ground) the guidance fins react to signals from the controller who steers the weapon onto 
the target. 
Specifications include a semi-active laser (man-in-the-loop) guidance system; 
Weight 800 lbs of differing sizes, 500, 1,000 and 2,000 lbs; with a range of 8 nautical miles; 
a CEP of 9 metres, and a Mission of Air Interdiction. 
Such missiles were deployed during Operation Iraqi Freedom from aircraft such as 
the A-10, B-52 and F-15365, with other types of missiles being used for specific purposes.  
3.2.1.c  The proportionality assessment 
In the previous chapter, Kosovo, the principle of proportionality was assessed ahead of the 
attack, whereas in this chapter, it is assessed at various points during the attack. This focusses 
upon the proportionality assessment in reaction to fluid and changing operations particularly 
in the chaotic and obscure battle conditions of urban warfare, compressing the time available 
for reasoned decision making. The issue of how it is assessed, on a case-by-case basis, is 
noted within the circumstances of each event as it arises, and this section considers the 
situation where circumstances change between the beginning of the mission, when the crew 
are in possession of the rules of engagement (ROE) as produced by the commander, and the 
launch and tracking of the weapon onto the target. 
 It is emerging from the literature that a considerable number of civilian casualties 
are caused when the aircrew of engaged aircraft are forced by circumstances to make a rapid 
second attack on the same target, this giving rise to the situation where there is little or no 
time for re-evaluation of the target.366 Two operational frameworks set the legal boundaries 
for military units engaged in warfare, the Rules of Engagement, (ROE) and the guidance of 
the commander. ‘Commanders provide guidance on the use of force and communicate their 
guidance regarding CIVCAS mitigation in a number of formal and informal ways, including 
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through daily briefs, battlefield circulation, interaction with host-nation officials, and 
conversations with Soldiers.’ 367    
Referring again to the work of the C&C Centres and their teams of analysts, the issue 
of available data and information remained a similar challenge to that in the Kosovo 
campaign. Here the problem is not purely the mass of information itself, but the lack of 
required information needed at a specific time for a specific strategic purpose,368 giving as 
examples military intelligence, battle-damage assessments and mission reports. This may 
appear to be at odds with the claim of “information overload”, but in reality it means that out 
of an endless stream of data only a few items may be necessary to contribute to the operation 
of the mission in hand. Clark and Cook note that what is required is some attempt at 
limitation; ‘… as the OA369 team assessing Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 
struggled to provide the commander with an effects-based assessment of his objectives. In 
that case, team members decided to limit themselves to assessing performance, leaving the 
assessment of effects to the supported command who briefed this to the deputy combined 
force combined component commander along with a performance assessment conducted by 
the OA team’. 
Turning to the subject of the case-study, IHAT 271. It was a square, white 3-storey 
building, indistinguishable from hundreds of others built close together in the centre of 
Fallujah. Since the beginning of the fighting, over 70% of the population had fled the city,370 
and from the results of military surveillance of the building and its environs, it was deduced 
that the groups and individuals making use of the property belonged to the IHL classification 
of “insurgents” and were using the house as a base to launch attacks against the Allied 
military forces. As the air strikes continued their attacks, many houses, if not whole blocks 
of property were destroyed, resulting in casualties not only of insurgents but also of civilians 
who had remained in the area and Allied military forces.  
 This was not a quiet operation. Apart from the non-stop barrage of air and ground 
forces using both precision weapons and dumb bombs, strafing by fighter aircraft, the roar 
of tanks and artillery during the day, and the rolling waves of attacks by the US Air Force 
A-10 attack aircraft, and the small-arms fire of the US Marines and other forces who had, 
due to the availability of infra-red equipment, the ability to fight by night as well as by day. 
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The grinding heat associated with desert climates, together with shortages of water and 
electricity all added to make this Allied mission as difficult as possible. 
Not all the pilots would be immune to this din of battle. Obviously, the bombers 
flying at 35,000 feet would be out of range, but for helicopters and other low-flying aircraft, 
the noise would have been considerable. The ground forces were not protected from this 
noise despite the heavy helmets, and the earphones worn by section commanders through 
which battle orders were relayed.  
The incessant clamour of the exchange of information was another source of endless 
noise, but one which was not altogether unfriendly to Allied forces. One aspect of the 
Fallujah battle order, the integration of both air and ground forces, meant that frequently 
troops trapped on the ground would call up for air strikes to remove the problem. The result, 
“dynamic targeting” leaves very little time for the Judge Advocate Generals (JAG)s to make 
reasoned reviews of the un-rolling situation, and hence excessive civilian injury may 
result,371 with the question remaining to be asked, how much time was there for any 
consideration of proportionality? 
It is clear that the circumstances of the death of IHAT 271 may never be known. Was 
he or she in that square white house? During aerial bombardments, civilians would 
frequently move from their own home in search of safe havens from the barrage, only having 
to move again as the barrage encroached deeper into the city. However, the issue of 
discrimination between civilian and insurgent moved with them.372 
 The deliberate fielding of precision weapons highlights the certainty in the minds of 
the planners that these would accomplish the aims of the overall mission, to bring an end to 
the use of Fallujah as a base for insurgents. This strike holds several lessons for this study, 
demonstrating the pin-point accuracy of the precision weapons, ranging from air launched 
missiles to those fielded by tanks and other land based weapons systems.  Fenrick observes 
however that it is difficult to analyse with any accuracy the application of the proportionality 
principle in relation to the time and space a strike occurred.  
He reminds us that a deliberate attack on civilians at any time is unlawful, and also, 
‘… the standard of measurement must be one that is practicable to use in advance and it must 
be possible to determine whether any assessment of the proportionality calculus is being met 
at various stages in the conflict’.373 This stipulation would be difficult to determine in 
                                                          
  371 CJ Dunlap Jr above n7 ‘Clever or Clueless…’  139, 144. 
  372 The issue of indiscriminate attacks is addressed in the case-study, “The Tank Commander”.  
373 Fenrick above n260  489-502.   
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situations such as during the air attack on Fallujah due to the rapidity of the unfolding events, 
changing from one minute to the next. 
  3.2.1.d  The temporal triangle  
The F-15 fighter-bomber (US Air Force) deployed as part of the “persistent strike and 
surveillance” tactic, occupies the mid-line of the triangle, having a speed of over 1,000mph 
and operational ceiling of 35,000 feet. 
 Considering what constitutes the background to this mid-line, the re-assessment of 
proportionality during an attack is traditionally the most difficult time to attempt such an 
operation as each assessment will differ according to the facts of the situation both in the air 
and on the ground. Which will come first in the mind of the commander and the JAG in the 
command and control centre, the safety of the Allied troops or the safety of civilians. The 
deployment of front-line commanders embedded with the troops greatly enhanced the flow 
of critical information at the point of the action itself, increasing the soldier’s awareness of 
civilians even when the civilians were not visible to the soldiers themselves. Such 
networking of information is increasingly important when the pace of operations is so rapid 
and the risk of mistake on all sides is correspondingly increased. 
The critical area of concern to the commander is that of information. At the CDDH, 
the United States noted: Commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon, or 
executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the 
information from all sources which is available to them at the relevant time.374 Further, 
Spain’s LOAC Manual states that: “if in the course of an attack the objective appears not to 
be military, the commander shall deviate or cancel the attack”.375  
 The Civilian Casualty Mitigation report notes that ‘The time available for an operation 
will affect the ability to incorporate CIVCAS mitigation during planning and preparation, 
including the gathering of accurate intelligence that may help prevent CIVCASs. The time 
available to conduct an operation may determine whether units can use tactical patience to 
prevent CIVCASs.’376 
 The Introduction (p2) stated that in the case of Fallujah, the pilot or the commander 
377 may have, at the most, half the usual time for considering a proportionality  based 
                                                          
374 United States: statement at the CDDH, Official Records, Vol VI, CDDH/SR 42, 27 May 1977, p 241. 
375 Spain LOAC Manual (1996), Vol. 1, § 10.8.c.(2). 
  376 ATTP 3-37.31 above n305 3-1.  1-12 1-69. 
377 These two words again, may be used for the person in control of an operational aircraft, as, if he is flying 
solo, he bears responsibility; should he be the lead pilot of a flight of two or three he would bear the 
responsibility for the actions of the others. At the same time, a pilot may be on duty in a C&C Centre, but his 
responsibilities there would be the same as the other commanders on duty at the same time. 
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decision. This is based upon the speed of the aircraft on release of the missile in relation to 
the distance to the target; the higher the aircraft speed, the shorter the distance and therefore 
the less thinking time available. The phrase “the usual time” is entirely relative to the other 
aircraft used in this triangle, as with the pilot of the A-10 in the Djakovice Convoy incident, 
who would have had twice the length of time at least, with the lower aircraft speed of 
450mph. 
3.2.2   A Fallujah incident: the tank commander. 
In this study, the subject is the commander of an Allied tank, one of many used in conjunction 
with and in support of the US Marines and other ground forces deployed in the second battle 
of Fallujah. This illustrates the point that  whereas precision weapons are revolutionising the 
war in the air, both ground and naval forces are being equally affected. However, Sandoz378 
notes that there are particular rules of the LOAC which apply solely to ground forces, and 
these principles and rules are to be observed by foot soldiers and their commander. He 
proposes that these fall generally into three categories; first, to have respect for the protection 
of civilians and civilian property; second, to have respect for the protection of other non-
combatants, and third, the attitude of the combatant against the enemy.379 It is the first, 
respect for the protection of civilians and civilian property which is addressed in the 
following section. 
   3.2.2.a  the reason the target was attacked 
The strategic reason for this attack is given earlier in this chapter, x/r page 80. This particular 
attack by one of the Allied forces vehicles represents the “ground war” which was prosecuted 
concurrently with the “air war”, both working jointly to attain the military advantage. This 
building appears structurally the same as to that involved in the previous case-study, however 
what sets this building apart is the re-assigning of a previously protected property, a civilian 
house, into a target which can be legally attacked.380 This must be seen contextually; ‘… 
attacking an apartment building occupied by civilians yields no military advantage, whereas 
attacking the same apartment building when used for billeting of troops would result in 
military advantage.’381  
                                                          
378 These include, ‘respect for and protection of civilians and civilian property; the principle of humanity and 
the obligation to ‘protect’ civilians; the principle of distinction; the principles of precaution and 
proportionality’ above n306 Y Sandoz in Clapham and Gaeta  92. 
  379 above n306 Y Sandoz in Clapham and Gaeta 92. 
  380 HPCR above n8 88. 
  381 HPCR above n8 36. 
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Again, what is noticeable is the speed at which the action occurs. Modern tanks have 
the capacity for both speed and manoeuvrability, but this will be limited when the vehicle is 
trapped in narrow roads and lanes which are sometimes deliberately blocked to impede their 
progress. Whereas the pilot of an aircraft has an overall, possibly unrestricted view of his 
target area, the tank crew, in such battle situations, are frequently progressing into the 
unknown, where they cannot see whether the road ahead of them is impeded by rubble and 
wreckage, or even land-mined and booby trapped, leading to severe problems in accuracy of 
targeting. 
 A key point here, addressing the precision weapons used, is that their effects may be 
compromised by the conditions under which they are, or are attempted to be, used.   
   3.2.2.b      the weapons deployed in the attack 
The heavy artillery was based on tanks, including the M1A1 Abrams battle tank. With a crew 
of four, a speed of 42 mph, and a range of 215 miles. Armament included 120mm cannon; 
50 calibre  machine-gun, and two 7.62. M240 machine-guns. 
In addition, the smaller but equally lethal, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. With a crew 
of six, a speed of 45mph and a range of 300 miles. Armament included wide range of cannon 
and machine-guns. Used by infantry in close-operation fighting with the enemy. The 
M109A6 Paladin Howitzers; 150 mm artillery pieces, launching shells capable of travelling 
over 13 miles. With a crew of four, a speed of 38mph, but no line of sight.382  Armament 
included 39 calibre M284 cannon assembly fitted with the M182 A1 mount; 0.50 calibre M2 
machine-gun.383 In this group, the objective of Sine’s “precision” concept can be observed, 
where each weapon is chosen specifically to prosecute a specific task with the least amount 
of individual injury and collateral damage.  
In addition to the aircraft participating in the “wedding cake” stack, MQ-1 Predator 
aircraft was highly valued as it can overcome the “line of sight” issue and find its own way 
to the target. 384 Manufacturer, General Atomic Aeronautical Systems, its   specifications 
include a speed of 120 KTAS at an altitude of 25,000 feet and an endurance time of 35 hours. 
Included in its Mission; Information, Surveillance and Reconaissance (ISR); interdiction; 
close air support; force protection; combat search and rescue; remote operations video 
                                                          
379  “Beyond line of sight” weapons are deployed where ‘… the target cannot be visually identified, for 
instance because it is too distant (“over the horizon”) or where it cannot be seen to night, weather conditions, 
terrain, etc.’ above n8 HPCR 74.  
383 Facts for all the above three weapons from http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/Iraqforces/weapons   
accessed 05/11/16. 
384 MQ-1 Predator http://www.ga.asi.com/aircraftplatforms  accessed 04/11/16; above n305 Head 120; above 
n308 Grant 50. 
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enhanced receiver’s operations. Indispensable in “persistent battlespace” areas. Has both line 
of sight and beyond line of sight capabilities. (As this aircraft plays a major role in the 
following chapter, Afghanistan, no more comment is added here.) In addition, Joint Direct 
Attack Munition (J-Dam) – GBU-31- GPS Guided Bombs were deployed, together with 
large numbers of dumb gravity bombs.385 
   3.2.2.c  the proportionality assessment 
Is the principle of proportionality, which applies throughout all stages of the attack386, being 
affected by the use of precision weapons? This section considers whether or not this is the 
case, and depends upon whom is making the decision to deploy these weapons, and how the 
information is assessed. In the present situation, this task is performed by one of the Allied 
commanders with, increasingly, a lawyer of the Judge Advocate’s Division. 
Contemporary military use of the word “commander” embraces a wide range of ranks 
and command levels, from the highest to the lowest, having the same structure in both air 
and ground forces. There can be a pilot in an F-16 designated as a commander when 
assigning responsibility for the outcome of an air strike, for example, and the tank 
commander in a US M1 Abrams tank who bears command responsibility during an attack 
on an enemy target.  What different levels of rank signify is to signal the level of security of 
information the holder is allowed to acquire and activate. 
Following the First battle of Fallujah, US forces and their weaponry had remained in 
Camp Baharia, a short distance from Baghdad, and so were not exhausted from long journeys 
to the combat zone.387 The tank commander would be given, over secure lines of 
communication only what is necessary for him to complete the phase/s of attack stated in the 
ROE, these communicated from the Command and Control centre in, at the highest level, 
the US Combined Air Operations Centre in Qatar. 
Even within the strict confines of a tank there is an hierarchy of command, the 
commander at the apex who assesses and disseminates the received information, followed 
by the ammunition loader, then the two gunners, one on either side of the vehicle. Only the 
commander has a good field of vision from the turret, and even this is restricted by buildings 
and clouds of debris and smoke when fighting in such close quarters.  
The second battle of Fallujah had been pre-planned for a week before the battle 
began, and as detailed from the first minute the tanks and Howitzers, including that of the 
                                                          
  385 J Dams above n362; Head above n305 120. 
386 HPCR above n8 100. 
  387 Head above n305 105, 112. 
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tank commander, began a barrage of sections of Fallujah with the intent of removing 
insurgents from among the civilian population. As the heavy armour moved into the outer 
areas of the town, US Marines and other ground forces were deployed together with the air 
support strikes of US heavy bombers dropping waves of dumb-bombs, and F-16 fighters 
carrying precision weapons for use against strategic targets.  
 The crew of the tank388 had seen precision weapons in action before, in other areas of 
the Iraq war, yet their accuracy of these weapons never failed to impress. They had received 
orders to attack a specific target from where insurgents had been seen firing upon Marine  
patrols, and had planted a shell onto the target. A Marine patrol who went in to check for 
survivors found only the remains of two civilians in the rubble, although, as was to become 
a regular pattern, it was not totally clear if they were civilians or insurgents.389  
As a tank crew, they were aware of the risk of facing charges of launching an 
“indiscriminate attack”390 It is stated that there are special LOAC circumstances attaching to 
war on land. One expert states there are three duties every soldier should have particular 
regard for; first, the protection of the civilian and his property; second, he has an obligation 
to other soldiers when one of them is injured and is hors de combat, and to the enemy who 
wish to surrender and clearly signal their intention; and third, soldiers are under certain 
restrictions in relation to the enemy.391 In addition, there are specific rules of the LOAC 
which apply to commanders fighting a land battle. The three most relevant being the 
responsibility for violations committed by subordinates; the responsibility for planning and 
carrying out an attack; and the responsibility for the methods of warfare and choice of 
weapons.392 
                                                          
388 This Study has written the following four paragraphs as representing the proxy tank commander and his    
crew to give a feel of the immediacy of the issues affecting them, and do not relate to any Allied personnel. 
389 See note 76 infra; The problem of civilian populations intermingling with belligerents is historic, but was 
particularly well documented in the Vietnam War (1962-1972) The enemy of the US forces, the Vietcong 
frequently used such protected places as temples and hospitals in addition to villages and towns, normally 
immune from attack under the then US ROE which were consistent with API and APII of the Geneva 
Conventions (not codified until 1977). The Vietnamese forces also had their rules of engagement, and Reynolds 
quotes from them making the important point about the bombing of cities that such attacks, ‘…on targets in 
urban areas must preclude unnecessary danger to civilians and destruction of civilian property, and by their 
nature require greater restrictions than the rules of engagement for less populated areas’. JD Reynolds above n 
304 1, 6.  
390 The prohibition against indiscriminate attacks arises from Article 51(4) 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of 
combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; (c) those which employ a method or means 
of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol. Dinstein above n7 117; J Beard 
above n174 432, 440; Corderoy and Perkins above n305 1, 22.  
  391 Sandoz above n306 92.  
  392 Sandoz above n 306 108.  
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It is clear that on the one hand, the tank crew are trained to protect civilians393 and 
yet on the other, on occasions, they are told to demolish their property.394 They are taught in 
training school that civilian property can be re-classified as enemy property under The Hague 
Regulations if it is proved to be occupied by enemy forces.395 This is nevertheless almost 
impossible to formulate when insurgents do not wear any recognizable uniform or symbol. 
Yet the principle of proportionality itself remains difficult to understand;396 however, what 
all the crew agree on that is that it can be made more comprehensible to people like me who 
are obliged to consider it if feasible under conditions of severe time constraint.397 
 We hear this integrated air and ground attack using precision weapons is to continue 
non-stop day and night, so if successful as a strategy it may have some effect on the way 
wars are fought in the future. One thing that cannot be controlled however is the weather. In 
Iraq it is not unusual to have sandstorms, high humidity and temperatures over 90 degrees398, 
despite   the cooling system inside the tank offering some relief.  
The weather challenges the concentration; for example, one moment we are told not 
to fire into a certain house because it may contain civilians, the next, we are told to destroy 
the house because an insurgent has been spotted going in over the roof. By this time, we have 
passed the house but the road is too narrow for us to turn around in and we have to go metres 
further down in order to do so. At this point it may be faster for us to contact ground forces, 
if there are any in the area, and if the communications channels are not blocked, and we may 
or may not learn in the post-battle briefing whether or not our target was sufficiently 
important for it to be eventually destroyed. 
                                                          
393 The issue is that of assessment during the attack. API Article 48 provides the basic rule: In order to ensure 
respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objects and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. n 5 AP1 Art 48; US Army 
Rules; in addition, Article 58(a) API states that the Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible, 
“without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to remove the civilian population, 
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives”. 
394 the issue of the civilian house which became a war target, a “military objective”, which was first defined in 
Art 24 (1) of The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, where it was stated that only military objectives could be 
bombed by aircraft. This regulation was later reiterated in AP/II Art 52 (2), and in line with the thinking of the 
Group of Experts, as a general principle, these rules applied to conflict on land, sea, and in the air.       
  395 Article 25 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 
396 The articles in AP/I do not refer to the principle of proportionality by name in any of their texts. What they 
do refer to are the attendant conditions; “indiscriminate attacks”; the steps to be taken to avoid damage to 
civilians and civilian objects, and grave breaches of the Protocol incurred … the “excessive loss” principle.396 
Returning to the text of AP/II, Article 13 ‘codifies the general principles that protection is due to the civilian 
population against the dangers of hostilities already recognized by customary international law and by the laws 
of war as a whole’. 
  397 Dill above n305 1-6. 
  398 AJ Hebert ‘The Road to Victory’ (May 2003) Air Force Magazine 10, 15. 
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Turning from the testimony of the commander to the textbooks, despite unceasing 
efforts to ensure the principle was adhered to during the many incidents of precision attacks 
from both air and ground precision systems, proportionality remains an entirely subjective 
issue. In discussing military objectives, Schmitt notes that ‘…no objective means of valuing 
either incidental injury/collateral damage or military advantage exists. Instead it is the 
subjective perspective of the party carrying out the proportionality assessment that 
matters.’399   
Remembering what was taught to the tank commander, Additional Protocol I Art. 
51(5) states that:     
 (a)   an attack by bombardment by any method or means which treats as a single 
military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in 
city, town, or village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilian or civilian 
objects: and 
 (b)   an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Referring again to Article 
57(2), to the final sentence ‘… direct military advantage anticipated…’400 This military 
advantage is known to the commander before the event, the ROE. It links to the initial 
requirement for feasible precision, yet should the situation change with time, his (the 
commander) thinking of the advantage will also change. Additionally, his expectations as to 
the outcomes may change. What may have been a high level of success will require an 
ongoing review with the possibility of last minute changes to the initial plans.  
A contemporary view of proportionality is that the principle of proportionality is 
involved with the injury and the death of innocent civilians as a result of military strikes 
against military objectives.401 First, as noted earlier, many prohibitions on the means and 
methods of warfare apply to all three services, land, sea and air. Specifically though 
‘Precautions must be taken in air bombardment to avoid civilian death or injury and damage 
to civilian objects.’402  In addition, unless special circumstances do not permit it, effective 
                                                          
399 Schmitt above n155 ‘Asymmetrical Warfare and international humanitarian law’ (2008) Air Force Law   
Review 10, 32; above n305 Beard 403, 436. 
  400 API Art 57.  
  401 Dinstein above n7 59. 
402 MOD above n37 12.26 i. 
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advance warning must be given of air bombardment that may affect the civilian 
population.403 Such warnings lie within the remit of the commander and the planning team. 
The safety of civilians is also the concern of organisations such as the International 
Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement as in State Practice “Precautions Against the 
Effects of Attacks” p.440 V. 449. Movements which have to pass through or close to 
populated areas shall be executed rapidly…. 451. Even a temporary military presence can 
create a dangerous situation for the civilian areas and persons. Units located in or close to 
populated areas shall be so deployed as to create the least possible danger to civilian areas 
… appropriate distance between militarily used houses and other buildings.  
 From the myriads of relationships possible between the participants and objects 
in a conflict, there is one concept which encapsulates them all; ‘For an object to qualify as a 
military objective, there must exist a proximate nexus to military action (or war-fighting)’.404  
Additionally, in land warfare, the terrain of the tank commander, the acid test is whether a 
specific geographic site, building, or factory, is being defended by members of the military, 
and not by civilians. In chaotic situations, as in Fallujah, it may be difficult if not impossible 
for him or his crew to make a positive identification of a certain building due to immediate 
environmental stressors (smoke, dust, noise, moving shadows in the intense heat); it may be 
possible with the aid of GPS equipment, but shortage of time will place severe operational 
pressures upon this crew and of the other vehicles involved in the mission. 
The training of commanders and the legal teams working in the Command and Control 
Centres are increasingly focussed upon the use of precision weapons in the urban 
environment.405 From days to hours in the Gulf War, down to 45 minutes in the Iraq war. 
Working from Langley AFB in Virginia, US, teams of analysts monitored military 
developments and controlled the airborne operations of the UAV’s in Iraq. Such technologies 
impact directly upon the authority exercised by strategists and commanders, both political and 
military. Real-time data from space satellites (space-data from here on) inform their decision-
making obligations. This study acknowledges that much military data is sensitive and so 
unavailable for public research, however, much general detail is in the public realm; for 
example, in the form of Doctrines. 
                                                          
403 MOD above n37 12.26 j.  
  404 Dinstein above n7 87. 
405 LA Dickinson ‘Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law 
Compliance’ (2010) AJIL 1-28; TF Gent ‘The Role of Judge Advocates in a Joint Air Operations Center. 
(Spring 1999) Airpower Journal 1-17. 
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 Military manuals provide imperative guidelines for commanders ahead of an attack; 
one example being for the planners of the campaign objective. ‘A campaign objective is a 
goal, expressed in one or more decisive conditions that needs to be achieved.’406  This chain 
takes into account all the available details necessary to achieve the strategic objective. ‘A 
strategic objective is a goal to be achieved through one or more instruments of national power 
in order to meet the national strategic aim’407 and will contain both long and short-term 
planning views on how to achieve that objective. This latter objective will be undertaken at 
the highest level of command.  
The Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands states: at 0511. The circumstances of 
the time are decisive to whether an object constitutes a military objective. The definition 
leaves the necessary discretion of the commanding officer. The Dutch government, in 
ratifying [1977 Additional Protocol I], has declared in this connection that military  
commanders who are responsible for carrying out attacks must base their decisions on their 
evaluation of the information available to them at the time… .408 Similarly, the US Naval 
Handbook (2007) notes  that “ the commander must determine whether the anticipated 
incidental injuries and collateral damage would be excessive, on the basis of an honest and 
reasonable estimate of the facts available to him.” 409 This emphasis upon the “information 
available to them at the time” is one of the major factors of decision making, old information 
is worse than useless, running the risk of unecessary loss of life on all sides in a conflict.  
The Military Manual of the Netherlands puts it even more precisely; 
Once an attack has been launched the issue of cancellation or suspension may arise, 
In principle, the same rules apply as to the refraining from deciding to launch an attack in 
the preparation phase. 
The extent to which commanders and their possible staff will be held accountable to 
comply with these rules depends upon three factors: 
- Freedom of choice of means and methods. 
- Availability of information. 
- Available time. 
                                                          
  406 JDP-340 1050 p 166. 
  407 JDP-340 1050 above n406 p 166. 
408 Military Manual (2005) of the Netherlands; Humanitair Oologsrecht Handleiding, Voorschift No. 27-412, 
Koninklijke Landmacht, Militair Jurisdische Dienst, 2005, §§ 0511 and 0543. 
409 United States. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14 M/MCWP 5-12  
1/COMPTPUB P5800-7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Operations and 
Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007 § 8.3.1. 
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The higher the level [of command] the stricter the application of these rules can be 
required.410  It is noted that the Netherlands is the only State where the concept of time itself 
is admitted as a relevant factor. 
In addition, the principle of precaution is a duty imposed upon commanders at 
command level, and is closely related in its aims to both proportionality and to distinction in 
that it’s central concern is the security of the civilian. It considers all elements of an attack, 
from the initial decision of which target to strike, to the final choices and the reasons for 
them. The concept of command responsibility was first enunciated in the case of General 
Yamashita,411 and from that judgement, together with a later Commentary, a test was 
determined to elucidate responsibility if ‘… he has actual knowledge or should have 
knowledge, through reports received by him or through other means’.412  However, there is 
as yet no agreement on the nature of command and the degree of knowledge required.413 
 The commander as an actor is coming under increasing scrutiny as his task becomes 
more difficult with the technological advances which influence the performance of the 
weapons under his control. Despite this, ‘… conventional military forces in Iraq kept 
remarkable faith to the law of armed conflict. In general, this occurred in spite of, rather than 
because of, actions at the strategic level. In no small measure this was due to the efforts of 
judge advocates who accompanied the forces into combat.’414 
 It is proposed that, through such scholarly contributions by Boivin416 and Dill417, that 
the principle of proportionality is progressing into a modern phase of warfare, a radically 
different position from that described by Gardam418 at the beginning of this chapter where it 
languishes in a state of neglect. 
3.2.2.d The temporal triangle 
There is no application of the triangle in relation to the tank battle. 
3.3 Application of the temporal triangle 
The US F-15 fighter-bomber, deployed as part of the “persistent strike and surveillance” 
strategy, occupies the mid-line of the triangle, having a speed of over 1,000mph and 
operational ceiling of 35,000 feet.  
                                                          
410 Netherlands Military Manual, (1993), p. V-11. 
  411 UK  MOD above n402 438 16.36.1.  Case of General Yamashita (1946) AD Case No 111. 
412 UK  MOD above n402 438 16.36.1. 
413 UK  MOD above n402 439 16.36.4. 
  414 Warren above n305 167, 168. 
416 Boivin above n260. 
417 Dill above n305 1-9.   
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As the bar of the triangle moves upwards, so the background environment constricts, 
as does the time available for commanders to consider any available options open to him. 
The background is as equally important as the baseline, as it represents the total environment 
in which the proportionality principle operates; in both the physical terrain of the land 
battlefield and the air space of the aircraft and precision weapons, and the human subjective 
space of the decisions of the commander, of the contents of superior orders, and the 
intentions of humanitarian conventions. 
In complex situations such as in Iraq, the commander will be aware that some 
strategic decisions are made at the highest levels, at the points where political necessity and 
military strategy co-exist. An example being taking the bombing to urban war zones based 
on the premise that precision weapons will neutralize the risk of civilian casualties. This may 
be the intention on paper, however urban warfare carries with it other additional 
responsibilities in, for example, the form of warning the population of impending raids, and 
these force additional data into the amount of time available.419 It is noted that the 
manufacturers of the Predator aircraft include in the specifications “ISR” and “close air 
support”. If this real-time data can be delivered to troops and pilots fighting in crowded urban 
situations it has the potential to reduce the level of individual injury and collateral damage 
to what could be expected in such situations. 420 
What is changing in contemporary warfare is the length of time necessary for the 
completion of a mission. The  reduction in time for the completion of this data-chain was 
rapid 421. From days to hours in the Gulf War, down to 45 minutes in the Iraq war. Working 
from Langley AFB in Virginia, US, teams of analysts monitored military developments and 
controlled the airborne operations of the UAV’s in Iraq. Such technologies impact directly 
upon the authority exercised by strategists and commanders, both political and military. 
Real-time data from space satellites (space-data from here on) inform their decision-making 
obligations. This study acknowledges that much military data is sensitive and so unavailable 
for public research. However, much general detail is in the public realm; for example, in the 
form of Doctrines. 
                                                          
 419 Alberts et al note that ‘… it is important to recognize that under the pressure of time or uncertainty some 
of today’s decisions are made either by default of by individuals who may not have all the expertise or even 
training or experience necessary to be proficient.’ DS Alberts, JJ Gartska, FP Stein, Network Centric Warfare: 
Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority 2nd Edition (Revised) CCRP Publication Series 
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Contemporary urban warfare requires that this environment be networked in a matter 
of possibly a mere few seconds. The following chapter, Afghanistan, takes this a step further 
in considering whether or not aerial vehicles in the form of drones deal with this paradigm 
in a more efficient way. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Is the proportionality principle being constrained by these pressures of urban warfare?. 
Fenrick observes that it is difficult to analyse with any accuracy the application of the 
proportionality principle in relation to the time and space the event occurred. He reminds us 
that a deliberate attack on civilians at any time is unlawful, and also, ‘… the standard of 
measurement must be one that is practicable to use in advance and it must be possible to 
determine whether any assessment of the proportionality calculus is being met at various 
stages in the conflict’.422  
Following the second battle of Fallujah, this assessment would appear difficult given  
the view that the battle, although short, was complex and problematic and as a result, any 
research following the battle would find it difficult to sift the truth from the disingenuous. 
What is known is that in one of the attacks which killed IHAT 271, and in another attack the 
tank commander would have been overwhelmed with information. In the wake of the battle 
however, the plethora of information has been largely scientifically and coherently classified 
and catalogued.423 However, proportionality assessments are undertaken only if an 
investigation is necessary following a specific event when breaches of the principle were 
specifically claimed, as in the two Kosovo case studies.  
Every stage of this conflict was planned upon the established rules of western military 
engagement as applied to the Allied army and air forces, incorporating the rules and 
proscriptions of the LOAC including proportionality. It is true however, that the framers of 
the Additional Protocols were living in a different global era, of the Cold War and the 
deployment of the earlier versions of precision weapons; yet these rules retain their veracity 
although it is claimed by some observers424 that new treaties or conventions are required to 
deal with the elemental changes fuelled by precision technologies and the evolution of the 
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military drone. The importance of Article 36425 is noted by Haines, ‘Implicit in this 
requirement is an assumption about the relationship between technology and law by which 
the existing law should constrain weapon development rather than new weapons technology 
drive the shaping of new law.’426  
The matter of indiscriminate attacks is similar to proportionality in that it is an “after 
the attack” forensic inquiry. Article 20(b)(2) of the 1966 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind “[launching] an indiscriminate attack affecting the 
civilian population and civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects constitutes a war 
crime.427 
 In both case-studies, there would be an immense problem in determining whether 
attacks were launched with such knowledge together with the intention of causing exccessive 
levels of death and injury. Precision weapons were used specifically to avoid such situations, 
and it was made clear during the long pre-planning stage that civilian security was the 
priority on the commanders list of orders. In the event, it was the co-locating between 
insurgents and non-combatants in a crowded urban setting which led to the previous 
problems. There is no ready answer to this, except by influence, whereby civilians come to 
appreciate the benefits of different belligerents publicly showing their allegiences, but this 
is a long-term issue in other social fields. 
 During this battle, another issue emphasised was that of information, and the problems 
this presents to the commander and the planning team. This is one paradox of modern 
warfare; the more information that is generated to assist him in decision making, the more 
likely it is to produce the reverse effect, of so overloading the communications systems that 
they either malfunction or fail entirely, thus depriving him of any information at all. 
‘…battlespace knowledge consists of tacit information. Tacit information requires 
interpretations. While supporting “facts” can be easily transferred, the underlying organizing 
logic can seldom be transferred quickly and easily.’428 There does exist a computer algorithm 
which, when inserted into a command and control system of an aircraft can automatically 
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compute a proportionality balancing mechanism, however this is not the same as the pilot 
making a last-second attempt to avoid civilians within the target zone. 
           All members of the armed forces are trained in the rules of the law concerning the 
main aspects of weaponry and what makes the differences between legal and illegal 
weapons. However, how much responsibility can the pilot, as the holder of authority in the 
aircraft, be expected to carry. He may be pulled two ways; in obeying the orders in his flight 
plan, or possibly deviating from them should a “humanitarian” situation arise. Some of the 
aircraft concerned, the B-52 bomber, flies at high altitude over 30,000 feet. From that height, 
at the top of the ‘inverted wedding-cake’429 structure of the aircraft stacked above Fallujah, 
the ground may be clear or obscured due to cloud or local conditions such as fog or smoke, 
rendering visual analysis of any detail impossible, with the pilots totally reliant on GPS 
navigation equipment. 
 Nevertheless, as in any highly trained force, the pilots will carry out the task in hand, 
understanding that there is some reasoning behind the raid which builds into the overall 
strategy for prosecuting the war. At present there are abundant guidelines; the ICRC notes 
that the implementation of the rules of civilian protection shall apply ‘…both during the 
planning, decisions and action stages of the attack, and by the party that is attacked’.430 
Further, the HPCR state that ‘the principle of proportionality applies throughout all stages 
of an attack, from planning to execution. Anyone with the ability and authority to suspend, 
abort or cancel an attack must do so once he reaches the conclusion that the expected 
collateral damage would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage’.431  
 There are laws in existence reminding host countries of their responsibilities, as an 
example, Iraq’s Law of the Supreme Criminal Tribunal (2005) identfies the following as a 
serious violation of the laws and customs of war applicable in international armed conflicts:  
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or civilian damage which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantages to be 
gained.432 Also - Article 58(a) AP I states that the Parties to the conflict shall, to the 
maximum extent feasible, “without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, 
endeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects 
                                                          
  429 Grant above n305 41, 52.   
430 ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross ‘Weapons: ICRC Statement to the United Nations, 2012 
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under their control from the vicinity of military objectives”. Article 58 AP I was 
adopted by 80 votes in favour, none against and 8 abstentions.433 
Rogers notes however, that no matter how stringent the precautions undertaken by 
the belligerents, the civilian remains open to the risks of injury or death which involvement 
in any combat zone will naturally bring his way.434  This study does not agree that such steps 
as creating new conventions would clarify the matrix of proportionality at this stage unless 
a totally new concept arises. It is felt that the principle of proportionality, when honed down 
to its basic meaning, as in Dill435 is sufficient to communicate the requirement of not harming 
more civilians than is absolutely necessary. The real problem then is not proportionality 
itself, but the unintentional shortcomings in the ability to process its meaning within a 
“human” time-frame.  
As Dinstein has noted436 the norms which aim to protect the civilian in times of war 
are man-made. Made by other humans at other times not affected by the current conflict. 
This should provide them with an air of neutrality but as will be seen it is in their 
interpretation, as with many forms of legal constructions, that the problems arise. This is 
never more true than in the case of the principle of proportionality. As in the studies of 
Kosovo and Iraq, the principle itself held its central claim as a protector of civilians during 
armed conflict, excessive civilian casualties resulting from mistakes by military personnel 
in recognition and targeting, failures and mis-firings of weaponry, and the interaction of 
insurgents, the military and the civilian population in the urban space. Fallujah is an excellent 
example of proportionality being assessed during the attack, a situation likely to be repeated 
in conditions of urban warfare. 
This Study proposes that that the assessment and application of the principle of 
proportionality during the attack on Fallujah was seriously eroded in so many circumstances, 
and in so many instances, due to the speed and complexity of the military action, that there 
was, in many occasions such as the attack on the house of IHAT 271, no time whatsoever 
for a commander to begin to assess it before initiating an attack. Similarly, even with the 
assistance of his tank crew, their commander could on many occasions have little or no time 
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to think either of his own position as commander or that of his position in the overall battle-
plan of his platoon of tanks.  
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 TEMPORAL TRIANGLE – IRAQ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Launch (a)  to  (b)  -  the distance line; the distance between the launch point and the target (b). 
Launch (a)  to  (c)  -  the speed line; how fast the weapon travels between the launch point and the target (b). 
Background  -  this shaded area constitutes the presence of the principle of proportionality in the temporal 
matrix. This shading will change with each case study, illustrating how this proportionality is degraded by the 
differing speeds of the weapons used, until the diagram changes from a completely shaded fill to a nearly empty 
space. 
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Chapter Four:  Proportionality452in the Afghanistan war 
In this final case study, the proportionality assessment moves from the densely crowded 
urban space of Fallujah to the wide expanses of mountains and plains which form the 
landscape of Afghanistan. An attack upon a civilian group453 by a drone-launched missile 
forms the subject matter of the case-study, with the principle of proportionality being 
assessed following the attack in the context of military “lessons learned” together with the 
forensic recording of both military and civilian casualties. Three key issues are carried 
forward from the previous chapter, those of precision, inter-operability of weaponry, and 
inter-operability of C&C systems.454 
In addition to the deployed fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, unmanned aerial 
vehicles, UAVs or “drones” were increasingly used as an integral part of this network, both 
as attack aircraft and surveillance platforms. Reflecting the complexity of the war, 
“precision” became the keyword of missions, as Allied forces sought to reduce levels of 
personal injury and collateral damage to both civilians and own-side military. The weaponry 
used to prosecute this war over such vast distances was integrated into a network of 
information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), providing commanders and planners 
with what became known as “persistent surveillance” to track down and target the enemy 
within this theatre of conflict.     
As in the battle of Fallujah, air and ground forces worked as integrated units using 
information gathered from drones and other types of aircraft and disseminated by the 
Command and Control Centres. Working at the centre of operations, the Judge Advocate 
General’s (JAGs) lawyers worked twenty four hour rota systems, supplying the military 
forces with both real-time information together with advice on aspects of the law of armed 
conflict relating to the mission in operation. In addition to the US Command and Control 
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System, that of another Allied partner Australia is considered in relation to the 
interoperability issue of such a large number of countries using possibly different equipment 
for the same aim of mission. 
 Assessing the principle within a reason able time-frame presented the commanders 
and (JAG) lawyers with a choice. Operating as an attack weapon, the drone could leave very 
little or no time at all for assessment; however when operating in the loiter, “persistent 
surveillance” mode, it could give as much time as the planning team required to make their 
decision. In addition, the deployment of drones raises many questions of strategic policy and 
planning, including the erosion of national sovereignty and the further development of these 
technologies, together with the issues of legal control, are examined within the overall debate 
on the principle of proportionality.455 
Finally, referring to the temporal triangle, the speed of the Hellfire missile travelling 
at 950 mph when launched from Predator drones, is represented by the highest level of the 
baseline. As a result the background environment is severely compressed, illustrating how 
the principle of proportionality is further constrained by the deployment of precision 
weapons. In taking such issues into account, the final section reaches the conclusion that in 
some cases, the commander may have only a few seconds, two or three at the most, in which 
to make a reasoned decision concerning the complex nature of the principle of 
proportionality.456 
4. 1  Precision weapons 
Sine has described “precision” as ‘…a tactical capability providing measurable and 
quantifiable first-order effects and minimal unintended or undesirable effects.’457 This 
description can be linked to this chapter by asking the question of what was it that the strategy 
makers at the highest level needed to know; the answer being the location of high-value 
insurgents. Bearing in mind the vastness of the theatre of war, the location of a single 
individual or a small group was not a simple achievement from any height. 
By the outbreak of this war, the development and deployment of precision weapons 
had produced the answer to problems such as this, in the form of the drone.458 This would 
provide information on a regular reliable basis, the “persistent surveillance” ideally suited 
for long and short range tracking and loitering, either of a long-term life-style watch of an 
                                                          
  455 Report ‘Recommendations and report of the task force on US drone policy’. Stimson www.Stimson.org . 
456 ‘They must often make difficult life-and-death decisions in an extremely compressed time frame and do so 
on imperfect information produced in the chaos of battle.’ Dunlap Jr above n7 128. 
  457 Sine above n4 1, 1. 
  458 A Rothstein Drone (Bloomsbury Academic London 2015). 
106 
 
individual for maybe days or months, or the high speed tracking of a fleeing vehicle in the 
role of Close Air Support (CAS) for Allied troops on the ground. 
Referring to aerial warfare, the destruction of a target by the first strike is strategically 
highly desirable, eliminating the necessity of the pilot to return for another attack which runs 
the increased risk of civilian injury and collateral damage. To this end alone, the 
development and deployment of drones, with their on-board navigation and radar systems, 
was seen as an advance in this direction. Further, due to the fact that Afghanistan is a vast 
and remote land-locked country, a variety of weapons systems capable of providing a 
uniform coverage were required.  
The contribution of drones to this issue is significant, reflecting its range of 
operational modes; the drone as an aircraft, a platform for launching weapons, and a camera 
site for the collection of intelligence, the availability of the drone has changed the way in 
which wars are fought. The information it garners informs the commander as to the location 
of the enemy, stationary or on the move, alone or in company, on foot or using vehicles, this 
data builds up a visual picture for the commander and the lawyer to disseminate and activate, 
whether to order the remote operator to launch an attack, to await developments, or to do 
nothing and move to another potential target. 
Together with the drone, high-altitude aircraft for example the U-2 and a variety of 
other types including helicopters and fighter aircraft, gather information for the US and the 
Allies. This information contributes to Sine’s “tactical capability” approach where everyone 
within the target area, receives orders based upon “precision” at every level. Precision, in the 
form of real-time information underpinned the tactical advantages of the Allied forces, 
nevertheless, mistakes occurred, as is seen in the context of the Dam Gulek attack. 
For as long as NATO exists, the literature is determining that three key factors 
underpin its survival; precision, inter-operability of weaponry, and interoperability of C&C 
systems.459 Since the end of WW2 and throughout the Cold War, the US fielded the largest 
numbers of aircraft and munitions, a position it retains to the present day. This has meant 
that during recent conflicts, where the US and its European Allies were operating jointly, the 
majority of aircraft were of US origin, as was the majority of aircrews lost. This is noticeable 
from the origins and types of the aircraft used in the case-studies. 
In the 1980’s, with the shifting political climates across Europe, the design and 
development of purely European aircraft460 signalled a new phase whereby Europe could 
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become more self-sufficient in its defence role whilst remaining close Allies of the US. The 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) initiative, proposed by the US in 1996, ‘… appears to offer promise 
for enhancing interoperability through the use of a common system.’461 However Lambeth 
notes that this is limited by the vastly different fiscal contributions each European member 
can make to the JSF, as many continue to contribute to the European fighter initiative.462  
It is noted that in retrospect, the contribution of precision weapons by the Allies in 
Kosovo had only a limited effect due to the increasing shortage of the weapons themselves, 
this being due to exorbitant cost, there being no defects in either the weapons themselves or 
in the abilities of the pilots.463 By the time of the Afghan conflict, “precision” was the 
primary requirement of US and NATO weaponry, one of the drivers of this being the 
continuing concern over unacceptable levels of civilian injury and collateral damage which 
was given widespread and adverse coverage by the world media when these mistakes did 
occur. 
Heinsch notes that ‘… at the moment we do not have specialised treaty law which 
regulates the use of the current new technologies such as cyber warfare, remote-controlled 
weapons, or autonomous lethal robots.’464 The difficulty lies in finding a way forward for 
the control of such weapons when States are averse to considering the matter and there is 
negligible State Practice; following from this Heinsch considers one way may lie in an 
increased recognition and use of customary international law, which also has the modern 
advantage of being fairly rapid to initiate. 
From the law attempting to control them, the following section illustrates the varieties 
of new weaponry deployed during the conflict in Afghanistan. 
 4.1.1 Weapons deployed in the Afghan war 
The deployment of drones during the Gulf War, January 1991, heralded what one noted 
policy centre has described as ‘… the dawn of a new era in conventional warfare.’465 In 
addition to the drones themselves, the tactical reforms for how these weapons are best 
deployed has resulted in multiple changes in policy, as in the case of the strategic guidance 
for “persistent surveillance” which provided the Allies with the continual overview required 
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to keep track of insurgent activity, where weapons were specifically selected to fulfil this 
requirement. 
 The most widely used of the drones, the US Predator together with the UK Reaper, 
together with the Apache helicopter and AC-10 gunship were deployed throughout the 
conflict. Again, the US constituted the largest proportion of the weaponry, the air forces 
providing “close air support” to ground troops and Afghan forces when required, being 
“called down” frequently at very short notice.466  
At the same time, a vast arsenal of small arms and ammunition existed in 
Afghanistan. This fact is not unusual in such large naturally wild habitats of forests and 
mountains.  The same is true in the US and Canada, where handguns are an accepted method 
of providing food and sport, in addition to self-protection, being used by everyone, men, 
women and older children. While these are not technically catalogued, ownership and use of 
these small arms by the general public was an additional cause of instability which could not 
be factored into a mission ROE with any certainty. 
4.1.2  The Allies Command Structure  
The NATO Headquarters were situated in the capital city Kabul, with the mission to ‘… 
provide security for the Afghan government and the civilian population and to defend against 
insurgent operations,’467 the Command and Control hub for Afghanistan being located in US 
Combined Air Operations Centre in Qatar.  
(The attack on the Dam Gulek group occurred over a period of time when several 
commanders and planning teams had input into the final decision to launch the missile.) 
There are specific rules guiding the effectiveness of combined operations. Rule 161 
of the HPCR stipulates that ‘A State may not invoke its participation in combined operations 
as justification for its failure to perform its obligations under the law of international armed 
conflict’.468 Whereas the Iraq example illustrated the problems potentially caused by 
differences between commanders and other ranks of different cultures, in Afghanistan, the 
example will use the differences between the legal regimes of the contributing States. The 
obligations of each State within such regimes do not change when a State becomes a member 
evolved over time. 
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Two of the more common are first, the use of “common Rules of Engagement”, 
where partners may accept more restrictive ROEs than usual in order to fall in line with other 
members; and second, the use of caveats, placed upon certain operational activities in order 
to keep support from political or public pressures of the home State. Due to the tensions such 
caveats can cause, there is common agreement that it is the responsibility of the partners 
involved in combined operations how to arrange the decision making process.469 
The NATO command operated a counter-insurgency operation “Operation Enduring 
Freedom” supporting the government of Afghanistan, established by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1386.470 A second force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) came 
into being on 20 December 2001 and was taken under NATO control 11 August 2003. The 
primary objective of ISAF was to provide effective security and counter-insurgency 
procedures, and to develop new Afghan security forces.471 
 Referring to the US Forces, throughout the prosecution of the war, there were a total 
of eleven rotations, changes in the leadership and their staffs. These changes affected all 
those … in the war, down through the members of the Task Force at division and corps 
levels, to the commanders fighting in the theatre itself. In search of a standard control 
procedure, they reflected evolving political and practical purposes, however the result was a 
loss of knowledge at theatre level leading to commanders having different visions of what 
must be done, a  … commanders’ intent.472 This particular policy went against the traditional 
command system, where there was one supreme Commander-in-Chief in office from the 
beginning of the conflict, through to the final stages of the war which could be a period of 
years,  as was the case with General Eisenhower, in charge of the whole European theatre 
during WW2. 
This “unity of command” of different forces had been a central tenet in the US 
military since the end of WW1. In Afghanistan, the CFC-A passed control of ISAF ground 
fighting down to three distinct centres; CENTCOM (Commander of US Central Command); 
SACEUR (Commander of European Forces); and SOCOM (Commander US Combined 
Central Command). The aim of this structure being to reconcile service, coalition, functional 
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and geographical differences; but from a strategic perspective, no one was in charge of the 
overall mission.473 
During the prosecution of the war, the command structure was re-organised on 
several occasions, responding to the shifting policies at the highest levels of policy making. 
From 2011, responsibility for security was passed to the Afghanistan forces, and the presence 
of NATO ground forces concluded at the end of 2014, with only the F-16s remaining. 
At the height of the conflict, there were 180,000 military personnel and 51 partner 
nations474 involved in the ISAF force, which according to the size of their contribution, and  
each with their own command and control centres, this again being one reason for the 
difficulty of obtaining a single overall view of the theatre of operations. 
The rugged terrain of Afghanistan demanded a high level of knowledge concerning 
navigation of roads and tracks, local knowledge of the area to be worked (The allies utilized 
a system called “Terrain Mapping” whereby information gathered through discussions with 
local tribal elders and other reliable sources could be generated into an up-to-date map of an 
immediate local area of interest,)475 and whether or not there were any local patterns of 
weather disturbances which could abort a strike at the last minute. The data obtained from 
the use of terrain mapping, updates from surveillance aircraft, all the information obtained 
as part of the dynamic network of information for the commander to use. This chapter 
describes a variety of military issues to which proportionality can be exposed, and despite 
the difficulties faced, the principle endures in that it continues to sustain the link between 
weaponry and humanity in dealing with civilian populations in wartime, and the pure 
necessity of achieving the military objective. The delicacy of this weighing operation, 
described in the previous conflict studies, has not changed throughout the past fifty years;  
however what has changed is the means and methods of military operations in the air, in the 
move from traditional weapons to the UAVs.  
4.2 The case studies 
4.2.1 the Dam Gulek attack 
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A drone-fired missile killed five members of a single extended family, four men and a boy, 
near Dam Gulek village in Nuristan province on 5 December 2012.476  
  4.2.1.a  the reason the target was attacked. 
No reason has ever been given by the authorities, either by the Allies or by the Afghan 
government, as to why the group was attacked. The Allied war-plan focussed on the removal 
of insurgent leaders, therefore the reason could have been a mistake in identity between as 
group of insurgents and a group of civilians, or insurgents and civilians travelling 
collectively. Noting the date of the Dam Gulek attack, 2012, the aim of the strategic policy 
makers had moved from waging outright war on the insurgents to that of isolating persons 
of value from among the insurgents. This group in particular was part of a family travelling 
to the home of a friend recently returned from a Pilgrimage to Mecca, taking with them a 
cow to contribute to the celebrations. 
 By this time, the Allied forces were taking increasingly strict precautions in the 
prevention of civilian harm. This took not only the form of sophisticated levels of 
information, but also other measures such as “patterns of life” assessments to ascertain 
certain potentially hostile gatherings or movements of the civilian population.477 For 
instance, as in agrarian community, there could be specific market days for the sale of farm 
animals, proving attractive   to insurgents as a place of cover or potential harm to civilians. 
As in any mainly farming community, the Afghan population would accept travelling long 
distances over tracks, footpaths and narrow roads as part of everyday life. 
 In operating within this enormous space, the operational discrepancies between the 
Allied forces came to light as the conflict progressed. As one example of particular 
importance to airstrikes, being the phrase “hostile intent”. To the NATO Allied forces it 
meant “manifest and overwhelming” force, whereas to the US alone it meant “the threat of 
the imminent use of force.”478 Similar to the process of defining the meaning of the principle 
of proportionality, this is a subjective operation and bearing in mind that each participating 
country had its own ROE, it should not be surprising when conflicts of opinion arose, 
particularly in any forensic investigation following civilian deaths claimed to have been 
caused by an airstrike. 
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In addition, together with the issue of inter-mingling, both civilians and insurgents 
wore the same style of clothing, the traditional, which may have local variations. With few 
exceptions, for example those politicians who have exposure to other cultures through the 
media, and may wear “Western” style suits, there was little or no difference between the 
clothing of the rich and the poor. The standard dress for adult men being costumes in wool 
or cotton, depending upon the season, and the universal pato or blanket, worn folded over 
one shoulder, serving as a cloak, a sleeping rug and a prayer mat. According to the area of 
the country, either turbans or caps are worn on the head.479 Dinstein notes that although the 
insurgents were openly carrying their weapons, they wore the usual customary dress, not 
uniforms or any particular mark or badge. Arising from this, they could not claim Prisoner 
of War status under customary international law.480   
These similarities in dress make the distinction between the two, civilian and 
insurgent, extremely difficult if not impossible. Returning to the attack, the weather at 11am 
on the morning of the attack was sunny and clear. 481 This being the case, there was no 
impediment through bad weather which could have affected the performance of the precision 
weapons deployed. 
 Being a land-locked country bounded by mountains which form part of the 
Himalayan chain, the winters are long and severe, with the high peaks causing severe and 
unpredictable changes in wind speed and direction, with snow storms capable of interfering 
with communications and the integrity of local radar systems. The country also lacked any 
comprehensive system of road or rail communications; in other States, where present, these 
structures provide useful tools of visual navigation and guidance. 
Recent literature proposes that a lack of local knowledge poses a far greater threat to 
the success of counter-insurgency than was previously thought. Krupiy notes that ‘The use 
of technology frequently does not enable attackers to correctly interpret the context behind 
the events on the battlefield. This results in attackers having an incomplete understanding of 
what is happening on the battlefield.482 Consequently, even with the deployment of precision 
weapons, failure to correctly isolate and identify the target, mistakes as in the Dam Gulek 
attack, will continue to be made. 
4.2.1.b  the weapons deployed in the air attack  
                                                          
  479 Types of clothing: Afghanistan. http://www.uwf.edu/atcdev/afg-/soc/Lesson4Dress3Men.htm.  
  480 Dinstein above n7 48. 
  481 Amnesty International ‘Left in the dark:..’ above n452 53.  
  482 T Krupiy ‘A Case against Relying Solely on Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
  Technology to Identify Proposed Targets’ (2015) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 415-449 
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A report published following the attack noted it had not been possible to identify the weapon 
which struck the family group, even from the remains of metal found at the site of the 
explosion If there were no other military activities in the area at the time, would there be a 
strong assumption that the missile was launched by a drone. In fact the Amnesty Report483 
notes specifically that a drone had launched the weapon. 
 In attempts to limit personal injury and collateral damage, the Allied forces were using 
smaller munitions in bombs,484 one of the crucial points made by Sine in describing the 
acceptance of the “precision” concept by the armed forces.   
Turning to the types of weapons used, not only in the attack itself but also in the 
Afghanistan conflict as a whole. It is noted that the weapons systems used in the Afghanistan 
conflict were heavily influenced by two interests, that of ”precision”, and that of “persistent 
surveillance”; to this end, drones in their dual modes of surveillance and of attack vehicles 
were a clear choice.  
However, a critical phase in the life-cycle of any military weapon is research and 
development where the original idea for a weapon is transferred to the drawing-board and 
thence to the test firing or test flights. Financial support for these stages may come largely 
from national governments, hence only weapons which will serve the “national interest” 
survive the course to actual use in battlefield conditions. In addition, their use must be legal 
in every sense, and the LOAC foresees some of the problems which may arise with the 
development of new weapons and takes steps to minimise these in advance. Thus, API 
Article 36 stipulates: 
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or methods 
of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its 
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited under the Protocol or 
by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party. 
Even if such precautionary measures are fulfilled, there is no guarantee that these weapons 
will not be misused, however the situation remains that the correct interpretation remains 
that the clause in API Article 36 applies to what would be the ‘… normal and expected use 
of new weapons.485   
                                                          
  483 above n452 Amnesty International ‘Left in the dark…’ 53. 
  484 above n452 HRW ‘Troops in Contact’ 20. 
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As demonstrated in all three case-studies, the increase in new weaponry has been at an 
unprecedented rate. Efforts have been made to bring some conformity to this process, as with 
both the 28th International Conference in 2003 which called for an international which would 
establish specific procedures and control under international law.486 In a guide published in 
2006, “Reviewing the legality of new weapons, means and methods of warfare”, the ICRC 
made two recommendations; first, that States should have a standing mechanism for an 
automatic review of new weapons, and second, that this be made mandatory by law or other 
directive. 
 In considering the principle of proportionality, the Guide makes an important point 
concerning the “conduct of hostilities” rules of the LOAC; ‘Although these rules are 
primarily intended to be applied at field level by military commanders on a case-by-case 
basis, they would nonetheless be relevant at the review stage of a new weapon insofar as the 
weapon’s design, characteristics and foreseeable effects enable the reviewing authority to 
determine whether or not the weapon’s end-user will be capable of employing it in 
conformity with them,’487 A further requirement is that the reviewing body is composed of 
experts from multi-disciplinary as well as multi-cultural backgrounds, thus ensuring a clear 
understandable synthesis of the opinions and recommendations expressed. However, even at 
this point, very few States have initiated procedures to address these points. 
 With the deployment of military drones, these issues become critical. It is recognized 
that a ‘A variety of never-before-anticipated, complex legal, ethical, and political issues have 
been created-issues in need of prompt attention and action.488  This, written in 2011, raises 
another point, that of “emergent behaviours”, behaviours not programmed but arising out of 
sheer complexity.489 This reflects the chaotic solution in Fallujah, but with the addition of 
far more programmed robotic war machines than were available at the time. Marchant notes 
that such emergent behaviours cannot be accounted for in advance, specifically during the 
programming stage before a mission.  
 With this in mind, consider a lethal military machine which is considered fit to fulfil 
its obligations as a new weapon under the LOAC, yet may still behave erratically towards 
civilians in a combat zone. 
                                                          
  486 Lawand above n452  925, 926; 
  487 Lawand above n452  925, 928; 
488 GE Marchant et al ‘International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots’ (2011) The Columbia 
Science and Technology Law Review 272, 274. 
  489 Marchant et al above n 488  272, 284. 
115 
 
Listing first the aircraft, one very much to the fore in Afghanistan was the Apache 
helicopter. 490 The Apache has a service record beginning in 1984, with at present there are 
some 2,100 in service around the world, including the UK which on 11 July 2016 took 
delivery of 50 AH64E Apaches. Manufactured by Boeing, the Apache AH-64 has a 
maximum speed of 279 k feet per minute; a vertical rate of climb of 2,000 feet per minute, 
and a maximum rate of climb of 2,800 feet per minute. Powered by two high performance 
turboshaft engines, it carries a crew of two. 
Its weaponry is composed of components which specifically support its role as a 
provider of real time battle management digital data of images and locations of targets to 
joint operations battlefield commanders. These are comprised of laser guided Hellfire 
missiles; 70mm rockets; 30mm automatic cannon and 200 high explosive dual purpose 
rocket rounds, in addition to longer range accessibility and night flying and fighting abilities 
Radar systems displays of both moving and static objects, can classify up to 128 
targets per minute, with integrated sensors providing networking and digital communication 
for Apache pilots situational awareness particularly in heavy cloud and storm situations. 
Apache helicopters and drones are discovering a new working relationship, as Grossman 
reports: in the areas of information supporting target acquisition and strike capabilities. The 
UAV is an either manned or unmanned MUT-T vehicle, through which the Apache pilot can 
control the sensors for payload and flight path of US Army Shadow and Gray Eagle drones. 
This gives additional benefits as quicker reaction times when drones are engaged in mid-
session corrections. The MUT-T vehicle has the ability to detect a target up to a distance of 
50 to 60 miles.491 At the time of writing, the “Global Hawk”492 drone has the capability to 
maintain 35 hours on watch at a height of 65,000 feet, almost double the operational height 
of commercial airliners. 
Afghanistan witnessed the potential of drone warfare taken to its ultimate, and the 
choice was very much in favour of the Predator UAV,493 an aircraft already tested in the 
Kosovo conflict.494 Type: MQ-9 Predator UAV aircraft. Manufacturer; General Atomic 
Aeronautical Systems. Specifications; Speed - 120 Kph.  Altitude - 25,000 feet. Endurance 
– 35 hours. Mission: ISR; Interdiction; close air support; force protection; combat search and 
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rescue; remote operations video enhanced receivers operations.  This aircraft flew in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Has both line of sight and beyond line of sight capabilities.  In 2001, 
there were 10 “Predator” UAVs in service used mainly for surveillance. By 2001 these 
numbers had risen to 180 plus with the vehicle itself able to fly for 24 hours at a height of 
26,000 feet. 
Recent developments have resulted in the new variant Predator B ER. The new 
landing-gear extends endurance from 27 to 34 hours, further enhancing operational 
flexibility as the aircraft can land in a wider range of conditions than on a specific runway. 
With the wing span extended from 66 feet to 79 feet to contain the fuel previously held in 
the fuel pods, this new configuration further extends endurance rate up to 42 hours. The 
aircraft has been acquired by the US Air Force, the Royal Air Force, NASA, and the air 
forces of France, Italy and Spain. 
In addition to the Predator, the UK’s Reaper was widely used. Unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) Reaper. UK. A medium to long range endurance (MALE) reconnaissance 
aircraft used in support of (ISR) and ground attack missions. With the pilot in command 
mode, this gives kinetic support to Commander for attacking fleeting or static targets plus 
other CAS options. It is powered by one engine, a Honeywell TPE 331-10T, with a cruising 
speed of 250 kph at an altitude maximum of 50,000 feet. Operated by crews of professional 
pilots, a sensor operator and Mission Intelligence Co-ordinators from Ground Control 
Stations. 
Command and Control; Activation of Reaper authorized by the Forward Air Control 
officer (FAC, and at the higher level of (JTAC) Joint Tactical Air Command – observing 
target on the ground, or from Land Forces Headquarters. Joined the Royal Air Force in 
Afghanistan in 2011.495  
At the other extreme is the tiny Wasp, lightweight, low altitude robust vehicle 
developed jointly by AVINC and DARPA. Has line-of-sight video and data-link capabilities 
for military use in urban or mountain terrains. Hand-launched and waterproof, can be 
launched from either land or water. With an altitude ceiling of 10,000 feet, it can transmit 
high resolution colour or infra-red information to both ground-control units and remote 
viewing units. An electronic front-end motor delivers a speed of between 40 to 60 kmh. On 
board equipment includes two cameras, and navigation information using all-weather GPS 
facilities.496 
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  Is there any evidence that weapons are becoming more precise with the advent of 
advanced technology. Returning to Sine’s definition,497 as a “technical capability” all 
contributing to the overall picture, ‘The aerial forces relied on intelligence from Predator 
drones equipped with Hellfire498 anti-tank missiles, which instantaneously relayed battlefield 
video to AC-130 gunships, Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance surveillance drones, 
…’.499 Considering their deployment, the trend towards the use of drones is significant. ‘In 
2013, UNAMA documented 19 incidents involving airstrikes from drones that resulted in 45 
civilian deaths, a substantial increase over the figures from 2012’.500    
An important point to note is that the deployment of precision weapons does not 
eliminate the effect of bad weather, nor the targeting difficulties in such rugged terrain. 
Strong gusting winds may blow a missile miles off track, when even missing the target by a 
few feet may leave the target unscathed.  
The American strikes in Afghanistan was unprecedented in the amount and quality of 
advanced weaponry deployed. By 2010, the US Airforce was flying at least 20 Predator 
drones a day, these being used mainly for surveillance and to give protection to American 
ground forces. Where lethal strikes were required, both bombs and missiles were used, 
however these were chosen with the strategic aim of reducing collateral damage.501 In a 
further effort to reduce civilian damage, the then commander of the American troops General 
McChrystal ‘… has tightened the rules for airstrikes, especially by military jets, which 
usually drop larger bombs than the drones and have less time to follow the targets.’502   
One expert proposes there are three points associated with this new strike power; 
mobility, the lethal effect of the weaponry, and the survivability of the delivering aircraft 
makes airpower the system of choice when determining the operational requirements of 
regional conflicts such as Afghanistan.503 There have been indications that feed-back from 
military “lessons learned” is beginning to affecting policy at the highest levels of strategic 
planning. The literature criticises the claims of the potential accuracy of drones when ‘…it 
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is possible to greatly minimize civilian casualties if the policy governing their use… restricts 
the targets against which they are employed.’504 This has led to the US military ‘… now 
adhering to a sophisticated set of collateral damage methodology protocols in order to 
determine whether a particular action satisfies the requirements of proportionality in most 
situations’.505  
4.2.1.c  the proportionality assessment 
The principle of proportionality was defined very clearly by Judge Higgin’s Dissenting 
Opinion in Nuclear Weapons; 
The principle of proportionality, even if finding no specific mention, is reflected in 
many provisions of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Thus 
even a legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would 
be disproportionate to the specific military gain from the attack.506    
As a model for civilian protection, proportionality does not operate in isolation but rather 
interacts with other principles and rules (e.g. – distinction and command responsibility) to 
fulfil this rationale. Whilst it may appear at first glance that the principle of proportionality is 
burdensome and unworkable, it has developed over the course of time into a practicable 
system of civilian protection in tandem with military necessity.507  
What is striking is the emergence of proportionality from a ‘state of neglect’ in 
1993508 to a position of concern to both experts and the general public alike at the present 
time. This study considers that, with emphasis now on assessment on a case-by-case basis, 
the hundreds, if not thousands of individual strikes in the Afghan conflict bring to light the 
fact that proportionality is far from being defunct, is continuing to demand decisions at most 
if not all levels of command responsibility. Barnidge notes that during the action of modern 
warfare, the responsibility for the assessment falls upon the shoulders of the military 
commander in two stages, during the assessment stage of his decision-making process; where 
API Article (57) (2) (a) (iii) - the authorization stage – the decision to launch the attack is 
being made, and possibly later, under API Article (57) (2)  (b) when the attack is underway, 
when there is a clear risk of excessive collateral damage. Barnidge proposes that and the 
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legal test for a “disproportionate” attack are those only where casualties from that attack are 
assessed as being excessive.509 
Placing responsibility on the commander makes sense when viewed against the speed 
of modern warfare, he is the one at the scene of the action and processing the authority for 
the final strike. In addition, he will be required to contribute to the after-flight briefings. 
Assessing the principle of proportionality following an air strike is important as it presents 
an opportunity to evaluate the action from the initial targeting decision to the final outcome. 
As with the Dam Gulek strike however, such evaluations are not always forthcoming, for 
various reasons, in this case the relatives of the victims did not know where to find the 
required source for assistance within the local area. From the military point of view, the 
forensic details provide material for “lessons learned”, of what to avoid or what to carry 
forward to benefit strategic planning in the future. 
Heinsch comments upon proportionality as being too general to deal with newly 
developed weapons.510  However, it remains the fact that it is in the interpretation of   
proportionality that the problems arise. Claims of  vagueness and ambiguity do not sit well 
with the programming of precision weapons, and with the widespread and increasing use of 
these, the principle is beginning to receive the attention it is due.  
By the beginning of the Afghan war, the amounts of information reaching the 
commanders and the planning teams managing these weapons had reached saturation levels; 
hence applying the law to the filtered information requires great skill of the lawyers who, 
working alongside the commanders assist in translating this into military terms for combat 
orders.511 The US government moved to make its position clear: US State Practice, at 18.5.1., 
Legal Advisors: The US has provided for legal advisors to advise military commanders on 
the law of war. For example, DOD policy has required that each head of a DOD component 
make quality legal advice available at all levels of command to provide advice about law of 
war compliance during planning and execution of exercises and operations.512  
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In the investigation following a strike, and even though collateral damage 
methodology protocols may be in place, each strike is considered on its own merits, as each 
will have individual issues such as the need for a second run at the target by the pilot of a 
manned aircraft, particularly dangerous regarding the risk of excessive collateral damage. 
Wright feels that it (the principle) is ambiguous in meaning and application and, ‘…there is 
no overarching definition of “excessive” because the variables in the proportionality standard 
are relative to each other. Commanders must consider each attack on a case-by-case basis, 
there can be no bright line rule’.516 (The primary purpose of the “case-by-case basis” is 
however part of the attempted protection of commanders from legal consequences should 
criminal charges arise following an armed attack.)  
Further, there is no requirement upon the commander to order the use of precision 
weapons. It falls within his margin of discretion to select the weapons he feels will best 
accomplish the task with the minimum of cost, both human and economic. There is a link 
here with the Dam Gulek strike: the use of a Hellfire missile to contain an individual subject 
appears extreme, but such criticism should be tempered by factors such as superior orders 
from the highest level, which may include political aims, the specific details of which may 
be withheld from personnel lower than strategic level. The complexity of an Allied 
command, where each country further claimed its own chain of command. The Australian 
chain of command exposes significant similarities and issues between it and the structure of 
the US. A short history explains how, following the 9/11 attacks, on 14 September 2001, by  
invoking Article Four of the ANZUS Treaty521, Australia announced the formation of Air 
Force assets to be made available for service in Afghanistan, under Operation Slipper.  
‘Command arrangements for Australian Defence Forces (ADF) in Afghanistan 
complex and opaque, and involve multiple regional and national elements, changing over 
time.’522 As of August 2010, operations in Afghanistan involved three or four command 
elements in the region; a National Headquarters, Joint Task Force 633 Afghanistan, at Base 
Command Tarin Kowa. This base was subordinate to a wider Australian general command 
structure – Air Defence Force Primary Regional Command – ANHQ (MEAQ) mid-east area 
operations at Al Minhad Air Base in the United Arab Republic in late 2008. The overall 
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Australian Defence Forces (ADF) for Afghanistan, was based in the capital, Kabul, National 
Command E1.- Task Force 633 liaises with ISAF regional command South in Kandahar.523 
Actual details of the duties of the Command and Control crews belonging to all of 
the Allied Forces will include the core tasks of the overall radar  surveillance of the aerospace 
for detection and identification of traffic; controlling and plotting the movements of such 
traffic with particular attention to any missile warnings; the staffing of aircraft filter centers 
and intercept control centers; submitting Close Air Support (CAS) and tactical air 
reconnaissance reports; and in emergency situations, assisting forward air controllers in 
tactical air mission planning and operations.524 
4.2.1.d  the temporal triangle 
In this diagram the base-line is at its highest point, indicating the high speed (950mph) of 
the chosen weaponry, the Hellfire missile. The thesis question argued whether or not the 
principle of proportionality was being constrained by the deployment of precision weapons, 
and the three case studies have demonstrated that this is true, and is occurring at an increasing 
rate. 
In the Kosovo conflict, the weapons chosen to demonstrate this fact were selected as 
relatively “low and slow” to provide the material for the lowest level of the base-line. 
Compared with the battle of Fallujah, some five years later, the pace of the whole operation 
was considerably less frenetic, with only the sporadic outbreaks of violence as seen in the 
Djakovice convoy incident to warrant the later claims of indiscriminate attacks. A later surge 
in the availability of both precision weaponry and precision in navigation led to a greatly 
reduced time being available to commanders for reasoned decision making, this being shown 
in the central position of the base-line of the battle of Fallujah, while this acceleration was 
even more noticeable in the present case of Afghanistan, where in some cases there was no 
available decision time at all. 
The vehicle chosen here to demonstrate the base-line was not an aircraft but a missile. 
Nevertheless it is still a precision weapon, and with the progression of weapons into 
“weapons systems” it is difficult if not impossible to predict where this morphing of 
otherwise discreet technologies will lead. The compression of the proportionality 
environment into this remaining small space gives a clear visual picture of what confronts a 
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commander when facing a split-second decision. Is it reasoned, intuitive, a good (or bad) 
guess, or a simple judgement call, because there was nothing else he could do.   
Some assistance to commanders may be given by technologies such as DARPA’s 
“Deep Learning” programme, but until such opportunities are commonplace, then 
operational mistakes will continue to be made because, for the commanders and pilots, there 
must be a limit to what any human being can cognitively control. Adams notes that ‘More 
and more aspects of warfighting are not only leaving the realm of human senses, but also 
crossing outside the limit of human reaction times…in short, the military systems (including 
weapons) now on the horizon will be too fast, too small, too numerous, and will create an 
environment too complex for humans to direct’.517 
 4.2.1.d  The temporal triangle 
The temporal triangle encompasses and absorbs all aspects of the principle of 
proportionality. A “central core” of proportionality has developed which, with the 
categorization of clear thresholds 518 delivers stability to the norm, particularly in times of 
uncertainty, as in the war in Syria. Despite this claim however, the literature does not reflect 
such clarity in military action. There remains no simple definition of the principle. 519 
although it emerges from the case-studies that the confusion arises more from the human 
interpretation than from the principle itself. 
Such recent patterns have not however displaced the certainties of existing military 
texts, and proportionality continues in co-existence with other humanitarian norms in 
protecting the civilian. 520 The contemporary use of chemical weapons, with little or no care 
for the safety of civilians opens a challenging chapter in the LOAC. Should such actions, by 
either State or non-State actors be categorized as war crimes, 521 this would contribute in part 
to the issue of lack of enforcement in international law, 522 this in itself a problem enmeshed 
in the background of the temporal triangle.  
The issue of information overload provides a good illustration of how the temporal 
triangle links the textual requirements of AP1 to the ever decreasing amount of time available  
to the C&C commander to evaluate data and construct a real-time ROE for pilots and ground 
________________________ 
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commanders. The background of the temporal triangle is capable of absorbing the “new wars 
and new laws” gamut of information as situations arise and evolve, as in Syria, where the 
military actors could be solitary soldiers on the ground each requiring different “micro” 
amounts of intelligence at the same time in the same situation. 523 
 All these facts are embedded in the background of the temporal triangle, representing the 
reality in which the principle of proportionality holds the capacity for continuing to protect 
the civilian in battlefield situations. 524  
The existence of customary international law is embedded in all of these issues and 
questions. In an age of high-speed engagement and instant decision making, it remains to be 
seen whether or not opinio juris can retain its importance, while State Practice, being a 
reflection of political power, remains part of the structure of the change and uncertainty of 
the contemporary global scene. 525  
   In viewing the temporal triangle, first as in the diagram of section of chapter 4 
(Afghanistan), and then as the completed whole, with all the relevant information in place, 
it is proposed that the Syrian conflict and the possession of chemical weapons by unregulated 
groups poses the greatest practical threat to the application of the principle of proportionality 
at the present time. 
  4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The issue of time is inherent in all the stages of this chapter, not only in the last minutes prior 
to the attack on the group. The lingering presence of drones in the skies above Afghanistan526 
 being witnesses of the US strategic policy of identifying persons of interest, were all part of 
the network of surveillance and as such, subject to the temporal requirements of commanders 
and the teams of lawyers and remote operators which controlled them. 
The thesis question asks whether or not the principle of proportionality is being 
constrained by the deployment of precision weapons. However, this needs to be qualified by 
the reality of “proportionality”, determined in the last few minutes of the strike by the ROE, 
and in the geographical and political location of the conflict. Proportionality is totally 
contextual,527 being affected by every aspect of its surroundings, and this, together with the 
ongoing debates as to its meaning, makes its assessment doubly problematic. Referring to 
the temporal triangle, all such items of information are further compressed into the 
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background space as the speed bar moves upwards towards the highest level, increasing the 
risk of a mistake being made at the last moment of a strike. 
A further ongoing issue inherent in the doctrine of proportionality is that of semantic 
vagueness and ambiguity, which leads the narrative back to the basic question of what the 
principle really means.  ‘Terminological imprecision taken to its logical end, marginalizes 
the precepts of international humanitarian law and therefore creates strong disincentives to 
its application and enforcement’.528 While accepting such incoherency in the texts, are nation 
states now accepting this in the face of new war theory as it gives them more choices of 
action. 529  
The literature continues to analyse this “meaning”, with a range of views across the 
spectrum,530 with the result for any commander being that he is not dealing with a clear cut 
rule but with a purely subjective issue which in itself takes possibly even more time to 
cogitate when in fact there is no time available for such additional permutations. At base, 
proportionality is an ethical issue, and the transfer of proportionality to a non-ethical military 
rule card for soldiers and pilots to use in attacking a target is not one which as yet, met with 
universal satisfaction.  
The Oxford Group express it thus; ‘Neither practitioners, lawyers nor philosophers 
have a clear understanding of the required degree of nexus between harm done to civilians 
and a military action for the former to count as collateral damage. This is due in part to the 
conceptual still less predicting, the interacting causal factors that determine military effect 
and political advantage’. 531  
In arguing the nexus between proportionality and the issue of time, in assessing these 
in relation to the deployment of Predator drones, the commanders and the lawyers have two 
paths to follow when preparing the remote controller to effect a strike; they have either plenty 
of time, or no time at all for a proportionality assessment. For example, in a situation identical 
to the Dam Gulek attack they may have both, at different stages of the strike.  
                                                          
  528 Heinsch above n70 36.         
529 Newton and May above n 7 517. 
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During the “persistent surveillance” phase of the drone, the assessment period for the 
commander, when the movements of the individual are being constantly watched, sometimes 
for days or even weeks, there would be time for collation and cross-referencing of facts, both 
old and new, to build up a picture of habitual movements. When the time was ripe for an 
attack, there would not be time, in the last few seconds to change plans in reaction to the 
sudden appearance of civilians, as once a precision weapon (the Hellfire missile) is launched, 
its speed and track to target cannot be changed. Vogel notes that there is almost a total 
inability to “call back” drones once the mission is underway.532 
A further advantage of the deployment of drones is the protection of the attacking 
force. In their surveillance mode, the cameras and radar trackers provide the soldiers and 
pilots with real-time information concerning, giving information which may allow escape 
from a planned ambush for example, or the suspicious behaviour of groups near a village. 
This makes practical sense, for survival means the possibility of later attacks, an advantage 
to a commander. The US Naval Handbook (2007) states that “Military advantage may 
involve a variety of considerations, including the security of the attacking force.” 533 
The principle of proportionality forms part of the information network within which 
the commanders operate, however ‘Proportionality assessments are made on the basis of 
imperfect information and often with too much stress and too little time from the perspective 
of the decision maker.’ 534 Drones provide extraordinary levels of intelligence to the military 
through their technical abilities, but they do not operate without legal boundaries; Boothby 
notes that the operators of drones, even though located thousands of miles distant in the US, 
remain subject to the same laws of war as are the pilots and operators situated in the actual 
battle zone, for example, in Afghanistan.535 
In such cases, how far can command responsibility reach, both geographically and 
legally. Some authors claim that there is sufficient law to control the use of drones, while 
others consider there is no law at all. Interlaced with this is the issue of new weaponry, even 
the language used to describe this area of weaponry is proving ambiguous and contentious 
and caution is required when moving between weaponry and technology. Hensel notes that 
‘International norms are generalized standards of conduct that delineate the scope of a state’s 
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entitlements, the extent of its obligations and the range of its jurisdiction by prescribing 
certain actions but proscribing others’.536 Within or without such standards of conduct 
however, it is true that the conflict in Afghanistan, through the use of precision weaponry, 
produced the lowest level of civilian casualties in relation to the number of target strikes in 
the records of modern warfare.537 
As noted, one of the most recent, and most publicised, technological development in 
the field of armed conflict is the “drone”, and it is this move into the area of long-distance 
control which poses the greatest challenge to the principle of proportionality. However, the 
development of such weapons as drones have highlighted the fact that there is at present 
(2013) little or no law available for regulating their use.   
Among those who claim there is sufficient law are Boothby, who concludes ‘… that 
the established framework… should be capable of being applied,’538 whereas Dinstein avers 
that there are ‘… hosts of ambiguities embedded in the law as it stands.’539 From a different 
viewpoint are those who consider that the emergence of “new wars” could lead to a 
completely new concept of the law of armed conflict. Lamp suggests a “paradigm of 
compliance” a possible joining of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello; however he also 
thinks that jus in bello proportionality cannot work where the war itself is illegal. 540  This 
range of views reflects the subjective nature of the LOAC and the proportionality principle. 
 ‘It is proposed that ‘jus in bello proportionality is unique in its context, and a 
simplistic shift to make it operate precisely parallel to other usages would largely destroy its 
utility in the context of armed conflicts.’541 This study agrees that this is why the concept of 
proportionality is a principle and not a rule or imperative; it’s very “vagueness” allows for 
movements across different real-life situations in differing cultural backgrounds where even 
the respective militaries have their own military languages.  
This being so, are the existing rules capable of controlling weapons of kinetic effect 
only. As it stands, existing LOAC is applicable to computer network attack, but its authors 
do not consider it substantial enough to provide guidelines for policy. Referring to the 
principle of proportionality, as part of the pre-attack planning, such issues as the question of 
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excessive collateral damage, is there a threshold to this limit, and would there be different 
methods of fulfilling the mission. 542 
Addressing contemporary precision weapons, ‘It is fair and accurate to assert that 
today’s aerial munitions (if not ground launched ones) are relatively much more precise on 
average than those used by US forces 20 years ago. However, this statement is a comparative 
one, quite different in its implication that the absolute designation of current US military 
operations as “precision warfare.’ 543  
In the age of the new wars, the effective use of such technologies will require rapid, 
effective, and close interaction between many different systems.  and instead the human role 
will take other forms, strategic direction perhaps, or to go to the other extreme, whether or 
not to enter hostilities at all.544  In addition, it is not only the weapons themselves which are 
becoming faster, but also speed of change is affecting the whole system of military weapons. 
However, the humanitarian conventions and principles in place at the present time were part 
of a by-gone age, and in view of the advent of the “new wars” there are commentators who 
call for new sets of rules which may be required for governance of the LOAC.545 An issue 
which arises in the Afghan campaign is noted by Schindler; when it comes to contemporary 
conflicts, these are ‘… fought by private groups that lack a clear command structure, that are 
not trained in the conduct of hostilities and that are not familiar with the principles and rules 
of international humanitarian law’.546 Another factor may be the size of the fighting unit 
involved. ‘… a small unit may not have a wide choice of methods and means of combat at 
its disposal and, moreover, may be limited in more than one way.’ 547   
However, for proportionality the future may not be so bright in any case, whether or 
not it can be roboticised. Dill proposes it is largely ineffective and vague, and offers three 
reasons for its failures; first, it fails to sufficiently guide a well-intentioned combatant in his 
actions in the field; second, it fails to adequately protect civilians, and third, it fails to provide 
a standard for unbiased assessment of the conduct of hostilities.548 She further urges that a 
feasible, workable approach based on the concept of necessity is urgently needed.  
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This study comments that the reason for the second failure is the failure of the other 
two, and of these, failure three may prove to be the most intractable. Every commander and 
JAG lawyer will be subjectively biased even though it is buried in his sub-conscious, Unless, 
as Dill suggests, a solid external textual standard is decided, bias will remain in one of the 
areas in most need of unbiased decision-making, the law of armed conflict.   
Wright feels that it (the principle) is ambiguous in meaning and application and, ‘to 
answer the question posed at the outset: there is no overarching definition of “excessive” 
because the variables in the proportionality standard are relative to each other.’549  
Nevertheless, the semantic flexibility of the jus in bello proportionality can be a benefit in 
times of hostile activity. Flexibility permits the military commanders the discretion to make 
choices and to take the risks necessary at the precise moment of military impact, without 
which he and the planning team could be denied the opportunity of pursuing the military 
advantage required. This disparate range of views is not surprising given that, as Heinsch 
postulates, ‘… it is too early to determine whether the available new military technologies 
have influenced the creation or adaptation of established rules of customary IHL.’550   
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TEMPORAL TRIANGLE - AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Launch (a)  to  (b)  -  the distance line; the distance between the launch point and the target (b). 
Launch (a)  to  (c)  -  the speed line; how fast the weapon travels between the launch point and the target (b). 
Background  -  this shaded area constitutes the presence of the principle of proportionality in the temporal 
matrix. This shading will change with each case study, illustrating how this proportionality is degraded by the 
differing speeds of the weapons used, until the diagram changes from a completely shaded fill to a nearly empty 
space. 
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Chapter Five - Conclusions 
Evidence exists to support the claim that the compression of time through the use of high-
speed precision weapons inhibits the effective implementation of the principle of 
proportionality represents the core of the thesis question, as illustrated in the following texts. 
Drawn from the three case studies, this evidence provides the proof that proportionality 
remains a fundamental principle within the Western system of IHL, which in modern 
practice, demands a balance between the use of force and excessive amounts of civilian harm. 
551However, recent unforeseen events in Syria, Yemen and Iraq illustrate how, in those 
circumstances, the principle could be incapacitated or destroyed in both theory and practice. 
           Scholarly debate continues as to its customary status, with one commentator 
remarking that customary law is not typically understood as including definitions, being 
vague and ambiguous.552 This paucity of specific definition was one reason for the evolution 
of the 1977 Protocols, with the continuing customary status of the existing IHL being 
eventually codified in Article 51(5)(b) – the proportionality of means, and in Article 57(2)(b) 
- the proportionality of methods. Custom also retains its importance in situations where non-
complying States are involved, an area at the cross-roads of law and politics, and where the 
Asylum, Continental Shelf, and the Nuclear Weapons cases553 retain their importance in 
modern international decision making.   
Addressing the problem of non-compliance, not all States subscribe to the 
proportionality principle. Major world States, including the US554 and Russia express their 
position of non-compliance either in totality of through the use of reservations. It was 
commonly held that existing treaty norms were failing to provide the guidance needed by 
commanders due to the increasing complexity of modern warfare, together with the claim 
that they hindered a State’s ability to engage in combat on its own terms. The role of the 
‘persistent objector’ remains part of the creation of customary international law, forcing 
debate upon areas of uncertainty in the specific case.  
These three subjects, the application of non-complying States to API, principle of 
proportionality, and customary international law endow the subject matter of the following 
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texts within the boundaries of the thesis question. Additionally, the impact and potential of 
the temporal triangle is summarized in the final section. 
5.1 Application of the principle of proportionality in non-complying States to API  
The concept of “specially affected” States was set out by the ICJ in the Continental Shelf555 
where it stressed that practice must include that of such States and has been interpreted to 
mean that no customary rule can develop if these States do not accept the practice. The 
scholarship agrees that there is a core of proportionality which has existed for as long as the 
principle itself, which gives stability to the elusive idea of the phenomenon of LOAC 
proportionality through the use of clear thresholds. There are five thresholds but only one is 
relevant for this thesis, the first, for war or armed conflict. 
A gradual move by international lawyers towards codifying proportionality was 
furthered by the controversies concerning US actions, as an example, the use of napalm and 
other ‘scorched earth’ tactics in the Vietnam War. It was commonly held that existing treaty 
norms were failing to provide the guidance needed by commanders, however, the American 
military review concluded that even if the provisions of Protocol I had been in effect during 
the Vietnam War, for tactical, ideological and technical reasons they would have been of no 
value. In 1972, in response to a letter from Senator Edward Kennedy, the General Counsel’s 
memorandum had laid out the US military position on collateral damage and distinction, 
nonetheless, with a warning against attempts to limit the effects of attacks in an unreasonable 
manner. This fuelled opposition to the ratification of API from within the US military and 
its lawyers, an opposition which remains in place to the present day.  
Despite the acceptance of proportionality as a customary rule applicable to 
international armed conflicts, there is the possibility of non-parties to AP1 claiming the status 
of ‘persistent objector’. The role of the ‘persistent objector’ is part of the creation of 
customary international law, forcing debate upon areas of uncertainty in the specific case. 
One commentator proposes that ‘… the most favourable argument from the objecting States 
point of view would be that because they are “specially affected” States, the rule has not 
become customary law.  
 There are two attitudes non-ratifying States can take; either, as is the case with the 
USA, the customary rule is not the text of API Art 51 or, the customary rule is the text of 
API Art 51, but the non-parties may be persistent objectors to it. Opposition to API, 
specifically the principle of proportionality as laid down in API Art 51(5)(b) was most 
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publicly articulated by the US, their view being that it would hamper their inherent right of 
self-defence. The importance of this claim lies in the fact that, as one of the most powerful 
members of the P5, legal positions taken by the USA and other members influence the 
continuing development of customary international law.  
 This is a complex area, demanding precise evidence of practice, however the bench of 
an international court is constituted by judges from all areas of the world, each possessing 
their own cultural views as to what forms customary law may take in both theory and 
practice. Even so, there is a need to simplify this area, with this new need being the reduction 
of State practice (the objective element), and increased reliance upon opinio juris (the 
subjective element), thus distorting the historical balance between the two elements. As one 
expert proposes, customary international humanitarian law in general is experiencing a 
tendency to let the lex ferenda conflate the lex lata, and attempts by certain States to object 
to the development of new rules have been met with resistance. Should there be the 
possibility of non-parties to AP1 claiming the status of ‘persistent objector’ the burden of 
proof would be on the objector to show that it is an objector and that the burden has been 
held by the ICJ to be a high one.  
A further element stimulating debate is that of the duration of time; how long has a 
particular custom been recognized as such by those who are influenced by it. A fine example 
being the North Sea Fisheries Case where opinion was divided between three aspects, short 
duration; long duration, and instant customary law. The latter “instant” custom evolved 
through the necessity of constructing laws specific to the rapidly unfolding US Space 
Programme of the early 1960s and there were insufficient objections from the United Nations 
to prevent its subsequent adoption, with one expert being of the opinion that there is no 
reason why rules of customary international law cannot arise instantaneously in reaction to 
novel circumstances. 
One commentator opines that the required duration of usage depends on the facts of 
each specific case. “Those who are influenced by it” being, in this case North Sea Fisheries 
Case, the fishermen who drew their living from the waters involved in the dispute. The 
repetition of these actions over generations, where fishing provided the backbone of the 
national income, formed yet another aspect of the customary matrix. 
 A key question is whether Rule 14 of the Study applies to those States that have not 
ratified API, particularly the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (‘the P5’) 
as the most important States for the purposes of new weaponry due to their advanced 
militaries and high GDP spending on military research and development.  
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Referring to the P5, France had, upon ratification of API stated that the Government 
of the French Republic considers the first sentence of paragraph 2 of [Article 52] prohibits 
only such attacks as may be directed against non-military objects. Such a sentence does not 
deal with the question of collateral damage caused by attacks directed against military 
objects. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland made the following 
Declaration; …that Article 51(5)(b) was a “useful codification of a concept that as rapidly 
becoming accepted by all States as an important principle of international law relating to 
armed conflict.’ 556 
Iraq’s Law of the Supreme Criminal Tribunal (2005) identfies the following as a 
serious violation of the laws and customs of war applicable in international armed conflicts: 
the intentional launching of an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental 
loss of life or injury to civilians or civilian damage which would be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantages to be gained. Also - Article 
58(a) API states that the Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible, without 
prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to remove the civilian 
population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of 
military objectives.  
Neither China, the Russian Federation or the United States entered a reservation or 
declaration. In addition, the USA also questioned the rigour of the Study: for many rules 
proffered as rising to the level of customary international law, the State practice cited is 
insufficiently dense to meet “the extensive virtually uniform” standards generally required 
to demonstrate the existence of a customary rule.  
       The ability of the principle to be utilized despite the rapidly increasing speed of 
precision weapons is currently challenged in Syria, with weapons in hands of non-state actors 
operating in loosely organised groups or individuals with little or no centre of gravity and 
ROE as understood by Western military strategy. Such apparently ad hoc attacks in the 
Yemen and Iraq originate from groups organising around existing parties with varying 
political and ideological beliefs. These may have their own concepts of proportionality, for 
example, the means to an end concept, as adopted by Russia. Proportionality is an ancient 
concept, historically arising from the medieval idea of constant care, and evidenced in many 
instances where women and children were spared the killings carried out upon the civilian 
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men. The evolution of International Criminal Court may assist ameliorate some atrocities, 
however, requires permission of sheltering State to locate suspects which in many cases 
creates an unsurmountable barrier. 
Referring to other aspects of State practice, only the USA is not party to API, with 
the US Naval Handbook 2007 codifying the principle of proportionality in the exact terms 
of the API test, thus the principle of proportionality requires the commander to conduct a 
balancing test to determine if incidental injury, including death to civilians and damage to 
civilian objects, is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
expected to be gained. Despite not being a signatory to API, the US is one of only a few 
States to have adopted formal review processes.  
 It is arguable that the USA and other non-parties have discharged this burden through 
their continuing opposition to API Article 51(5)(b). One sign of such constant opposition 
would be the following; on the 6th May 2002, the US Government sent the following 
communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations; ‘This is to inform you, in 
connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 
1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the 
United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000. …’. 
Nevertheless, the Report on US Practice states that “United States practice recognises the 
principle of proportionality as part of the customary law of non-nuclear war.” 
Thus, even if Rule 14 can be said to reflect customary international law for the 
purpose of State responsibility in international armed conflicts, the discharge of the persistent 
objector burden by the non-participating States in API restricts the applicability of the 
customary international law rule to them as the principle of proportionality inhibits the use 
of these weapons. As these are some of the most important States in the world in the 
development of new weaponry in research and development this is an important limitation. 
Nevertheless, this does not undermine the study of the temporal compression in a 
commander’s decision-making in proportionality for new weaponry, not only because others 
of the P5 (e.g. the UK) accept proportionality in international armed conflicts but also 
because other States that accept proportionality can acquire such new weaponry from the 
main suppliers. 
An important point is that the behaviour of ‘persistent objectors’ in the formation of 
customary international law is equally as important as that of belligerents, and as a further 
point of interest, it is noted that the First and Second Gulf conflicts, together with 
Afghanistan and Iraq, were fought mainly by the armed forces of states not subject to the 
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rules of API, which renders serious comment on the practical effects of the provisions of 
API extraordinarily difficult. This paradox is furthered by another issue which remains a 
severe problem in the LOAC, the difference between international and non- international 
armed conflicts, although customary international law is certainly not confined to wars, it 
applies to international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. Referring to 
the case studies, Kosovo was declared an IAC, with constraints on the application of the rule 
of proportionality, whereas Iraq and Afghanistan were both NIACS with no constraints on 
its application. As a result of the Tadic557 case, it was felt by the legal community that the 
facts brought the differences in the two closer together, with the classification of NIACs 
being more representative of modern warfare.  
Thus despite all its attendant problems, evidence continues to prove the importance 
of customary international law and the existence of the persistent objector. Evidence for the 
position of proportionality in modern practice is drawn from the three case studies. 
5.2.1    proportionality in the Kosovo war   
Evidence exists to support the claim that the compression of time through the use of 
high-speed precision weapons inhibits the effective implementation of the principle of 
proportionality. Historically there had been disquiet that the security of the civilian in a 
rapidly changing world was insufficiently determined, leading to the drafting of the 1977 
Additional Protocols. Following the NATO intervention, Kosovo was the first armed conflict 
where the principle of proportionality was specifically mentioned. With API as the relevant 
treaty, specifically Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) and (b), what these provisions required 
was an assessment before the attack as to the anticipated military advantage and whether the 
civilian damage is likely to be excessive in relation thereto; in this case the principle was 
analysed ahead of the attack over a period of weeks as part of the strategy to limit collateral 
damage.  
Consisting of a variety of both kinetic and precision weapons, together with state of 
the art C&C centres and radars, these attacks were exceptional in the detail of their pre-
planning. Using methods originating in the Vietnam war, the planners employed a regime of 
precautionary measures, including proportionality, designed to produce minimal damage 
particularly to civilians. That this strategy worked too well was evidenced in the near 
destruction of both the Djakovice convoy and the Grdelica bridge. 
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Conflicting facts and opinions distorted the construction of a clear picture of what 
had occurred as survivors of the attack, many if not all of the witnesses being medically 
shocked and disorientated that they were unable to present any coherent recalls of the 
incident. Nonetheless, with the passage of time a more accurate and stable picture emerges 
from which credible evidence can be accrued, sufficient to provide in some cases, facts that 
will support accusations of war crimes. It eventually became clear that efforts were made 
during these attacks by planners and commanders to enforce the tenets of avoiding 
“excessive” damage to civilians. The concept of the “margin of discretion” allows for slight 
variations in decision making, taking into account the particular surrounding circumstances 
of each case. The final forensic review determined that it was neither reasonable nor feasible 
to expect the pilot of the US F-15 to make a definitive identification of the targets.  
Following the Vietnam War the US government sought a new method, or approach 
on waging future conflicts. This “Revolution in Military Affairs” reflected the advances 
made in both civilian and military technology, moving increasingly towards control systems 
reliant upon space-based platforms. Its stated intention being not to destroy the enemy but 
achieve a strategic result. This Effects-Based Operations strategy558 was the move away from 
the titanic battles between armies to the more agile, responsive, forces of the present day. 
The variable conditions of warfare as found in Korea and Vietnam made accurate targeting 
difficult although there were instances of successful specific avoidance tactics by the US Air 
Force.  From information, to the aircrew who use it and the aircraft available. The three basic 
principles of weapons law remain: first, that the means and methods of warfare are not 
unlimited; second, the principle of distinction; and third, the principle of humanity which 
has retained its structure from the Preamble of the St. Petersburg Convention, to the text of 
API Article 35(2), then to the text of the CCW.  
Particular rules apply when several States are working together in unison against a 
common enemy.559 Intended to reduce misunderstandings and friction between States of 
differing cultures, languages and political systems, these rules are general in construction 
and neutral in application. Specifically, in identifying the applicable law, these rules mediate 
the range of problems that arise when different legal obligations exist among the partners in 
a combined operation, of importance when it is recalled that it is the control of this lethal 
force which now underpins the application of the principle of proportionality. “Lethal” due 
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to the fact that the precision weapons currently in use by an increasing number of States, is 
successful in its accuracy of over 90%. 
An additional issue in modern warfare is that of “own side” safety, an aspect of the 
value system of Western militaries, it was claimed that the pilot was flying at that height to 
avoid being shot down by the sophisticated Serbian anti-aircraft batteries, which brought 
down a Stealth bomber later in the conflict. The resulting collateral damage was due to 
accident, the one element that cannot be factored into any risk element of an ROE. Experts 
consider that finding an agreed common standard or metric for the principle of 
proportionality would be a significant step in the general understanding of this principle, 
with some suggesting a common denominator principle which has the aim of balancing the 
values found in every proportionality calculation.   
Following the incidents of the Djakovice convoy and the Grdelica bridge, the ICC 
recognizes that attacking civilians and civilian objects now constitutes a war crime,560 subject 
to specific criteria being met. However, as recently as 2012, the UN Secretary General noted 
there had been little progress in protecting civilians from deliberate targeting, indiscriminate 
or disproportionate attacks, and other violations of humanitarian law. Proportionality 
continues to perplex those who attempt to interpret and apply it, to the point where even the 
ICTY Commission reflected on the considerable intellectual difficulties associated with the 
implementation of the proportionality rule.561 
The temporal triangle locates at the lowest level, indicating the speed of the slowest 
aircraft, the US A-10 Thunderbolt with an operating speed of 400mph. 
 5.2.2  proportionality in the Iraq war 
Is the proportionality principle being constrained by pressures of urban warfare, a very 
different battlespace to that of Kosovo, fought over open country side. The claim that 
evidence exists to support the claim that the compression of time through the use of high-
speed precision weapons inhibits the effective implementation of the principle of 
proportionality is particularly apt when considering the air and ground battles of Fallujah, 
and the problems of urban warfare are of increasing importance. In comparison with Kosovo, 
it was possible to sustain some time for considering the proportionality needs, however the 
time available for its application was being rapidly reduced.  
 A noticeable aspect of the battle of Fallujah was the speed and ferocity of the fighting, 
both ground and air. Within this battlespace, even less time was available for proportionality 
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calculations. In such situations, commanders are allowed a margin of discretion in their 
calculation; this will contribute to what is now recognised as “reasonable” decision making, 
moving towards the situation where there is practically no time at all for human intervention. 
 Every stage of this conflict was planned upon the established rules of western military 
engagement as applied to the Allied army and air forces, incorporating the rules and 
proscriptions of the LOAC. It is true however, that the framers of the Additional Protocols 
were living in a different global era, of the Cold War and the deployment of the earlier 
versions of precision weapons; yet these rules retain their veracity although it is claimed by 
some observers that new treaties or conventions are required to deal with the elemental 
changes fuelled by precision technologies and the evolution of the military drone.  
Specific guidelines exist in the LOAC for the formation of a combined operations 
group of States. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the operations of such a coalition would on 
occasion overlap, due to the timescales of the missions. In conjunction with this is the issue 
of different cultures and languages. With over fifty participating States, the rules deal with 
this situation by stipulating that the legal obligations of a State do not change when its armed 
forces are operating in a multinational force under the command and control of a military 
commander of a different nationality. As these rules are laid down in treaty law and custom, 
the habit has developed, when a dispute arises among the States, to leave those concerned to 
reach a compromise.  
One example given being, as in the attack on the area of Fallujah which killed IHAT 
271, one State may agree to carry out a lethal attack while another may strongly disagree. 
The operational tasks could be separated, where one State would deploy an aircraft to guide 
and protect the attacking aircraft deployed by the other State. Reviewing the legality of new 
weapons, means and methods of warfare, the ICRC made two recommendations; first, that 
States should have a standing mechanism for an automatic review of new weapons, and 
second, that this be made mandatory by law or other directive. 
 In both case-studies, there would be an immense problem in determining whether 
attacks were launched with such knowledge together with the intention of causing exccessive 
levels of death and injury. Precision weapons were used specifically to avoid such situations, 
and it was made clear during the pre-planning stage that civilian security was the priority on 
the commanders list of orders. To this end there is opinion that, in urban warfare, a customary 
norm is evolving that there is a duty to use precision weapons562 in preventing excessive 
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civilian losses, as under existing law there is no guidance on the subject. Further, Iraq, in its 
Law of the Supreme Criminal Tribunal (2005), definitively includes the importance of 
excessive civilian casualties. 
During this battle, another issue emphasised was that of information, and the problems 
this presents to the commander and the planning team. This is one paradox of modern 
warfare; the more information that is generated to assist him in decision making, the more 
likely it is to produce the reverse effect, of so overloading the communications systems that 
they either malfunction or fail entirely, thus depriving him of any information at all. Tacit 
information requires interpretations, and while supporting “facts” can be easily transferred, 
the underlying organizing logic can seldom be transferred quickly and easily. There is a 
computer algorithm which, when inserted into a command and control system of an aircraft 
can automatically compute a proportionality balancing mechanism, however this is not the 
same as the pilot making a last-second attempt to avoid civilians within the target zone. 
The deployment of US F-16 aircraft equipped with precision weapons produced more 
“first strike” successes, reducing the necessity of secondary attacks and proportionality re-
runs, with potentially fewer civilian casualties in each particular case. A further advantage 
of these weapons was the concept of “mass” which controlled the radius of the bomb damage 
thus limiting the harm to civilians and property. In densely populated zones, with multiple 
choices of targets, a commander may use alternative weapons to those in the ROE to achieve 
his aim, such as substituting an airstrike with simple handheld machine guns or rifles to deal 
with a difficult small-scale target with a high risk of civilian occupation. 
This thesis proposes that that the assessment and application of the principle of 
proportionality during the attack on Fallujah was seriously eroded in so many circumstances, 
and in so many instances, due to the speed and complexity of the military action, there was 
very little or no time whatsoever for a commander to begin an assessment during an attack. 
Similarly, even with the assistance of his tank crew, their commander could on many 
occasions have little or no time to think either of his own position as commander or that of 
his position in the overall battle-plan of his platoon of tanks.  
            Following the battle of Fallujah, any post-engagement assessment would appear 
difficult given the view that the battle, although short, was complex and problematic and as 
a result, any research following the battle would find it difficult to sift the truth from the 
disingenuous. The HPCR states that the principle of proportionality applies throughout all 
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stages of an attack, from planning to execution.563 Anyone with the ability and authority to 
suspend, abort or cancel an attack must do so once he reaches the conclusion, using the 
margin of discretion, that the expected collateral damage would be excessive in relation to 
the anticipated military advantage.  
 This study does not agree that such steps as creating new conventions would clarify 
the matrix of proportionality at this stage unless a totally new concept arises. It is felt that 
the principle of proportionality, when honed down to its basic meaning, is sufficient to 
communicate the requirement of not harming more civilians than is absolutely necessary. 
The real problem then is not proportionality itself, but the unintentional shortcomings in the 
ability to process its meaning within a “human” time-frame.  
While API provides the framework for civilian protection in situations of armed 
conflict, it is in the interpretation of the Articles, that the problems arise. This is never more 
true than in the case of the principle of proportionality. As in the studies of Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, the principle itself held its central claim as a protector of civilians during armed 
conflict, excessive civilian casualties resulting from mistakes by military personnel in 
recognition and targeting, failures and mis-firings of weaponry, and the interaction of 
insurgents, the military and the civilian population in the urban space. Fallujah is an excellent 
example of proportionality being assessed during the attack, a situation likely to be repeated 
in conditions of urban warfare. 
Referring to the temporal triangle, the bar stands at the mid-line, representing the US 
F-16 fighter, with speeds of up to 1,000 mph; the decision making time available to the 
commander is reduced by one half. 
 5.2.3 proportionality in the Afghanistan war  
The conflict in Afghanistan supports the claim that evidence exists to support the claim that 
the compression of time through the use of high-speed precision weapons inhibits the 
effective implementation of the principle of proportionality. The battlespace differs from 
both Kosovo and Iraq in that it presented a mix of vast plains and towering mountains with 
widely scattered settlements and towns. The lingering presence of drones in the skies above 
Afghanistan being witnesses of the US strategic policy of identifying persons of interest, 
were all part of the network of surveillance and as such, subject to the temporal requirements 
of commanders and the teams of lawyers and remote operators which controlled them.  
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The issue of time and distance is inherent in all the stages of this chapter, not only in 
the last minutes prior to the attack on the group. The thesis question asks whether or not the 
principle of proportionality is being constrained by the deployment of precision weapons. 
However, this needs to be qualified by the reality of “proportionality”, determined by the 
ROE, and in the geographical and political location of the conflict.  
Historically there had been disquiet that the security of the civilian in a rapidly 
changing world was insufficiently determined, leading to the drafting of the two 1977 
Additional Protocols; though their efficacy faced their severest tests in this war with the 
deployment of radically new technologies. Thus proportionality is totally contextual, being 
affected by every aspect of its surroundings, and this, together with the ongoing debates as 
to its meaning, makes its assessment doubly problematic.  
A further ongoing issue inherent in the doctrine of proportionality is that of semantic 
vagueness and ambiguity, which leads the narrative back to the basic question of what the 
principle really means. Terminological imprecision taken to its logical end, marginalizes the 
precepts of international humanitarian law and therefore creates strong disincentives to its 
application and enforcement. While accepting such incoherency in the texts, the margin of 
discretion continues to allow planners and commanders options in decision-making 
processes. 
The principle of proportionality forms part of the information network within which 
the commanders operate. Drones564 provide extraordinary levels of intelligence to the 
military through their technical abilities, but they do not operate without legal boundaries, 
one expert noting that the operators of drones, even though located thousands of miles distant 
in the US, remain subject to the same laws of war as are the pilots and operators situated in 
the actual battlezone, in Afghanistan.  
In such cases, how far can command responsibility reach, both geographically and 
legally. However, the development of such weapons as drones have highlighted the fact that 
there is at present (2015) little or no law available for regulating their use. It is proposed by 
one expert that where possible, records of any use of the principle should be retained after 
the event, thus providing future references for the utility of its use in similar circumstances.   
Interlaced with this is the issue of new precision weaponry, and even the language 
used to describe this area of weaponry is proving ambiguous and contentious and caution is 
required when moving between weaponry, technology and law. However, the development 
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of such weapons as drones have highlighted the fact that there is at present (2013) little or 
no law available for regulating their use. It is proposed by one expert that where possible, 
records of any use of the principle should be retained after the event, thus providing future 
references for the utility of its use in similar circumstances.  
Addressing the use of contemporary precision weapons, it is fair and accurate to 
assert that today’s aerial munitions (if not ground launched ones) are relatively much more 
precise on average than those used by US forces 20 years ago. However, this statement is a 
comparative one, quite different in its implication that the absolute designation of current 
US military operations as “precision warfare.  
During the “persistent surveillance” phase of the drone, the assessment period for the 
commander, when the movements of the individual are being constantly watched, sometimes 
for days or even weeks, there would be time for collation and cross-referencing of facts, both 
old and new, to build up a picture of habitual movements. When the time was ripe for an 
attack, there would not be time, in the last few seconds to change plans in reaction to the 
sudden appearance of civilians, as once a precision weapon (the Hellfire missile) is launched, 
its speed and track to target cannot be changed. It is noted that there is almost a total inability 
to “call back” drones once the mission is underway. The data obtained from the use of terrain 
mapping, updates from surveillance aircraft, all the information obtained as part of the 
dynamic network of information for the commander to use. 565 
There are a wide variety of military issues to which proportionality can be exposed, 
and despite the difficulties faced, the principle endures in that it continues to sustain the link 
between weaponry and humanity in dealing with civilian populations in wartime, and the 
pure necessity of achieving the military objective. The delicacy of this weighing operation, 
described in the previous conflict studies, has not changed throughout the past fifty years; 
however what has changed is the means and methods of military operations in the air, in the 
move from traditional weapons to the UAVs.  
With the deployment of military drones, these issues become critical. It is recognized 
that a variety of never-before-anticipated, complex legal, ethical, and political issues have 
been created-issues in need of prompt attention and action. A further advantage of the 
deployment of drones is the protection of the attacking force. In their surveillance mode, the 
cameras and radar trackers provide the soldiers and pilots with real-time information 
concerning, giving information which may allow escape from a planned ambush for 
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example, or the suspicious behaviour of groups near a village. This makes practical sense, 
for survival means the possibility of later attacks, an advantage to a commander.  
In the age of the new wars, the effective use of such technologies will require rapid, 
effective, and close interaction between many different systems, and instead the human role 
will take other forms, strategic direction perhaps, or to go to the other extreme, including 
whether or not to enter hostilities at all.  In addition, it is not only the weapons themselves 
which are becoming faster, but also speed of change is affecting the whole system of military 
weapons. However, the humanitarian conventions and principles in place at the present time 
are part of a by-gone age, and in view of the advent of the “new wars” there are commentators 
who call for new sets of rules which may be required for governance of the LOAC.  
However, for proportionality the future may not be so bright in any case, whether or 
not it can be automised. One expert proposes it is largely ineffective and vague, and offers 
three reasons for its failures; first, it fails to sufficiently guide a well-intentioned combatant 
in his actions in the field; second, it fails to adequately protect civilians, and third, it fails to 
provide a standard for unbiased assessment of the conduct of hostilities.566 Again, the main 
issue is that of subjective interpretation, particularly in areas as defining key words like 
“excessive”. 
It is widely accepted that there is no overarching definition of “excessive” (civilian 
casualties) because the variables in the proportionality standard are relative to each other. 
Nevertheless, the semantic flexibility of the jus in bello proportionality can be a benefit as 
well as a hindrance in times of hostile activity, as flexibility permits the military commanders 
the discretion to make choices and to take the risks necessary at the precise moment of 
military impact, without which he and the planning team could be denied the opportunity of 
pursuing the military advantage required. This disparate range of views is not surprising 
given that, as one commentator postulates, that it is too early to determine whether the 
available new military technologies have influenced the creation or adaptation of established 
rules of customary IHL. 
               In considering proportionality in relation to targeting, the principle remains vague 
and elusive for one major reason at least, because the courts have rarely convicted anyone of 
violating the proportionality rule, and there are no judicial decisions available on what is, or 
should be, the exact parameters of proportionality. The risk of indiscriminate attacks 
increases in such fragmented battlefield situations, and they are similar to proportionality in 
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that they are an “after the attack” forensic inquiry. Article 20(b)(2) of the 1966 ILC Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind addresses the situation thus, that 
the launching of an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population and civilian objects 
in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive civilian casualties. 
            There are further threats to the principle, being in the form of so-called “proxy wars” 
as in Syria, in which small groups of fighters or even individuals act on behalf of a State or 
some other source of power to weaken the strength of an enemy, these actors displaying little 
or no regard for the concept of protecting civilians. At present, with the apparent demise of 
traditional large-scale wars, it is in such small - scale events where there is no knowledge or 
regard for what are generally accepted universal norms of civilian rights that the future for 
the principle of proportionality becomes precarious indeed. 
In arguing the nexus between proportionality and the issue of time, in assessing these 
in relation to the deployment of Predator and Reaper drones, the commanders and the 
lawyers have two paths to follow when preparing the remote controller to affect a strike; they 
have either plenty of time, or no time at all for a proportionality assessment. For example, in 
a situation identical to the Dam Gulek attack they may have both, at different stages of the 
strike. 
 It is proposed that jus in bello proportionality is unique in its context, and a simplistic 
attempt to make it operate equally to other usages would largely destroy its utility in the 
context of modern warfare. This study agrees that this is why the concept of proportionality 
is a principle and not a rule or imperative; it’s very “vagueness” allows for movements across 
different real-life situations in differing cultural backgrounds where even the respective 
militaries have their own military languages.  
Several implications arise from this. First, that the principle of proportionality, while 
its provenance in API remains sound when applied by affirming States, will remain where it 
is in relation to its development to meet new challenges unless more States publicise their 
State practice, which at present is very scant. Arguments which support it in its present state 
will need to recall that the terms of API were drawn up over forty years ago, when the 
operational ability of aircraft and munitions was considerably less than it is today.  
The speed line in the temporal triangle now stands at the highest level, the operating 
height of remotely-controlled drones, where in many instances the human operator has been 
removed from the actual theatre of war, particularly where the weapon is remotely 
controlled, thus indicating the large extent to which proportionality and its sphere of 
influence has been constrained. 
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5.3       Status of the principle of proportionality in customary international law  
Modern practice in custom in international law is classically defined in Article 38(1)(b) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) and comprises two well-established 
elements: 1) the practice of States; and 2) opinio juris sive necessitatis or ‘an opinion as to 
law or necessity’ Although the existence of this source of law and of these two components 
is settled, their precise contours are a matter of longstanding and ongoing debate.567 It is 
necessary to forensically sustain claims to the status of customary international law of 
individual provisions.  
The principle of proportionality is traced to Article 51(5)(b) of API to the Geneva 
Conventions, with scholars claiming that it has attained the status of customary international 
law (‘custom’). The importance of custom in the field of the law of armed conflict is 
increasing as treaty frameworks of humanitarian rules are not progressing rapidly enough to 
adequately address contemporary problems. Moreover, a key problem is the applicability of 
CIL to those states that are not party to API and other treaties in which the status of 
proportionality as custom is commonly grounded.  
 The second change, the increase in importance of customary international law, driven 
primarily by the lack of State practice in cases classified as non-international armed conflicts, 
is promoting a large academic response. As the formulation in API has now been superseded 
by the criminal statute the question arises as to whether the provisions in API as pertaining 
to custom, are the same as those of Article 8 of the Rome Statute. API states that the sources 
of custom are found in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, while in the Rome Statute. the 
applicable provisions are found in Article 21(b) and (c). These are not the same as the two 
treaties lay down different legal standards for two regimes of responsibility. 
  Additionally, radical judicial comment is frequently found in Dissenting Opinions, as 
in Nuclear Weapons. Judge Herczeg; Dissenting Opinion; ‘… the entitlement to resort to 
self-defence is subject to certain constraints, and that there is a specific rule…well 
established in customary international law’ whereby ‘self-defence would warrant only 
measures which are proportionate to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it.’; Judge 
Schwebel; Dissenting Opinion ‘…“disproportionate to what?”  it is to the threat posed to the 
victim State. It is by reference to that threat that proportionality must be measured.” The 
Court had agreed with the General Assembly’s request for an Advisory Opinion, however, 
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the Court had replied by a bare majority that it could not answer the question. Assuming that 
the use of nuclear weapons is lawful, the nature of the weapons, combined by the limitations 
imposed by the requirements of necessity and proportionality which condition the exercise 
of the right of self-defence, will serve to confine their lawful use to that extreme 
circumstance.  
Thus, it is submitted that there is widespread acceptance by States of the principle of 
proportionality as embodied in Rule 14568 as the customary standard for international armed 
conflicts. It has taken more than 150 years for proportionality to evolve into its present form 
in API, and ultimately, into the Rome Statute. While the textual divergence between the two 
instruments potentially reflects a higher standard of proportionality for the purpose of 
individual criminal responsibility as opposed to State responsibility as reflected in API, the 
existence of both rules with relatively high numbers of ratifications evinces proportionality 
in international armed conflicts is accepted as custom, albeit to slightly different standards 
for two purposes.  
Against this judicial background, other agencies contribute to the continuing 
development of the evaluation of State practice to determine the status of customary 
international law, including the International Law Commission. In its draft conclusion 12, 
on custom, the ILC outlines three modes by which a treaty provision can reflect custom: 1) 
at the time when the treaty was concluded, codifies an existing rule of custom: 2) has led to 
the crystallization of an emerging rule of custom; or 3) has generated a new rule of custom, 
by giving rise to a general practice accepted as law. 
Further, in its 64th session in 2012, it undertook the ‘identification of customary 
international law’ as a project in its long-term programme of work, and in his third report, 
the Special Rapporteur outlined the problems of identifying customary international law 
based upon underlying treaties: as examples, that the status of customary international law 
is incorrect, or that customary international law has evolved since the treaty was concluded. 
It is thus necessary in each case to verify whether the provision in question was indeed 
intended to codify custom, and whether it reflects customary international law, that is, it is 
necessary to confirm that the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of states is confirmed 
by practice. Examining practice outside the treaty, i.e. that of non-parties or of parties 
towards non-parties, may be particularly important. 
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 These disparate issues form part of the jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Court, in which the fora for the discussion of customary law is considerably widened. From 
its central tenet of criminalizing the individual and not the State, to the reception of new 
words into the lexicon of the ICC (e.g.) “clearly” and “intent”, customary international law 
is under increased scrutiny, with the literature reflecting the resulting tensions and outcomes.  
The legal structure of the ICC is built upon the criminal law systems of domestic 
courts. Although geographically and culturally different, each contains elements denoting an 
aspect of human behaviour which will contribute to the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
one clear element being that of intent. Without provable intent, there can be no crime; 
nonetheless, intent is an ambiguous standard of knowledge. Intent figures largely in Article 
8 of the Rome Statute, together with the other element of “clearly”, which sets this Article 
apart from the prior example of the principle of proportionality set out in API. To date, there 
has been no case law in this area.  
As noted, the evidentiary standard for custom is at present set by the courts; 
international courts, domestic courts, and those of the ad hoc Criminal Tribunal type. 
Referring to the ICTY, which noted that although the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is defined by 
Statute, reliance on customary law ensures that the principle of legality is respected even 
where the alleged crimes occurred before the Statute entered into force. Central to the 
customary law debate remain the two elements of State practice and opinio juris, where the 
views of commentators oscillate between those who consider both elements are required to 
fulfil the element of custom, to those with the view that State practice alone is sufficient, and 
finally to those who support the possibility of “instant” customary law where, due to 
exceptional circumstances and the absence of relevant law, the issue of State practice needs 
to be dispensed with. In addition is the question of jus cogens, whose imperative power is 
informing the debates concerning compliance by both States and individuals. 
 API provided the foundation for new guidelines within the Military Manuals of 
individual States and the details of how different States responded during the drafting and 
ratification of these rules generate issues to the present day. One perennial problem emerging 
from the negotiations, and which persists to the present day, is the issue of the relationship 
between the new treaties (API and APII), and customary international law. Thus, it is 
submitted that there is widespread acceptance by States of the principle of proportionality as 
embodied in Rule 14 as the customary standard for international armed conflicts.  
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5.4 Final conclusions 
The compression of time through the use of high-speed precision weapons inhibits the 
effective implementation of the principle of proportionality has been sustained as the core of 
this thesis. At the final stages of this thesis, it is deduced that two possibilities exist for the 
future of the principle; first, its continued acceptance and practical application, and second, 
its potential extinction due to the fact that non-state actors, as in contemporary Syria, appear 
to be unaware of its existence or, if they are aware, choose to ignore its precepts.  
Evidence continues to prove the continuing importance of proportionality in both 
theory and practice. Referring directly to proportionality, a question could be asked referring 
to the on-going military situation in Syria; is it possible to apply the principle as traditionally 
founded in such chaotic situations, or does this pattern of unpredictable attack and 
withdrawal signify the opening stages of new and uncharted conflict. With the speed of 
changing political and military events, problems arising previously particularly in Iraq, 
return in Syria with the issues inherent in urban warfare, specifically the intermingling of 
military and civilians with the attendant risks of excessive civilian casualties and the question 
of own side casualties. 
Excessive civilian casualties remain a priority for Western forces. Efforts however, 
have been made to limit these by the US government. By setting a limit of 40 civilian 
casualties as an acceptable loss in each identified strike, this containment is intended to 
restrict the numbers of forensic reports which may be demanded by family relations and 
human rights agencies following what may be considered a contentious attack. Even so, the 
word excessive remains the target of consistent criticism by both practitioners and authors. 
         The evolution of precision weaponry has developed in tandem with the modernisation 
of proportionality. Beginning with Kosovo, with the merging of traditional kinetic 
armaments with modern precision weapons; with Iraq and the use of air and ground precision 
weapons in urban situations; and to Afghanistan with the burgeoning of drone warfare and 
interacting systems, the speed of development is historically unsurpassed. Whether or not 
the abilities of human planners and commanders can keep abreast of this prospect remains a 
singular challenge for the principle of proportionality and the law of armed conflict as a 
whole. Referring to the speed/time ratio, the vast amount of information required to populate 
the structure of this thesis reflects the necessity of some “representation” capable of 
summarising this mass into a simple diagram. It is proposed the temporal triangle fulfils this 
requirement, and each viewer will read into the background his own interpretation of the 
military operations. 
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      In Western states, the principle of proportionality remains accepted as a basic pillar of 
the LOAC. Nevertheless, with the advent of belligerent non-state actors, it is proposed that 
proportionality may have reached what may be called its end-state. Historically, it had 
developed from the concept of constant care in the principle of distinction; a theory 
developed into an ethical norm and kept alive by actors who adhere to its tenets.  
     Despite challenges to both theory and application, it continues to reflect the balancing 
of military strategy with the safety of civilians in conflicts, with even naysayers to API 
conceding that something similar is essential when conflict does break out. It is noticeable 
that this concept holds with Western militaries, however, with the rise of belligerent non-
State actors it faces its most critical and possibly fatal test. Practices by non-state actors in 
Syria, Yemen and Libya indicate that the principle has reached its end-state. In such 
situations, unable as a principle to regress, neither can it cannot go forward, as is its natural 
crusade. It is neither recognized nor applied. It has reached its end-state.569 
     As evidenced in the three case-studies, the compression of time through the use of high-
speed precision weapons is inhibiting the effective implementation of the principle of 
proportionality. Additionally, further challenges to the status of proportionality continues, 
with eruptions of new wars as in Syria, Yemen and Iraq. It is within this increasingly unstable 
global background that the principle of proportionality deserves further research into both 
its theory and application. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
569 See also; J Kieler ‘The End of Proportionality’ (2009) Parameters 53-64. 
150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ADF   Australian Defence Forces (ADF) in Afghanistan 
AFLR  Air Force Law Review 
AJIL   American Journal of International Law 
CIVCAS  Civilian Casualties 
CFLCC   Combined Forces Land Component  
CAS   Close Air Support 
C&C   Command and Control 
CDDH  Steering Committee for Human Rights 
Denv.J.Int.L.&Pol’y  Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
EJIL   European Journal of International Law 
HPCR  Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 
GCS   Ground Control Stations 
IAC   International Armed Conflict 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
ICRC   International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICTY   International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
IHAT   International Historical Allegations Team 
ISAF   International Assistance Force Afghanistan 
IHL   International Humanitarian Law 
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
JDAM  Joint Direct Attack Munition  
JFACC   Joint Force Air Commander 
151 
 
JFO   Joint Forces Quarterly 
JSCL   Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
JTAC   Joint Tactical Air Command    
J-Dams  Tail kits for dumb bombs 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OTP   Office of the Prosecutor  
OA   Operation Analysts 
RAF   Royal Air Force 
ROE   Rules of Engagement 
RPA   Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
SC    Security Council 
WCMD  Wind Correcting Munition Dispenser 
UK  MOD  United Kingdom Ministry of Defence   
UN   United Nations 
UNTS  United Nations Treaty Series 
US   United States  
USCENTCOM  United States Central Command 
USCENTAF  United States Central Afghanistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
CASES 
Fisheries cases ….. 
Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons 587 
Asylum case (Columbia v Peru) I.C.J. Rep. 1950 266 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) Merits: 
Judgement) [1986] ICJ Rep 14. 
(ICTY), The Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutary Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2nd October 1995.   
Prosecutor v Hadžinasanović Case Number IT-01-47-AR72. Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging 
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility. 16 July 2003. (para 12) 
Prosecutor v Delalić Case Number IT-96-21-T. Judgement (16 November 1998). para 302 and 256 
Prosecutor v Kupreškić Case Number IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000). para 527 
  BOOKS 
ALBERTS DS, GARTSKA JJ, STEIN FP Network Centric Warfare; Developing and Leveraging Information 
Superiority (2nd edition Revised) CCRP Publications Series 
ARGENTINA – Law of War Manual (1969) § 1.008(1). In ICRC – www.icrc.org/customary- 
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule14 
BOOTHBY WH Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict (OUP Oxford 2009) 
CHENG B Studies in International Space Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1997) 
Chambers Study Dictionary (Chambers Edinburgh 2002) 
CLAPHAM A and GAETA P eds The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP Oxford 
2015) 
COCKBURN A Kill Chain-Drones and the Rise of High-Tech Assassins (Verso London 2015) 
DAVIES S Boeing B-52 (Haynes Publishing Yeovil 2013) 
DINSTEIN Y the Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of Armed Conflict (CUP Cambridge 2004) 
FLECK D ed The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (3rd edn OUP Oxford 2013) 
153 
 
GARDAM JG Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force (CUP Cambridge 2004) 
JG Gardam Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers Dordrecht 1993) 
GREEN J Persistent Objectors in International Law (OUP Oxford 2016) 
GREEN LC  The contemporary law of armed conflict (3rd ed Juris Publishing Manchester University Press 
2008) 
HARRIS D Cases and Material under International Law (7th ed Sweet & Maxwell London 2010) 
HAAVE EE and HAUN PM eds A-10s over Kosovo (Air University Press Maxwell AFB 2003) 
HELM A ‘The law of war in the 21st century: weaponry and the use of force’ International Law Studies - US 
Naval War College - Volume 82. (Naval War College Newport 2006) 
HENCKAERTS JM and DOSWALD-BECK L Customary International Law, vl. 1: Rules (CUP Cambridge 
2005) 
HENCKAERTS JM and DOSWALD-BECK L Customary International Law, vl.1 and II: Practice (CUP 
Cambridge 2005) 
HENSEL HM (ed) The Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Military Force 
(Ashgate Aldershot 2005 
HIGGINS R Problems & Process: International Law and How We Use it (OUP Oxford 1994) 
HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (CUP Cambridge 2013) 
  KALSOVEN F Reflections on the Law of War (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2007)   
KALSOVEN F and ZEGVELD L Constraints on The Waging Of War (CUP Cambridge 2011)   
LAMBETH BS E-Book:  NATO’s Air War for Kosovo – A Strategic and Operational Assessment 1-140 
www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1365-html   
NEWTON M and MAY L Proportionality in International Law (OUP Oxford 2014) 
NETHERLANDS Military Manual (1993) V-11 
ROBINSON A Aircraft of World War Three (Bison Books Greenwich USA 1983) 
ROGERS APV Law on the battlefield  (2nd ed  Juris Publishing Manchester University Press 1996) 
  ROTHSTEIN A Drone (Bloomsbury Academic London 2015) 
SANDOZ Y Commentary on The Additional Protocols Of 8 June 1977 To The Geneva Conventions Of 12 
August 1949 (International Committee of the Red Cross Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Geneva 1987) 
SAXON D International Humanitarian Law and the changing technology of war (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers Dordrecht 2013)   
SCHABAS WA  An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th ed CUP Cambridge 2011) 
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES ed CT Onions (3rd ed The 
Clarendon Press Oxford 1962)    
SOLIS GD The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (CUP Cambridge 2010)   
STARKE JG Introduction to International Law (10th ed Butterworths London 1988) 
WATSON A Legal Origins and Legal Change (The Hambledon Press London 1991) 
WILMSHURST E and BREAU S eds Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (CUP Cambridge 2007) 
 
154 
 
JOURNAL ARTICLES 
ATTP 3-37.31 ‘Civilian Casualty Mitigation’ July 2012 Headquarters, Department of the Army 
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html  
ADAMS TK  ‘Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decisionmaking’ (2011-12)  Parameters 1-15. (This     
article was first published in the Winter 2001-02 issue of Parameters) 
  ADLER G  ‘Targets in War: Legal Considerations’  (1970-1971)  Hous. L. Rev  
ALDRICH GH ‘Customary international humanitarian law - an interpretation on behalf of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross’ (2006) BYBIL  
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCES (ADF) in Afghanistan 
http://www.nautilus.org/publication/books/australian- forcesabroad/af 
  AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCES (ADF) IN AFGHANISTAN 
  http://www.thebalance.com/iC5xi-command-   control.3344256 
BACKSTROM A and HENDERSON I ‘New Capabilities in Warfare: an overview of contemporary 
technological developments and the associated legal and engineering issues in Article 36 weapons reviews’. 
(Summer 2012) 94 IRRC 886    
BARNIDGE R ‘The Principle of Proportionality under International Humanitarian Law and Operation Cast 
Lead’ www.mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graphics/MFA%20Gallery/Legal  
BEARD J ‘Law and war in the virtual era’ (2009) AJIL 
BELLINGER, JB III and HAYNES WJ II ‘A US government response to the International Committee of the 
Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 IRRC 866   
BETHLEHEM D in ‘The Methodological framework of the Study’ in E Wilmshurst and S Breau 
BOHISON JS and others ‘Cloud Cover Over Kosovo’ (Summer 2000) Crosslink   
www.aero.org/publications/crosslink/summer2000/05.html  
BOLT A ‘The Use of Autonomous Weapons and the Role of the Legal Advisor’ in SAXON D International 
Humanitarian Law and the changing technology of war (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Dordrecht 2013)   
BOIVIN A ‘The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting Military Objectives in the Context of Contemporary 
Warfare’ 2 (2006) Research Paper Series, University Centre for International Humanitarian Law 
BOON K ‘Are Security Council Acts relevant to the Formation of Customary International Law?’  
www.opiniojuris.org/2014/06/26/security-council-acts-relevant-formation-customary-international-law/     
last accessed   05.08.2015 
BOOTHBY WH ‘Some legal challenges posed by remote attack’ (2012) IRRC Vol 94 No 886  
 _ _  ‘How Far will the Law allow Unmanned Targeting to Go?’  in SAXON D International 
Humanitarian Law and the changing technology of war (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Dordrecht 2013)     
BRAUN M and BRUNSTETTER DR ‘Rethinking the Criterion for Assessing Cia-targeted Killings: Drones, 
Proportionality and Jus Ad Vim’ (2014) 12:4 Journal of Military Ethics   
BROWN B ‘The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law of Warfare: Recent Efforts at Codification’ 
(1976-1977) Cornell Int’l LJ   
CLARK CR and COOK TJ ‘A Practical Approach to Effects-Based Operational Assessment’ Air & Space 
Power Journal (Summer 2008) 1-11. www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08sum08clark.html 
COHEN A ‘Proportionality in Modern Asymmetrical Wars’ (no date available) Jerusalem Center for Public    
Affairs www.jcpa.org    
155 
 
COHEN A and SHANY Y ‘A Development of Modest Proportions: The Application of the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Targeted Killings Case’ Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007) 
J CORDEROY AND R PERKINS ‘A Tale of Two Cities’ (December 2014) AOAV Action on Armed 
Violence 1-28 
COX DG ‘Human Terrain Systems and the Moral Prosecution of Warfare’ (2011) Parameters 
COYNE EC ‘Influence with Confidence: Enabling Lawful Command Influence by Understanding Unlawful   
Command Influence—A Guide for Commanders, Judge Advocates, and Subordinates’ (2012) 68 A.F.L.Rev. 
CRYER R ‘Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel: The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals 
on the ICRC Customary Law Study’ (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 2 
CUCCIA PR  ‘Op-Ed: The Technology Avalanche and the Future of War’  (January 9th 2012)   
http://strategicstudiesinstitutearmy.mil/index.cfm/articles/Technology-Avalanche-and-the-Future-of-
War/2012/9/15   
CULLEN A ‘The Definition of Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold of Application Contained in Article 8(2)(f).’ (2008) 12 Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law 3  
DAVID E Chapter 14 ‘International and non-International Armed Conflicts’ in A Clapham and P Gaeta eds 
The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP Oxford 2015) 
DEMPSEY R and CHAVOUS JM ‘Commanders Intent and Concept of Operations’ (2013) Military Review  
DEPLANO R ‘The Use of International Law by the United Nations Security Council: An Empirical Framework 
for Analysis’ (2015) Emory International Law Review 2085-2112 
DERIETH J ‘Enhancing the Combined Training Initiative, (2015) at        
http://www.nato.int/document/Review/2015/enhancing-ir 
DICKINSON LA ‘Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law 
Compliance’ (2010) AJIL  
DILL J Policy Briefing ‘Applying the Principle of Proportionality in Combat Operations’ (Dec 2010) Oxford 
Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict 
DREW C ‘Drones are playing a Growing Role in Afghanistan’ (February 20th 2010) New York Times 1, 1 
  DUNLAP CJ Jr ‘Come the Revolution: A Legal Perspective on Air Operations in Iraq since 2003’ 81 Int’l  
  Stud. Ser. US Naval War Col. 337 2006 
—   — ‘Clever or Clueless? Observations about Bombing Norm Debates’ in The American Way of Bombing: 
Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from Flying-Fortresses to Drones ed. M Evangelista and H Shue (Cornell 
University Press 2014) Chapter 5 
—   —  ‘Law and Military Interventions 77 
ESTREICHER S ‘Privileging Assymetric Warfare:(Part II): The Proportionality Principle Under International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2011) New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 275 
www.http//:lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/      
  ETZIONI A ‘The Great Drone Debate’ (March-April 2013) Military Review 2-13 
FENRICK WJ  ‘Targeting and Proportionality during the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia’  
(2001)  EJIL 
156 
 
FORSYTHE DP ‘Legal management of internal war: the 1977 protocol on non-international armed conflicts’ 
(1978) AJIL   
P GAETA ‘War Crimes and other International “Core Crimes”’ in CLAPHAM A and GAETA P eds The 
Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP Oxford 2015) 
GARDAM JG ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’ (1993) 87 AJIL  
GARRROWAY C in SAXON D International Humanitarian Law and the changing technology of war 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Dordrecht 2013)   
GENT T ‘The Role of Judge Advocates in a Joint Air Operations Centre’ (Spring 1999) Airpower Journal 
GHIKAS DA ‘Taking Ownership of Mission Command’ (2013) Military Review   
GRANT R  ‘The Fallujah Model’ (2005) Air Force Magazine  
GRIGSBY WW et al ‘Integrated Planning; The Operations Process, Design, and the Military Decision Making 
Process’ (January – February 2011) Military Review 
GROSSMAN D ‘Drones are giving Apaches a Second Pair of Eyes’ (8 June 2016)     
http://www.popularmechanics.com/military-weapons/a21239/  
GROVES B ‘Civil-Military Cooperation in Civilian Casualty Investigations: Lessons Learned from the 
Azizabad Raid’ 65 A.F.L.Rev.1 (2010)   
GRUT C ‘The Challenge of Autonomous Lethal Robotics to International Humanitarian Law’ (2013) 18 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 1   
GULDAHL CG ‘The Role of Persistent Objection in International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) Nordic Journal 
of International Law   
HAAS M ‘The proliferation of advanced conventional weapons’ (December 2013)   CSS Analysis in Security   
Policy No. 145 Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich; WW Grigsby et al ‘Integrated Planning; The 
Operations Process, Design, and the Military Decision Making Process’ (January – February 2011) Military 
Review 28-35. 
HAGGER M and MCCORMACK T ‘Regulating the Use of Unmanned Combat Vehicles: Are General 
Principles of International Humanitarian Law Sufficient?’ 5 (2011-2012) 21(2)  
HAINES S ‘Humanity, Distinction, and Precautions in Attack’. in  CLAPHAM A and GAETA P eds The 
Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP Oxford 2015) 
HALLION RP ‘PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS AND THE NEW ERA OF WARFARE’ (1995) APSC 
Paper Number 53 Air Power Studies Centre Fairbairn Australia    
HAYS PARKS W ‘Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews’ 8 Yearbook of International Humanitarian 
  Law (2005) 55-142 
 
  HAYS PARKS W ‘W Hays Parks ‘Air War and Air Law’ (1990) The Air Force Law Revue  
 
HEAD W ‘The Battles of Al-Fallujah: Urban Warfare and the Growing Roles of Airpower’ (2016) 18 Virginia   
Review of Asian Studies 
 
HEBERT AJ ‘The Road to Victory’ Air Force Magazine ( September 2004) 
 
HEBERT AJ  ‘Operation Reachback’ Air Force Magazine (April 2004) 
 
HEINSCH R ‘Methodology of Law Making’ in D Saxon International Humanitarian Law and the changing 
technology of war (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Dordrecht 2013) 
 
157 
 
HILPOLD P ‘The Kosovo case and International Law: Looking for Applicable Theories’ (2009) 8 Chinese 
Journal of International Law 1 
KALSHOVEN F ‘From International Humanitarian Law to International Criminal Law’ (2003) 3 Chinese JIL   
KAMERHOFFER J ‘Uncertainty in the formal sources of international law: customary international law and  
some of its problems’ (2004) EJIL   
KEILER J ‘The End of Proportionality’ (2009) Parameters   
KELLENBURGER J ‘International humanitarian law and New Weapon Technologies’ (08-09-2011) ICRC 
KITFIELD JD ‘Another Look at the War that Was’ (1999) www.airforce-magazine.com  
HOPE I ‘Unity of Command in Afghanistan?: A Foresaken Principle of War.’ (November 2008) Strategic   
Studies Institute  
KOLB R and del MAR K ‘Treaties for Armed Conflict’ in A Clapham and P Gaeta The Oxford Handbook of 
International Law in Armed Conflict 
KREUDER AY ‘The Future Urban Battlefield’  www.AU/ACSC/KREUDERAY08     
KRUIPY ‘A Case against Relying Solely on Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Technology to 
Identify Proposed Targets’ (2015) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 415-449 
LAMBETH BS ‘The Synergy of Air and Space’ (Summer 1998)   Airpower Journal   
LAMP N ‘Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The “New War” Challenge in International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2011) 16 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 2   
LAVOYER JP ‘International Humanitarian Law: Should it be Reaffirmed, Clarified or Developed?’ (no date 
given) Israel Yearbook on Human Rights  
LAWAND K ‘Reviewing the legality of new weapons, means and methods of warfare’ 88 International Review 
of the Red Cross 88 (2006) 864 
LIEBERMAN M ‘Pragmatism and Principle in International Humanitarian Law’ Conference Paper - 
Complementing IHL: Exploring the Need for Additional Norms To Govern Contemporary Conflict Situations.’ 
Jerusalem, June 1-3 2008.   
LIPPMAN M ‘Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: Technology and Terror from 
WW1 to Afghanistan’ 33 Cape Western International Law Journal (Fall 2002 1     
  LUCAS GM ‘Postmodern War’  9 Journal of Military Ethics (2010) 4  
MARCHANT GE et al ‘International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots’ (2011) The Columbia   
Science and Technology Law Review   
MARR J et al ‘Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight’ (March-April 2008)  
Military Review 
McCORMICK TLH & MTHARU PB ‘Expected Civilian Damage & the Proportionality Equation’ (2006) Asia 
Pacific Centre for Military Law University of Melbourne Law School   
MAY L ‘Targeted Killings and Proportionality in Law: Two Models’ (2013) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 11  
MEHURON TA ‘To Bomb a Bridge’: The Chart Page. (July 2001) Air Force Magazine   
MEILINGER PS ‘New principles for new war’ (January 2009) Armed Forces Journal 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/01/3805746/      
MERON T ‘The continuing role of custom in the formation of international humanitarian law’ (1996) AJIL  
158 
 
MERON T ‘Customary International Law Today: From Academy to the Courtroom’ in  CLAPHAM A and 
GAETA P eds The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP Oxford 2015) 
MYERS A ‘The Legal and Moral Challenges Facing the 21st Century Air Commander’ (Spring 2007) Air 
Power Review Vol 10 No 1   
OHLIN JD ‘Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?’ (2013) Journal of International Criminal Justice 11 
RHEM KT ‘Technology, Doctrine Changes Allow for Better Bombing Runs’ (2003) American Forces Press 
Service 
ROGERS APV ‘Zero-casualty warfare’ (31-03-2000) International Review of the Red Cross 837   
RONA G ‘Interesting times for international humanitarian law: Challenges from the War on Terror’. 
(Summer/Fall 2003) Fletcher Forum for World Affairs 27;2   
RONZITTI N ‘Is the non liquet of the Final Report by the Committee Established to Review the NATO 
bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acceptable?’ 31-12-2000 International Review 
of the Red Cross No 480 1017 – 1028 
SANDOZ Y ‘Land Warfare’ Chapter Five in A Clapham and P Gaeta eds The Oxford Handbook of 
International Law in Armed Conflict (OUP Oxford 2015)  
SCHEIPERS S ‘Is the Law of Armed Conflict Outdated?’  (2013) 43 Parameters 4   
SCHINDLER D ‘International Humanitarian Law; Its remarkable development and its persistent violation’. 
(2003) 5 Journal of the History of International Law  
SCHMITT MN ‘Precision attack and international humanitarian law’ 87 IRRC 857 (September 2005)   
    —   —        ‘21st century conflict: can the law survive?’ (2007) Melbourne JIL    
    —   —          ‘Assymetrical warfare and international humanitarian law’ (Winter 2008) Air Force Law Review   
    —   —        ‘International Law and Military Operations in Space’ (2010) Max Planck UNYB 10    
SCOBBIE I ‘The approach to customary international law’ in WILMSHURST E and BREAU S eds 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (CUP Cambridge 2000) 
SINE J ‘Defining the “Precision Weapon” in effects-based terms’ (March 2006) Air & Space Power Journal 
TYPES OF CLOTHING: Afghanistan. http://www.uwf.edu/atcdev/afg-/soc/Lesson4Dress3Men.htm.  
TURNS D ‘WEAPONS IN THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 2 201, 236 
VITÉ S ‘Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations’    
(March 2009) 98 ICRC No 873 69-94  
VOGEL RJ ‘Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2013) DENV. J. INT. L. & POL’Y 39:1   
WAGNER M ‘Taking Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for International Humanitarian Law.’ (2012) 155 
Journal of Law, Information and Science 65 
WARREN M ‘The “Fog of Law”: The Law of Armed Conflict in Operation Iraqi Freedom’ International Law 
Studies – Volume 86: The War in Iraq: A Legal Analysis’ Raul A “Pete” Pedrozo (Editor) (2010); 
WRIGHT JD ‘“Excessive” ambiguity: analysing and refining the proportionality standard’ (Summer 2012) 
International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 94 Number 886   819 - 854 
 
CONVENTIONS 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field   Geneva 22 August 
1864 TS No 377   1 Bevans 7 
159 
 
 
St Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, Of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes 
Weight.  (Signed 11 December 1868 eif 11 December 1868) (1968-69) 138 Consol. TS 297 
 
Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare 1923   
 
Protections of Civilian Populations Against Bombing from the Air in Case of War   League of Nations (signed 
30 September 1938)  
 
United Nations Charter – 1945   
Statute of the International Court of Justice (eif 24 October 1945) 15 UNCIO 335 Art 38(1). 
 
 
Geneva Conventions – 1949      
Convention I – for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of the Armed Forces in the 
Field   3 UST 3114   TIAS No 3362   755 UNTS 31  
Convention II – for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked members of Armed 
Forces at Sea 3 UST 3217   TIAS No 3363   75 UNTS 85 
Convention III – Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War   8 UST 3316   TIAS No 33644   75 UNTS 135 
Convention IV – Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War   3 UST 3516 TIAS 3365 75 
UNTS 287 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
Space Treaty: Treaty on Principles   ofs 27 Jan 1967   eif 10 Oct 1967    610 UNTS 205   TIAS no 6347  
 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) ofs 8 June 1977   eif December 1978    1125 UNTS 3 
 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977   
 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:  UNGA Res 2625 (XXV)   UN GAOR, 25th Sess, Supp. 
No 28, at 121.   UN Doc. A/8028 (1971), adopted by consensus on October 24, 1970 
 
UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects:  adopted 10 October 1980, eif 2 
December 1983    1342 UNTS 137   
 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987) 1465 
UNTS 85.  Art 4(1). 
160 
 
 
Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(iv)  §5. 
 
UN DOCUMENTS 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 
UNSC Res 1386 (20 December 2001). 
  UNSC Res 1160 (31 March 1998)  
  UNSC Res 1119 (23 September 1998)  
UNSC Res 2444 (19 December 1968) 
UNGA Res 2444 (XXIII) (19 December 1968) 
UNGA Res 1653 (24 November 1961) 
 
  REPORTS 
Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm     
 
‘NATO and the 2003 campaign against Iraq’ www.nato.int/cps/en/nato live/topics_51977.htm  
 
‘NATO Nations Approve Civilian Casualty Guidelines’  
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_65114.htm     
 
Center for civilians in conflict:  civilian harm tracking: Analysis of ISAF Efforts in Afghanistan May 2014   
www.civiliansinconflict.org  
 
Human Rights Watch Report.   Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (2000)  
www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200.htm 
   
Report ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 90 IRRC 872 
 
International Review of the Red Cross (no named Author) ‘The law of war and the armed forces’ (28. 02. 1978)  
ICRC Study on the current state of international humanitarian law. Address by Dr J Kellenberger 
‘Strengthening legal protection for victims of armed conflicts’  21. 09. 2010) 
 
(ICRC) International Committee of the Red Cross ‘Weapons: ICRC Statement to the United Nations, 2012 
 
IRAQ BODY COUNT: A DOSSIER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES  2003-2005  www.iraqbodycount.org  
  
161 
 
IRAQ BODY COUNT: Sloboda J and Dardagan H – Tuesday May 6th 2003. ‘Incidents in which civilians were 
reported killed by cluster bombs or bomblets’. http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/killed-by-
cluster-bombs/    last accessed 02.08.2011 
 
Kosovo Chronology:  Timeline of Events 1989 – 1999.  Issued by the Department of State, Washington DC.  
(May 21 1999) 
 
‘NATO and Iraq discuss further cooperation’ 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_75730.htm?selectedLocale=en    
‘NATO and the 2003 campaign against Iraq’ www.nato.int/cps/en/nato live/topics_51977.htm   
‘NATO Nations Approve Civilian Casualty Guidelines’ 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_65114htm        
‘NATO’s role in Afghanistan’ www.nato.int/cps/natolive/topics_8189htm     
    
Project on Defense Alternatives ‘Armed Conflict and Civilian Casualties, Afghanistan: Trends and 
Developments 01 January – 31 August 2008’ War Report – Afghan Archives  www.comw.org/pda/   last 
accessed 16/03/2011 
 
Moseley T. M ‘Operation IRAQI FREEDOM - By the Numbers’ Assessment and Analysis Division. 
Commander’s Action Group, 9AF, Shaw AFB, S.C.  
   
PDA ‘Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties’ Briefing Report #13 
Carl Conetta 18 January 2002 (revised 24 January 2002)  www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html   
 
PDA ‘Strange Victory: A critical appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War’ 30 
January 2002 
 
STIMSON ‘Recommendations and report of the task force on US drone policy’.  June 2014   www.stimson.org  
last accessed 18.03. 15 
 
Sir M Wood ‘Third Report on the Identification of Customary International Law’. UN Doc. A/CN4/682 (27 
March 2015) 
 
CONFERENCES 
‘International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts’ 31st 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT. Geneva, Switzerland 28 
November - 1 December 2011 
 
162 
 
Oxford Group Workshop Report ‘Proportionality in War’ 21 May 2009. Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and 
Armed Conflict, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Manor Road, 
Oxford. OX1 3UQ. http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/  
 
 
 
